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Abstract 
 
Embodied cognition is a relatively recent approach in the 
philosophy of mind. Similarly, the volume of research into dog 
cognition has increased in the last decade and is set to keep on 
growing as we learn more about the animals with which we have 
associated for so long. This thesis argues that the principles of 
embodied cognition can be productively applied to the study of  dogs.  
Adoption  of  these  principles  can  improve  experimental design and 
inform the conclusions that we draw from empirical data regarding 
dogs’ cognitive capacities and behaviour. This dissertation advocates 
for ethologically appropriate studies, designed for dogs rather than 
humans, a greater emphasis on the dynamic interplay between the 
dog, environment and humans, and fresh interpretations of the 
behaviour and cognitive skills that dogs demonstrate. Moreover, the 
models of embodied representation expounded in this thesis aid our 
understanding of dog behaviour and cognition and can enhance our 
approach to dog training. The thesis closes with a case for embodied 
representations as facilitators of rational actions in the domesticated 
dog.
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Introduction 
Dogs accompany humans through our diverse walks of life.  In 
the United States there are roughly 73 million pet dogs, 6 million in 
Canada and 43 million pet dogs in Eastern Europe (Coren, 2012). 
Sometimes dogs occupy a place in the family unit similar to that of a 
human child. Children often grow up with dogs and may relate to 
them as a kind of sibling: a constant, loved and cherished playmate, 
and someone with whom they can learn how to be gentle and 
considerate. Adults choose to live with dogs for a variety of reasons: 
to protect the home, for company, for work, to enable them, in the 
case of dogs trained for those with disabilities, to carry out their 
lives. Dogs are also part of the workplace. They work on farms, at 
airports, in police units, as part of search and rescue teams; the list 
goes on. Our association with the domesticated dog is prolific and 
remarkable. 
This thesis reviews what we know about dog cognition from 
recent studies and considers it in the light of the principles of 
embodied cognition. I use the domesticated dog as a case study; 
because of their unique place in human society and long-standing 
history of association with humans they make a fascinating species 
for the application of embodied cognition. 
Dogs have been associated with human beings longer than 
any other animal. In fact, dogs developed close associations with 
people roughly 3 thousand - 5 thousand years before any other 
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animal (Kubinyi, Viryáni and Miklósi, 2007). In the past, the dog’s 
entrance into human society was thought to be through its role as a 
pet. Since then it has been hypothesised that dogs’ usefulness in 
hunting sparked the beginning of dog domestication (Clutton-
Brock, 1984). However, there really is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest whether domestication sprang from keeping dogs as pets 
or from using them for hunting. There are so many different ways in 
which different cultures use their dogs that it is very hard to identify 
one of them as the primary role of the dog in early dog-human 
societies. For example, early dogs could have been a handy clean-
up crew for our human ancestors. They would perhaps have eaten 
discarded or rotten meat and if times were lean they would also 
have been a food source for humans.  However the dog came to 
be associated with humans, there is no doubt that this association 
has made the dog what it is today. 
The genetic origins of domesticated dogs is still under 
investigation. Some consider it possible that dogs descended 
from wolves plus a variety of other canid species such as jackals, 
dingoes and coyotes (see Conen, 1995, for example). Conen 
(1995) argues that this accounts for the genetic similarities found 
between dogs and other species of the canid family. But most 
agree that the domestic dog is descended from the wolf. Studies 
of DNA, behaviour, vocalisations and molecular biology all point 
exclusively to the wolf as the domestic dog’s most likely ancestor 
(Serpell, 1995). However, there is still a lot of disagreement over 
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which sub-species of wolf the dog descended from, or whether 
different types of dog (e.g. hunting, sledding, guarding) 
descended from different sub-species of wolf. 
Evidence suggests that during the late Pleistocene era (100 
thousand – 1.8 million years ago), humans and wolves co-existed 
in a wide variety of different places. There would have been plenty 
of opportunity for the emergence of dogs as domesticated animals 
in separate regions and for continued genetic mixing to occur 
between dogs and wolves (Lorenz, 1965 and Vilá, Savolainen, 
Maldonado, Amorim, Rice, Homeycutt, Crandall, Lundeburg and 
Wayne 1999). The descent of dogs from a variety of different wolf 
species in diverse locations would also account for the fact that 
dogs come in different shapes, sizes and colours (Savolainen, 
Zhang, Luo, Lundeberg, Leitner, 2002). However, it is very difficult 
to find evidence for this hypothesis based on DNA studies. None of 
the wolf lineages which have previously been thought to provide 
domesticated dog ancestry are conclusive. It is likely instead that 
wolves and dogs diverged between 11 thousand and 16 thousand 
years ago in a process involving extensive interbreeding (Freeman, 
Gronau, Schweizer, Ortega-Del Vecchyo, Han, Silva, Galverni, 
Fan, Marx, Lorente-Galdos, Beale, Ramirez et al., 2014).  
Where the domestic dog originated and over what time period 
is uncertain. Savolainen and his colleagues (2002) examined 
mitochondrial DNA sequence variations among 654 dogs. They 
claimed that their subjects represented all major dog populations 
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worldwide and concluded on the basis of their research that the first 
domestic dogs existed between 15 thousand and 40 thousand 
years ago in East Asia. Prior to this study, it was thought by most 
that the dog was first domesticated around 15 thousand years ago. 
However, Vilá, et al. (1997) suggested that it may have been as 
early as 50 thousand -100 thousand years ago. This time window 
coincides with the beginning of colonisation in South Asia by Homo 
Sapiens: Some of the oldest sites at which the bones of wolves 
have been found in association with those of our own ancestors are 
in South Asia. 
The beginnings of domestication of the wolf may even have 
been much earlier than Vilá et al. (1997) suggest. For example, 
some 300 thousand years ago, at the site of Zhoukoudian in North 
China the bones of wolves have been found nearby early hominid 
bones (Lindsay, 2008). Also, in the Cave of Lazaret near Nice in the 
South of France, the bones of wolves have been found near to 
hominid remains dated at 150 thousand years ago (de Lumley, 
1969 as cited in Clutton-Brock, 1995). Earliest of all, however, in the 
Boxgrove site in Kent, England where wolf and early hominid 
remains were dated at 400 thousand years ago (Clutton-Brock, 
1995). However, it is possible that some of the earliest wolves’ 
bones were kept as hunting trophies; wolves have been hunted for 
a long time. Therefore early evidence of wolf and human bones at 
the same location cannot be relied upon as evidence of the start of 
domestication. 
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In summary, the earliest domesticated dogs did not look much 
like the average modern dog. The approximate time at which the 
dog began looking like domesticated dogs of today, based upon 
mitochondrial testing (Savolainen et al., 2002) and the dating of 
remains is between 15 thousand and 20 thousand years ago 
(Miklósi, 2008, p.114). Early evidence of wolf remains at ancient 
human burial sites, such as those mentioned above, while 
interesting do not conclusively suggest that humans began 
domesticating wolves much earlier than 15 thousand to 20 thousand 
years ago. However, we can suppose that there began to be an 
overlap between the hunting or scavenging grounds of wolves and 
human occupation sites right back when the wolf remains were 
being left alongside those of humans. Perhaps, while wolves 
scavenged on human waste or came to hunt in the same areas as 
early humans, the odd wolf pup became habituated to humans and 
tamed whereas the less submissive or more mature wolves were 
killed for food, driven away or simply tolerated. 
As the domestic dog evolved, specific character traits were 
selected for that promoted association with humans. Also, there 
were physical changes. The snout became shorter than a wolf’s 
and the teeth became more compact. Other physical changes that 
we see in various breeds of dog such as longer fur about the eyes 
and flopped down ears also occurred. Notably, many of these 
physical changes resulted in diminished perceptual sensitivity. 
Perhaps as their reliance on humans for food and protection 
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increased, perceptual acuity became less influential over the 
dog’s reproductive success than traits that humans find endearing 
or useful. Breeds such as the Bearded Collie whose eyes are 
covered by a fringe of thick fur are a good example of diminished 
perceptual ability and the droopy ears commonly seen in many 
different breeds of dog are less sensitive to sound than the upright 
ears of the wolf. 
Once the early dogs had entered human society, humans were 
at a dramatic advantage for hunting. The dog, they discovered, 
could be trained to track or hold the prey at bay while the hunter 
aimed and threw his weapon. Furthermore, dogs are faster runners 
than humans and could chase down prey to drive back toward 
human hunters. In the history of our relationship with the 
domesticated dog, humans have selectively bred dogs with social 
skills that suit the needs of people. For example, a tractable 
disposition, trainability, perceptual sensitivity to social cues, and a 
tendency toward co-operation are all traits that would have 
enhanced the success of dog-human relationships. Furthermore, 
different traits are highly sought after depending on the use to which 
the particular human society wanted to put their dogs. 
As humans began to use dogs for different types of work, 
different traits began to appear. For instance, dogs that were 
selectively bred by humans for hunting or herding developed a 
stronger tendency toward cooperation with humans and other dogs 
(McConnell and Bayliss, 1985).In addition, a heightened herding 
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instinct is selected for in dogs being bred to move stock around. 
Well-developed social cognitive skills would be most useful in dogs 
put to relatively new roles such as guide dogs for the blind (Naderi 
et al., 2001). Naderi et al. performed one of the first tests on the 
types of interaction between a blind person and his/her guide dog. 
They found that one of the most significant abilities a dog must 
have if it is to be a successful guide dog is the ability to switch 
between the roles of leader and follower depending on the 
situation. This ability builds on the innate co-operative ability of the 
domestic dog and interestingly, it mirrors cooperation between 
humans in complex cooperative activity (Naderi et al., 2001). 
Enculturation, the process by which a dog (or human) can pick up 
on the rules of a society or group by observation and learning, may 
also be responsible for the development of certain cognitive 
abilities in the domestic dog (Cooper, Ashton, Bishop, West, Mills, 
Young, 2003). Coppinger and Coppinger (2002) suggest that the 
process of domestication may have selected for certain skills such 
as the ability to read human cues, which living in a human 
environment helps to foster. 
Experiments are being conducted now in an effort to understand 
more about the cognitive skills of the domesticated dog.  One of the 
most fascinating things, in my opinion, about dog cognition is the 
possibility that due to their long-standing and close association with 
humans, the way that humans think, communicate and behave 
around dogs is likely to have influenced the communication, 
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behaviour and cognitive skills of the domestic dog. This thesis 
examines what we currently know about dogs in the light of a 
paradigm in cognitive science called embodied cognition. The 
embodied cognition viewpoint encourages a much stronger 
emphasis on the role of the body and the environment in cognitive 
processing. Its   application to dogs is fruitful because it can shed 
new light on how we view certain aspects of dog cognition and 
reveal gaps in our currently knowledge worthy of further research. 
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Structural Outline 
 
This project begins with a critical review of studies regarding the 
cognitive skills of the domesticated dog. The research I review is 
largely the work of scientists engaged in experimental psychology 
and I discuss conclusions which can be drawn from their studies. 
The initial critical literature review bears fruit in the form of a new 
way of considering conclusions drawn from experimental research 
into dog cognition. 
Following the opening literature review, I outline the theoretical 
pillars of embodied cognition and argue that embodied cognition 
provides an excellent basis for studying dog cognition. Taking each 
pillar of embodied cognition in turn, I explain how it can be 
productively applied to dog cognition and give examples to 
demonstrate. 
Various theories of representation have arisen from embodied 
cognition. Two theories of representation from this paradigm are 
next outlined and applied to dogs. The two theories are Clark and 
Grush’s (1999) emulation theory of representation and Rowlands’ 
(2006) theory of representation in action. Discussing these theories 
is worthwhile because they can shed light on mechanisms behind 
dog behaviour and help us to further understand and train the dogs 
we are associated with. Training considerations occupy the 
penultimate chapter of this project along with reasons for the future 
application of embodied cognition to the broader study of animal 
cognition and behaviour. 
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The final chapter argues that embodied cognition can help make 
sense of the notion of rationality in domesticated dogs. After 
explaining an account of rationality from embodied cognition, I argue 
that it can be usefully applied to domesticated dogs to understand 
how they might be thought of as rational creatures. 
In short, dogs are part of most human cultures. They enable 
us to live, work and serve others in a plethora of ways. Therefore, 
they deserve our understanding, and our continued efforts to 
further our understanding of them. I put forward the discussions 
and arguments to follow, in the hope that our understanding of the 
behaviour and cognition of dogs may be considered in a different 
light and advanced. In this thesis, I show how the cognitive 
science paradigm of embodied cognition is a productive and 
valuable lens through which dog cognition can be studied.  
 
Chapter Summaries 
 
Chapter One: Cognitive skills of the domesticated dog 
 
The opening chapter provides a literature review on a 
substantial portion of the recent research into dog cognition. Taking 
types of cognitive skills in turn, the critical review summarises the 
main findings of recent research and reflects on alternative 
conclusions and explanations with regards to the empirical data. 
Dogs demonstrate a remarkable ability to dogs are able to use 
human cues as an aid to problem solving and are also extremely 
sensitive to human attentional states. Dogs’ range of problem 
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solving is diverse; he can, for example, learn by imitation and 
deduction. However, there are two significant confounding variables 
which threaten empirical research into dog cognition: the herculean 
task of controlling for confounding variables and the dog’s tendency 
to use human social cues, especially those from a familiar human, 
sometimes over and above other conflicting environmental cues.  
Furthermore, some studies and areas of study may not be 
ethologically appropriate. The opening discussion highlights the 
thought that when we design experiments for dogs we have to keep 
the distinctive characteristics of dogs in mind. For several reasons 
that will be explained, I argue that using experiments designed for 
humans is problematic because insufficient attention may be given 
to differing sensory and other capacities of dogs to humans in 
designing experiments for dogs. The two most significant areas of 
research which may not be ethologically appropriate are research 
into counting and studies about object permanence. Instead, I 
suggest, a productive way forward for research into dog cognition 
would be to examine which cognitive skills are manifest in the dog’s 
daily life and usual interactions with his environment. 
Lastly, I will argue in this opening chapter that by adopting a 
new approach to non-human animal cognition, fresh light may be 
shed upon the conclusions we draw about dogs’ cognitive 
capacities. For example, the opening literature review finds evidence 
of what has been taken as a diminished capacity for problem solving 
in domesticated dogs, compared with wolves. That is, wolves tend to 
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engage more independently in problem solving tasks, whereas a 
dog will look to the human present for additional cues. By viewing 
conclusions such as these through the embodied cognition 
framework, I suggest that rather than demonstrating a weaker 
problem solving ability, dogs may be off-loading their cognitive work 
onto an aspect of their environment (the human present). The 
second chapter outlines the main strands of embodied cognition to 
demonstrate how embodied cognition as a new approach might be 
productively applied to research into non-human animal cognition 
using dogs as a case study. 
Chapter Two: Embodied cognition and Chapter Three: 
Embodied dog cognition 
 
The second chapter introduces embodied cognition and teases 
out the seven main theoretical pillars of the approach which can be 
used to guide research into non-human animal cognition. The seven 
main pillars are: 
 
1.  Cognition is situated 
2.  Cognition is time pressured 
3.  Cognitive work is off-loaded onto the environment 
4.  The environment provides the agent with affordances 
5.  Cognition is for action 
6.  Cognition has evolved 
7.  Cognition is body-based 
 
The second chapter does not constitute a defence of embodied 
cognition because its main aim is to pave the way for my attempt to 
show how this new approach may be productively applied to 
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experimental conclusions regarding domesticated dogs and provide 
reflections on existing research. Instead the motivations and 
principles of embodied cognition are described, along with the most 
significant contemporary theories. The work of the third chapter is to 
then apply embodied cognition and demonstrate the formulation of 
principles to guide further research into dog cognition. At the end of 
the third chapter, I introduce the role that representations may play 
in descriptions of dog behaviour and cognition and suggest that two 
theories of embodied representations from theembodied cognition 
paradigm can help in the explanation of dog cognition and 
behaviour. 
 
Chapter Four: Embodied representations 
 
The fourth chapter introduces two important theories of 
representation to come out of the embodied cognition literature. 
These are Clark and Grush’s emulation theory of representation and 
Rowlands’ theory of representation in action. I introduce these 
theories to demonstrate a new way of thinking about representation. 
This chapter constitutes an explanation of these theories, but does 
not argue that embodied representations are the only type of 
representations that may be at work in non-human animal cognitive 
processing. The main point here is that they make a good starting 
point for thinking about representations in dogs. 
There are many different sorts of representations posited in 
studies of non-human animal cognitive processing, but some models 
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are unclear and others are taken from human-centred theories and 
applied to non-humans. This, I argue, is problematic because, 
according to many prevalent theories, human representations are 
inner mental states. Much non-human animal cognition, however, is 
not like this. The picture that embodied cognition paints for us 
highlights the situated, action-based nature of animal cognition, and 
representations are no different. Thus, accepting the embodied 
cognition approach entails a new look at how we approach 
representation in non-human animals such as dogs. The two 
theories of representation under discussion provide this fresh 
approach and the fifth chapter brings the theories of representation 
to life by showing how and when they can enhance our 
understanding of dogs’ cognitive processing in situations they might 
face. 
 
Chapter Five: Embodied representation use in dogs and 
Chapter Six: Studying dogs using embodied cognition and 
embodied representations 
 
Through a series of scenarios the fifth chapter begins to show 
how theories of embodied representation might enhance our 
understanding of dog behaviour and cognition. The main goal of this 
chapter is to show that these theories have explanatory value and 
how this approach to representations might be productive. I return to 
some of the main findings of the literature review on dog cognition 
and suggest ways in which the data might be interpreted given a 
new understanding of representation in dogs. The main areas in 
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which I argue that embodied representations are at work in dog 
cognition include learning by imitation, anticipatory planning in novel 
situations and the use of human cues such as pointing and 
attentional states. The overarching aim of these two chapters is to 
show how a clearer view of what animal use of representations 
might entail sheds light on the way in which we might view their 
behavior in certain circumstances.  
 
Chapter Seven: Embodied cognition and dog rationality 
 
The seventh chapter provides an argument for a new approach 
to how we conceive of rationality in dogs. I claim that embodied 
representations underpin our conception of what makes an animal’s 
action rational including times when information about the 
environment is hard to come by, or when the situation is challenging 
and novel.  From a philosophical standpoint, rationality in 
domesticated dogs is important because it has ethical implications. 
For example, Kant once argued that animals had only instrumental 
value because they lacked the requisite rationality for intrinsic value. 
He wrote: 
 
Every rational being exists as an end in himself and not 
merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or 
that will 
... Beings whose existence depends not on our will but 
on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational 
beings, only a relative value as means and are 
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therefore called things.  On  the  other  hand,  rational  
beings  are  called persons inasmuch as their nature 
already marks them out as ends in themselves (Kant, 
1785, p.428). 
 
This argument and variations of it have consequences for the 
way that non-human animals such as dogs are treated. A future 
area of research is the philosophical investigation into the ethical 
implications of a robust account of rationality with its roots in 
embodied cognition, such as the one I provide in this final chapter.
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Chapter One: Cognitive skills of the domesticated dog 
 
The opening chapter begins with a discussion of the perceptual 
abilities of the domesticated dog. I begin with a discussion of canine 
perception to elucidate the ways in which the dog sees the world. 
The dog’s worldview is so vastly different to our own because his 
methods of sensing the world are so divergent to ours. This is an 
important point to bear in mind, as I shall argue, when we work with, 
study and train our dogs. From here, it moves to a comprehensive 
review of studies into dog cognition. The following discussion is 
structured to move from perception, and cognitive processes which 
are heavily dependent upon humans, to more abstract forms of 
cognitive processing.  
 
1.1. Perception 
 
Physical characteristics of a dog’s perceptual system affect the 
nature and character of his cognitive processes (Anderson, 2005a, 
p. 14).1 The following discussion provides an overview of the 
sensory apparatus and abilities of the domesticated dog. What a 
dog attends to in any given situation is probably not what we attend 
to. There are vast perceptual differences, motivational differences 
and learning differences; all of which affect what the dog will use 
and focus on when interacting normally with his environment, or 
when completing experimental tasks set for him. This section of the 
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chapter aims to outline the perceptual capacities of the 
domesticated dog. Then, with the dog’s perceptual framework in 
mind, I move to a review of the recent literature concerning dog 
cognition. 
 
1.1.1 Vision 
 
Canine retinas contain predominantly rods, and very few cones; 
only 
3% of all photoreceptors are cones (Peichl 1992). Because of this, 
their ability to perceive colour is poorer than ours. Studies have 
suggested that the domesticated dog is capable of perceiving two 
hues: blue and yellow. Colours that fall between these two hues 
such as greenish-yellow or yellowish-red would probably be 
perceived as white or light grey. This means that dogs are not good 
at distinguishing between green and yellow, yellow and orange, or 
orange and red (Miller and Murphy, 1995) and their vision is largely 
dichromatic. 
The optic chiasm has a crossover of about 75% in the dog, 
which means that the average dog has good binocular vision 
(Aguirre 1978; Odom, Bromberg and Dawson, 1983). 
Furthermore, experimental data suggest that dogs have an 
enhanced visual sensitivity for motion. They can discriminate 
moving objects at a distance of 800-900 metres but the 
range falls to 500 metres if the objects are stationary (Miklósi, 2008). 
In addition, it seems that dogs notice shorter durations between light 
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flashes than we can. They have a shorter flicker fusion threshold – 
effectively their visual system ‘updates’ more frequently than ours, so 
the refresh rate of the frames on a TV would be too slow for dogs 
and they would see a series of static images rather than a 
continuous moving image. The refresh rate is 50-60 Hz for human 
watching, but the optimal value for dogs would be 70-80Hz or more 
(Coile, Pollitz, and Smith, 1989). 
Dogs’ eyes also function better in dim light compared to human 
eyes which strain in dim light. In short, dogs’ eyes are better suited 
to detecting motion and for distinguishing between light and dark 
shades rather than perceiving colour and stationary details at long 
distances (Lindsay, 2001). In many studies into dog cognition, visual 
cues are controlled for extremely well. This is a direct result of the 
experiments being designed with a human-centric bias. When we 
conduct experiments which involve the dog searching for something, 
problem solving or categorising on the basis of visual information, 
we should indeed control for visual cues, although the emphasis 
should be on controlling for olfactory cues, and we ought to bear in 
mind the visual perceptual differences between humans and dogs.  
 
1.1.2 Taste 
 
Gustatory perception is little understood in the dog; more is 
known about canine auditory and olfactory perception. Studies 
have indicated that dogs and humans share a pattern of taste 
receptors on the tongue. This suggests that salty, sugary, and 
27 
 
sour tastes are localised toward the front two-thirds of the tongue, 
while bitter tastes are located toward the rear third of the tongue. 
However, even though specific tastes are stronger in these 
specific areas, these same tastes are detected over the entire 
surface of the tongue (Lindsay, 2001). 
Despite the dog’s tongue being similar to our own, it is still 
debatable whether dogs can taste salt: past experiments have 
provided evidence that they cannot (Boudreau, 1989 as cited in 
Lindsay, 2001). As Boudreau notes, it is unlikely that most 
carnivores can taste salt because their diet will provide them with 
their salt requirements without them having to seek it out. 
Herbivores on the other hand probably do taste salt since they will 
have to be able to detect sources of salt to supplement their diet. 
In summary, the domesticated dog’s taste perception is probably 
much like ours except for the possibility that he cannot detect salt. 
 
1.1.3 Hearing 
 
As for the dog’s auditory perception, dogs can hear sounds 
between 
 
67 and 45 thousand Hz, well above the range of wavelengths that 
humans can detect (64 – 23 thousand Hz). Thus, dogs can hear 
sounds at high frequencies that are imperceptible to us, 
frequencies that are ultrasonic in human terms. Coren (2004) 
writes that the ability to hear such a wide range of frequencies may 
be an adaptation to hunting small animals that emit high pitched 
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squeaks and cause high-frequency sounds when moving through 
leaves and grass. This is important to remember when we are 
setting up experiments such as invisible displacement tasks. We 
must make sure that they can’t use auditory cues that are inaudible 
to us and ensure that dogs’ success on such tasks is not due to the 
simple fact that they heard where the item was moved to. 
 
1.1.4 Smell 
 
Nietzsche’s famous remark ‘all my genius is in my nostrils’ 
(Nietzsche,2009, p. 333) applies best to dogs. A much greater 
portion of the dog’s brain is devoted to the sense of smell than in 
humans. Almost an eighth of the dog’s brain is devoted to olfaction 
while in comparison the human olfactory lobes are much smaller 
(Syrotuck, 1972, p. 11). 
Scent in puppyhood is the most important factor for survival in 
the dog. When a litter is whelped, the newborn pups have their eyes 
closed. Their first contact with their mother is via smell, the pup is 
guided to his mother’s nipple by scent. One might think that a pup is 
guided to the nipple by following the heat source, yet when hungry 
he will disregard his litter mates and head straight for the ‘milk bar’ 
even though his littermates generate the same warmth as his 
mother. In addition, the pup quickly learns the varying scent of the 
bitch in certain situations (Pearsall and Verbruggen, 1982). 
Dogs also suffer from ‘nose fatigue’. It is important to note that 
canine nose fatigue, when a dog’s nose becomes gradually less 
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able to perceive a scent after prolonged exposure, may not be 
caused by an internal process, as it is in humans, but by a set of 
external causes. Dry, warm air on a dusty field will exceed the 
ability of a dog’s nose to humidify the air. The nasal membranes 
become dry and odorous molecules no longer find the watery layer 
in which they must dissolve in order for the dog to detect them. To 
counter this effect, dogs may lick their noses but even this maynot 
be enough. The best remedy is a long drink of cool water. This 
should be taken into account during tracking experiments and other 
olfaction- based activities we ask of our dogs. 
After a period of training, it was found that the dog can sense a 
concentration of the chemical n-amyl acetate that is 1.0 x 103 to 10.0 
x 105 fold lower than humans can sense (Walker, Walker and 
Cavnar, 2006). Probably the largest difference in the olfactory 
capacities between dogs and humans is the square area of olfactory 
sensory cells inside the nose; humans have about 1.5 cubic inches 
whereas the average German Shepherd has about 6 cubic inches. 
Thus, a much greater surface is exposed to scented air in the dog’s 
nose (Pearsall and Verbruggen, 1982, p. 7). Furthermore, it is 
estimated that a human has five million olfactory sensory cells, while 
a typical German Shepherd has 220 million (Syrotuck,1972). Some 
breeds of dog have more olfactory sensory cells than others. For 
example, Dachshunds typically have 125 million olfactory sensory 
cells and Fox Terriers have somewhere around 147 million 
(Syrotuck, 1972). The cell count appears to increase with the size of 
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the dog but more research is needed to be sure; it is also unclear 
whether fewer sensory cells mean a poorer sense of smell. 
Dogs also have more than one sensory system devoted to smell. 
They sense most odours using receptors in the olfactory cavity, but 
also have a vomeronasal organ which opens into the nasal cavity 
(Syrotuck,1972). The vomeronasal organ has its own layer of 
receptor cells and is specialised for the detection of species-specific 
chemical signals (i.e. sex pheromones). Though the precise role of 
the vomeronasal organ is not clear, it is thought that information 
from the vomeronasal cavity passes straight through to the limbic 
system and influences maternal care, aggression, and the secretion 
of sex hormones (Salazar, Cifuentes and Sanchez-Quinteiro, 2013). 
Smell plays an enormous role in the dog’s perception of his 
environment and of all the dog’s senses it is the most finely tuned 
and used. Much communication between dogs occurs via smell. 
The urine of a dog contains information concerning the sex, age, 
overall state of health, diet and recent sexual behaviour of a dog 
(Csányi, 2000). Humans also secrete a scent trail. The use of 
perfumes, soaps, deodorants, shampoos and so on are now in 
widespread use. Add to this the secretion of skin oils from 
sebaceous glands and the by-products of this chemical breakdown 
of cells and secretions, plus additional scents we pick up as we 
move 
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through our day combine to form human scent which can be 
transferred onto objects that we touch only once and detected by 
dogs. 
Therefore, when designing experiments with the domesticated 
dog, the importance of controlling for confounding olfactory cues 
cannot be overstated. All these smells and more will be passed from 
object to object with one touch leaving a clear trail as scent 
molecules fall with the movement of a hand, foot or shake of the 
head. For example, when testing for object permanence in dogs we 
must be careful that olfactory cues are properly controlled for due to 
the threat of accidental olfactory cues providing confounding 
variables. The dog can probably detect via following a scent trail 
where the ‘invisible’ object has gone.1 This, in the light of the above 
information, seems a daunting task, but some researchers have 
attempted it. For example, Gagnon and Doré (1992) tried to control 
for olfactory cues in an object displacement task. They write: 
 
Olfactory cues were masked with a solution of rose water diluted 
in tap water (1:10) that was sprayed on the objects, the screens, 
and the carpet. This substance was chosen because it was highly 
odoriferous, edible, and nontoxic. Two fans, placed at each end 
                                                             
1  In object permanence studies ‘invisible’ tends to be synonymous with ‘imperceptible’. 
This holds true for humans most of the time, but is not the case with dogs. 
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of the semicircle formed by the screens, served to spread the rose 
water odor uniformly (Gagnon and Doré, 1992, p. 65). 
 
However, this does not seem adequate. The dog’s sense of 
smell is at least ten thousand times better than our own. In the 
domestic dog, the surface area of the olfactory epithelium is up to 50 
times larger than humans and as we have seen there are up to 50 
times the number of olfactory receptors (Kalderbach, 1998). (This 
varies, though, depending on the breed of dog.) Moreover, because 
of the sheer quantity of scents the dog is able to detect, one 
hypothesis is that they must be able to ‘layer’ the scents or keep 
them all separate and be able to focus their attention on individual 
scents selectively, in much the same way as we can visually 
concentrate on one object rather than all the others in our immediate 
environment. 
So while rose water may mask many scents for humans, it is 
unlikely to do so for dogs. Therefore, the fact that the dogs in 
Gagnon and Doré’s (1992) study still succeeded in invisible 
displacement tasks in the odour masking condition does not, 
contrary to their conclusion, show that dogsare solving invisible 
displacement tasks from an understanding of object permanence. 
An alternative explanation is that despite all the rose water they can 
still smell where the target item has been moved to. 
In the early 1900s, von Uexkull remarked that each species has 
its own perceptual world, or Umwelt (Drickamer, 1996).  It can be 
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difficult to step outside our own perceptual world and try to 
understand that of the domesticated dog given that his primary 
sense is one of our weakest. In vertebrates, the cerebral 
hemispheres developed from the roof of the olfactory lobe (Saslow, 
2002). Olfaction was the predominant sense of animals coming out 
onto land and was exploited for distance information. 
In addition, the mammalian limbic system was largely driven by 
olfactory input. Evidence of this is felt in humans when we so easily 
recall an emotion from the past by its association to a particular 
scent. However, in primates, particularly humans, the emphasis on 
olfaction has diminished and our olfactory structures are not as 
strong as those of our ancestors. 
Dogs use their sense of smell for prey detection, social 
functions via detection of pheromones, scent mark investigation 
to determine, for example, sexual status and receptivity, kinship 
recognition, and recognition of other relevant aspects of their 
environment. Olfactory stimuli provide information during both the 
day and night (hence the usefulness of police dogs for night time 
work) and unintentional olfactory messages may be transmitted 
to the dog we are working with. There are chemicals released in 
human sweat when we are scared and adrenaline is pumping 
and when a dog is tracking a human he is often following a trail 
based on adrenaline in his target’s sweat. Similarly, when we are 
controlling for social cues inadvertently provided by an 
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experimenter during experiments (such as involuntary changes in 
facial expression sometimes controlled for by blocking visual 
access to the human’s face during experiments) we must 
remember that social cues for the dog are just as much, if not 
more, olfaction-based than visual. In the invisible displacement 
task above, social cues were controlled for by placing a screen 
between the dog and experimenter. However, this does not 
control for any olfactory cues that the experimenter may release 
during the experiment. As a simple example, if the experimenter 
experiences a jolt of adrenaline when the dog moves toward the 
hiding place of the target item during visible and invisible 
displacement tasks, it is possible the dog can smell this and learn 
to use this scent as a cue to ‘solving’ object permanence tasks. 
 
 
1.1.5 Touch 
 
The sense of touch is facilitated by somatosensory receptors 
located within a dog’s skin. There are five categories of these 
receptors: The nociceptors, associated with pain, proprioceptors, 
sensitive to body movement and position, thermoreceptors, 
sensitive to hot and cold, chemoreceptors, sensitive to chemical 
stimulation and mechanoreceptors, sensitive to pressure due to 
physical changes of the body. Particularly important for a dog’s 
sense of touch are his whiskers. The dog’s whiskers, known as 
vibrissae, are unique follicle receptors. They provide the dog with 
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protection for his muzzle in navigating around objects and 
particularly protect him from injury to his eyes or collision with 
objects. These vibrissae are also capable of detecting vibrations 
caused by moving objects and simple changes in air currents 
(Lindsay, 2000). Again, we need to be careful to control for cues 
that the dog may inadvertently receive during experiments. For 
example, if the dog can sense simple changes in air currents or 
vibrations associated with movements that he is not supposed to be 
able to perceive, this will confound the results. 
 
1.1.6 Perception: Conclusion 
 
In many experiments with dogs, much is made of controlling 
for environmental and social cues by restricting the dogs’ visual 
access to experimenters, aspects of their environment and so 
on. But we should bear in mind that controlling for other 
perceptual cues are just as important. When dealing with dogs 
in experimental psychology we need to fully understand the 
acuity of dogs’ senses of smell, touch and hearing. As is clear 
by now, these senses play a much greater role in canine 
perception than they do in human perception. Dogs have 
adapted to discern visual cues with amazing skill, but any well 
designed experiment into the dog’s cognitive capacities will 
need to take their other remarkable senses into account and 
control for the confounding variables that may arise from dogs’ 
heightened sense of smell, touch and hearing. In addition, well-
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designed dog experiments should attend to the differences in 
visual perception between dogs and human. 
My aim throughout the following discussion, which will occupy 
the remainder of this chapter, is to give an overview and discussion 
of what has been studied in relation to dog cognition, conclusions 
that have been drawn and the basis of these conclusions.  For a 
clearer structure, the studies are divided into sections based on the 
type of cognitive capacity they address, although of course it is 
unlikely that in reality these cognitive capacities are completely 
discrete. I have ordered following discussion to move from more 
interactive forms of communication and cognitive processing 
between the dog and his environment to studies of more abstract 
cognitive processing  
 
1.2 Cognitive Skills 
 
1.2.1 Communication 
 
Dogs can adapt to the internal rules of whatever social 
organisation they are in. For example, a family dog with training can 
abide by rules put in place by its human family and generally seem 
happy to be part of the social group. Pet dogs can bond with family 
members and interact with them to mutual benefit and enjoyment. In 
short, the cohabitation of humans and dogs seems natural and with 
sensible training the enculturation of the dog into a human family is 
usually a smooth process. Of course, there are dogs that for one 
reason or another do not fit in to human society with the ease I have 
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described and different cultures have diverse attitudes toward dogs 
and how they are treated. In many cultures, dogs are not accepted 
into the family home, but in the UK around a quarter of all families 
include one or more pet dogs and in North America, even in the 
cities, around one fifth of all households have a dog (Conen, 1994). 
There are data to suggest a close similarity between how humans 
interact with their dogs and how they interact with young infants 
(Mitchell, 2001). From the dog’s side, the attachment behaviour of 
dogs is analogous to that of human toddlers and canine subjects 
were able to discriminate and respond differently to their caregiver 
than to other humans (Topál, Miklósi, Dóka, Csányi, 1998). Dogs 
also respond differently to separation from the person they are most 
closely attached to than to separation from other members of the 
family; thus reinforcing the conclusion that not only do most dog 
owners regard their dogs as members of the family, dogs also 
become selectively attached to members of their family. 
The foundation of our relationship with dogs, whatever the dog’s 
role, whether he is a companion, a farm dog, a hunter’s aid or a 
guide dog, is communication. In this context, communication is the 
responding to and giving of social cues in a variety of situations. The 
ability to learn to communicate with humans was the most 
advantageous trait for the early domestic dog to possess (Hare, 
Brown, Williamson, and Tomasello, 2002). Probably dogs acquired 
the ability to read human communicative clues as a response to 
their living in contact with humans during the course of their 
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evolution. This is thought to be supported by the finding that dogs 
show better comprehension skills in some versions of a two-way 
choice task than chimpanzees (Miklósi, 2008). The two-way choice 
task involves the subject using a human’s pointing cue to decide 
which of the two presented vessels contains the food reward. 
Clearly, though, there are many experimental differences between 
the testing of dogs and the testing of chimpanzees that would make 
comparative statements of this nature difficult. Whether or not we 
can conclude on the basis of Miklósi’s study that the dog’s 
communicative abilities are a result of dogs and humans’ historical 
relationship, there seems to be little doubt that the evolution of the 
domesticated dog’s ability to communicate with us has influenced 
and been influenced by human beings over the years. 
In ethological research, communication is often defined as ‘an 
animal’s behavioural act that alters the probable conduct of another 
animal in a manner that, on the average, is advantageous for the 
communicating animal’s survival and reproduction’ (Csányi, 2000, p. 
161). When asked, most dog owners will happily provide anecdotal 
evidence of their dog’s astounding ability to communicate. Dogs 
readily learn how to let their owners know when they need to go 
outside, for example.  Furthermore, the remarkable communicative 
and interactive abilities are exemplified when we consider the 
number and diversity of communicative interactions the guide dog of 
a blind person is trained to perform on a daily basis. Here is a list of 
some examples: 
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Obstacle Avoidance 
 
Navigate around stationary obstacles e.g. lamp posts, parking 
meters or pillars. 
Navigate around hazards e.g. open manholes and deep 
potholes. Navigate around low hanging obstacles e.g. awnings 
or tree branches to avoid a collision. 
Avoid moving objects e.g. bicycles, people, strollers, shopping 
carts, wheelchairs. 
Leash guide around obstacles indoors or outdoors for a short 
distance.Intelligent disobedience as in refusing a command to go 
forward into the road if there is oncoming traffic or intersecting 
traffic in the team's path. 
The dog is also trained to halt, abruptly, rather than collide with 
a vehicle that intersects the team's path when it enters the 
intersection during the team's crossing. 
Signal changes in elevation 
 
Halt or sit to indicate every curb. 
Halt to indicate descending stairs at the top of a flight of 
stairs. Halt to indicate steps up into a building or patio 
area. 
Halt to warn of edge of subway or train platform. 
 
Halt to warn of approach to edge of cliff, ditch or other outdoor 
drop- offs. 
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Halt when confronted by a barrier such as at construction site. 
Intelligent disobedience - refuse a command to go forward if 
there is drop-off. 
 
Find objects on command 
 
Find an exit from a room; indicate door 
knob. Find the elevator bank. 
Find specific entrances and/or exits. 
 
Find an empty seat, bench, or unoccupied 
area. Find a customary seat in a particular 
classroom. 
Follow a designated person such as a waiter to restaurant table, 
clerk to elevator, etc. 
Locate a specified destination such as store in mall, hotel room 
or home from a distance, once all other decision points such as 
intersecting streets, hallways, etc. have been passed. 
 
 
The list above is a list of trained communicative behaviours. The 
dog is intensively trained through positive and negative 
reinforcement to respond in precise ways in certain situations. There 
are several interesting things to note from the list of examples of 
communication and responses between a guide dog and his human 
that are accomplished as a result of the dog’s training. Firstly, all the 
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communication between the human and dog revolves around 
actions. Some of the signals from the dog inhibit actions such as 
‘Stop’; some promote actions such as ‘Cross the road’. And 
prominent in the list above is that dogs have learned to associate 
words primarily with actions and this is the way communication 
works between humans and dogs; our signals to dogs are action-
based. They are signals for the dog to perform a specific action, 
whether it is retrieving a dropped item or herding sheep into the next 
paddock. This seems to make sense from an evolutionary 
perspective. The most useful dogs to have around would probably 
have been the ones that quickly learnt associations between words 
and useful actions. I will return to this point and discuss it in more 
detail later on. 
 
One of the very first experiments on dog cognition was a test of 
the dog’s ability to discriminate human spoken words. Buytendijk 
and Fischel (1936) trained a dog to respond to a verbal command 
and then gradually changed the word by systematically changing 
the phonemes within it. They report that the beginning of words is 
more significant for dogs, on the grounds that the dog was more 
likely to fulfil the command if the change occurred at the end of the 
word than at the beginning. Certain physical properties of complex 
sounds can have a more direct influence on a dog’s behaviour. 
Studies have also shown that dogs can be trained faster to 
perform a passive action to a long note with a descending 
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fundamental frequency. In contrast, an active response was trained 
more easily when using a sequence of shorter notes with a rising 
frequency (McConnell, 1990). These findings indicate that the tone, 
frequency and sound of words are discriminated by a dog, perhaps 
more so than the phonemic sound of the word itself. The reliance on 
tone and sounds of a word makes sense given that dogs’ barks are 
varied in tone, frequency and length according to their 
communication function. That the higher, faster barks resonate with 
an active, more emphatic communication is a way in which barking 
represents what is being communicated. Effective human-dog 
communication will employ this. For effective communication our 
verbal commands to dogs should accord in tone, length and 
frequency with what is being requested. This is analogous to the 
human use of hand gestures when speaking to another human. 
When excited or agitated a human will usually gesture emphatically, 
using whole arm movements and open hands. A dejected human 
conveying something negative will gesture with arms closer to the 
body, if at all, and the hands will not move as much (Navarro, 2008). 
Even without understanding what the speaker is saying a great deal 
can be conveyed through gesture. And it is the same with our 
communication with dogs; by varying the tone, pitch, length and 
frequency of our commands we can convey much information to our 
canine listener. 
The ideas I have just presented work well with an embodied 
cognition approach, the theory that our cognitive capacities are 
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inherently connected to our physical bodies and the environment. 
The same approach can also apply to communication. An embodied 
cognition approach to communication entails emphasising the body 
and action-based nature of communication, between dogs and for 
dog-human communicative exchanges. I argue throughout that 
harnessing the notion of embodied cognition will be very useful in 
our interpretation and application of experimental data on dog 
cognition.  So far I have discussed verbal communication of actions 
through sounds which embody the action requested. Now let’s look 
at some interesting studies into dogs’ comprehension of human 
names for objects. 
Kaminski, Call and Fischer (2004) were interested in the dog’s 
ability to learn the relationship between a word and an object. 
Kaminski and her team discovered a pet Border Collie named Rico 
who demonstrated a remarkable ability to match words with objects. 
With his owners, Rico had supposedly learnt the labels for over 200 
hundred items. Most of which were toys and balls. He could 
correctly retrieve these items on request with astonishing accuracy. 
Rico learnt the names of these items by his owners bringing him a 
novel toy or ball, repeating its name two or three times and then 
letting Rico play with it. After this initial procedure, the name of the 
item became part of Rico’s vocabulary and he could fetch iton 
request. As an initial study, Kaminski et al. designed an experiment 
to test whether or not Rico’s ability could be due to the ‘Clever Hans’ 
effect. In the early 20th Century, an Orlov trotter horse became 
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famous for his ability to do arithmetic. For example, in response to a 
question such as ‘what is 4+4?’ he would paw at the ground with his 
hoof a number of times to indicate his answer. So the answer he 
would give to ‘what is 4+4?’ would be eight hoof beats on the 
ground. His ability to solve maths problems was later found to be 
due to his ability to read unintentional signals emitted by his handler 
via subtle facial and bodily cues (Davis, 2002). 
 
To rule out the “Clever Hans” effect, Kaminski and her 
colleagues placed the owner out of Rico’s sight and asked him to 
fetch randomly selected toys. Throughout their study, Rico’s 
owners remained out of his sight and he correctly retrieved 37 out 
of 40 items. 
Kaminski and her colleagues then designed a further test to try 
and determine whether Rico could ‘fast map’. Fast mapping is the 
process that occurs in children when they quickly form hypotheses 
about the meaning of a new word after a single exposure. The 
experimenters placed a novel item with seven familiar items in a 
room adjacent to the one Rico was in. In the first trials, Rico was 
asked to bring a familiar item. In second or third trials he was asked 
to fetch the novel item, labelled with a novel name. The results 
showed that Rico was apparently able to link the novel word with 
the novel item. This, Kaminski et al. suggest, is because either he 
knows that the familiar items already had names or because they 
were not novel. Four weeks later, Kaminski and her team assessed 
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Rico’s ability to fetch the novel item using the previously unfamiliar 
name. Rico correctly retrieved the target item in 3 out of 6 sessions. 
This level of success is comparable, they noted, to that of a three-
year old infant. 
Kaminski and her colleagues concluded that Rico reliably 
associates names with objects. And his ‘experience with acquiring 
the names of objects allowed him to establish the rule that things 
can have names. Consequently, he was able to deduce the referent 
of a new word on the basis of the principle of exclusion when 
presented with a novel item along with a set of familiar items’ 
(Kaminski et al., 2004, p.1683). This study highlights the fact that 
while most of our communication with dogs may revolve around 
action-based cues, dogs’ ability to associate human words with 
objects may be significant. 
We should still be guarded, however, about concluding that 
Rico is truly associating the word with the object alone. Rather, 
the words ‘squeaky toy’ may to the dog signal ‘fetch the squeaky 
toy,’ which is an action associated with a particular object, not 
the object itself. Our human use of language is referent based. 
Humans have many words for many objects and we recognise 
that a word such as ‘ball’ or ‘stick’ stand for certain objects. 
When we talk about dogs’ understanding of words, however, it 
simply may not be possible to say with certainty that, for the 
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dog, the word denotes the object rather than the action 
associated with it. 
Doubt over whether Rico really understood that a word stood 
for a referent was also raised by Bloom (2004). In response to this, 
Pilley and Reid (2012) designed an experiment to investigate the 
issue. In 2009, Pilley and Reid acquired an eight week old Border 
Collie called Chaser. 
 
 
 
After three years’ 
training the researchers 
concluded that they had 
successfully taught 
Chaser to identify over 
1000 toys by name 
(Pilley and Reid, 2012). 
Chaser then participated in a study to see whether she understood 
that a word stood for a referent and not an action. Researchers had 
previously taught Chaser actions such as ‘nose’, ‘take’ and ‘paw’. 
The action ‘nose’ was Chaser pushing an object along with her 
nose; ‘take’ involved her picking an object up with her mouth and 
‘paw’ was the pawing action directed at an object by a front paw. 
Chaser was presented with three toys on a cloth and the 
experimenter remained out of sight. The toys in this study were 
Figure 1. The three objects were placed on a yellow 
mat in front of Chaser. The experimenter sat behind 
the screen out of sight during the experiment (Pilley 
and Reid, 2012, p.189). 
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already familiar to Chaser and she could fetch them on command 
reliably. The experimenter (from behind a screen) would call a 
command such as ‘nose lamb’ to which Chaser would invariably 
nose at the soft toy resembling a lamb. The trials were recorded 
and independent judges of whether her responses matched the 
command were employed. Their decisions indicated that Chaser 
correctly responded 100%. In the light of these results, Pilley and 
Reid wrote: 
 
 
Thus, Chaser produced a unique response oriented to each 
object depending upon the meaning of the associated command. 
She responded as though the commands and the proper-noun 
names were independent entities or morphemes. Thus, in 
effect, Chaser treatedphrases like “fetch sock” as though the 
“sock” was a sock and not “fetch   sock”   -   indicating   that   
her   nouns   referred   to   objects. Thus, Bloom's (2004) concern 
that Rico may not have understood the difference between 
“sock” and “fetch the sock” is ruled out in this study. These 
results clearly support the conclusion that Chaser understood 
reference – that the verbal noun of an object referred to a 
particular object with distinct physical features independent of 
actions directed toward that object (Pilley and Reid, 2012, p. 190, 
their emphases). 
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However, despite the authors’ conclusion, it is still uncertain 
whether Chaser was separating the required action specified by 
the verbs ‘paw’ ‘nose’ or ‘take’ from the names of the toys in front 
of her. It may be that she was taking the command ‘nose lamb’ to 
still refer to a specific action, inseparable from the toy itself; a 
more complex request for action than ‘lamb’ by itself might 
provoke (Grassman, Kaminski and Tomasello, 2012). The heart of 
the issue here is whether it makes sense to ask this question of 
an animal’s use of verbal commands. As I will argue later on, our 
default hypothesis should be rather that animals use words as 
signals for action and more work needs to be done to show that 
the ability of an animal to perform different actions with the same 
object on command is indicative of its ability to understand the 
proper referent for the noun being used. Defendents of Pilley and 
Reid’s suggestion that Chaser does understand the referent of the 
word ‘Sock’ by her ability to perform a range of actions with that 
sock might argue that she can, for example, isolate the command 
‘Fetch Sock’ to mean something like ‘perform the action FETCH 
with this particular item. Thus isolating the object of the action 
from the action itself. However, as already mentioned, the same 
moment or command can be perceived a multitude of ways 
depending on the creature’s perspective. Later on in this thesis I 
introduce the notion that features of a dog’s environment are 
perceived as opportunities for action, or affordances. There are 
many reasons to adopt this framework as a way of beginning to 
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understand how animals might perceive their world. If we stand 
inside this framework and think of the sock as an affordance, an 
object of significance to Chaser only in relation to the actions she 
associates with it, it becomes less clear that her ability to perform 
a diverse range of actions with the sock is evidence of her 
understanding that the sock is an object isolated from the things 
she might do with it.The earlier-mentioned Rico participated in an 
interesting study more recently in which he and five other dogs 
were investigated for their ability to understand the correct item to 
fetch after looking at a photograph, a miniature or a life-sized 
replica of the object they were to fetch. Three of the dogs, Rico 
included, were trained to fetch many different items by verbal cue 
and the other two were inexperienced in the task. Kaminski et al. 
(2009) found that all the dogs were able to successfully use both 
the life-sized and the miniature replicas of the items as an 
information source regarding which item to fetch. The dogs’ 
success in these trials was immediate in the case of the 
experienced dogs and occurred after just a few trials in the 
inexperienced dogs.  Dogs were less successful with using photos 
as information about the required object leading Kaminski and her 
colleagues to hypothesise that dogs’ lack of success in using the 
photos reflects their inexperience with them. This is certainly 
possible and further investigation would be interesting in this area. 
An alternative explanation is that dogs have trouble perceiving the 
photo clearly enough. The interesting point to note from Kaminski 
50 
 
et al.’s 2009 study is that dogs are able to use a variety of human 
cues to facilitate their responses to the environment. Their use of 
human cues is not limited to verbal cues or gestures. Rather they 
seem adept at using many different types of human signals. In 
what follows I will discuss dogs’ remarkable ability to use human 
pointing gestures and some comparisons between the 
performance of dogs and wolves in these tasks. 
 
 
1.2.2 Barking and verbal cues from humans 
 
Research into acoustic communication in dogs has grown in 
the last few years  (Faragó, Pongrácz, Miklósi, Huber, Virányi and 
Range, 2010; Feddersen-Petersen 2000; Molnár, Pongrácz, 
Faragó, Dóka, Miklósi, 2009; Pongrácz, Molnár, Miklósi, 2010; 
Taylor, Reby and McComb, 2010) and barks and growls are an 
important part of canine communication. 
 
Wolves also bark, but only rarely. The wolf’s bark is usually a 
warning or protest with little acoustic variation (Fedderson-
Petterson, 2000). In contrast, studies on dogs have shown that they 
have a much wider range of barks than wolves. Human participants 
were able to categorise at a significant level above chance recorded 
bark sequences from a number of different situations (i.e. a dog’s 
bark sounds different when tethered to a tree, when he attacks a 
stranger through a fence or plays with his owner). The analysis of 
51 
 
the barks seems to suggest that dogs use different barks in different 
situations. The dogs let out a lower frequency bark with a shorter 
interval between barks in aggressive situations. In play situations 
the barks had more harmonics, were higher in frequency and had 
longer intervals between barks (Pongrácz, Molnár, Miklósi and 
Csányi, 2005b). An interesting study would be to look at whether 
play barks resembled puppy barks. Anecdotally, my own and 
friends’ dogs do emit similar barks in play as they did as pups 
suggesting that in play situations, puppy-like vocalisations may be 
used. 
In a more recent study, Molnár, Pongrácz, Dóka and Miklósi 
(2008) used a machine learning approach to categorising dogs’ 
barks. They had a computer loaded with a program which would 
classify dogs’ barks in accordance with their different acoustic 
features and the context in which they were emitted. The barks 
were from different individuals in different contexts. Initially, the 
program would have the bark inputted along with the context of the 
bark. Then they tested the computer with unknown barks and 
found that the computer was able successfully to categorise the 
dogs’ barks on the basis of their acoustics. That is, the program 
could recognise the sort of bark and output which context it was 
likely to have occurred in. This suggests that barks are a way of 
communicating a dog’s situation and emotional states, and they 
are situation-specific. Communication occurs through variations in 
pitch, tone or frequency of the barks emitted. We can improve our 
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verbal cues by placing emphasis upon the acoustic nature such as 
the frequency and tone of each cue, for example a command for a 
high speed action such as a ‘Find’ command would ideally be 
radically different in sound to a positioning command such as 
‘Stay’. Ensuring distinctive variation in the acoustic nature of our 
verbal cues will aid the dogs’ discrimination of them. The theory 
behind matching the tone of our verbal cues to the required action 
is that cognition can be embedded in our bodily actions and vocal 
sounds. We instinctively learn much about the mental state of a 
person whom we are with on the basis of the way they hold 
themselves, gesture, move and sound. In fact, these cues are 
often more reliable than the words a person is saying, for it is 
much harder to lie with body language than it is with words 
(Navarro, 2008). The same theory applies to our communication 
across species. When our verbal and bodily cues match the action 
being requested we are more likely to be understood by our non-
human recipient. 
Information about the physical nature of the sender of auditory 
communication is also embedded into dogs’ barks and growls. Vocal 
signals are affected by the physical body of the sender and are a 
reliable indicator of a dog’s body size. In fact, we know this intuitively 
and most people can distinguish between a large dog and a small 
dog reliably based on the sound of their growls and barks alone. 
Moreover, people with experience with dogs will be able to 
distinguish between types of growls and barks. For example, our 
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little Terrier’s growl when a child is accidentally about to hurt him is 
much gentler (the tone is not as deep or intense) and shorter in 
duration than the deep and long growl he’ll give to his pack mates if 
he is guarding a good stick. Children growing up with dogs learn 
these different sorts of growls and barks quite naturally. Our son will 
rush to the window when our three dogs start the bark they reserve 
for the return of a family member or close friend. But he’ll ignore the 
barking kerfuffle that they create when someone unknown comes to 
the gate. Some of human infants’ understanding of canine vocal 
communication is probably taught by adults. In many cases this is 
learned implicitly. In an interesting study, Faragó, Pongrácz, Range, 
Virányi, and Miklósi (2010b) designed an experiment to determine 
whether body size was in fact encoded somehow into the growl in 
dog-dog communication. They presented images of dogs to their 
canine participants and paired the presentation of an image to the 
sound of a growling dog. When the size of the growling dog in the 
image matched the size of the growling dog in the acoustic stimulus 
the dogs looked sooner and longer at the image. This, Faragó et al. 
suggested, is indicative of the conclusion that dogs’ growls transmit 
information about the sender’s size. They then go on to hypothesise 
that dogs might be able to generate a mental representation of the 
sender of an acoustic signal such as a bark or growl, with respect to 
the sender’s size. While the question of what the mental 
representation might be is left open, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that information about a dog’s physical status, his size, strength and 
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possibly gender, is 
embedded into his 
acoustic communication. 
Acoustic communication 
such as barking and 
growling therefore may 
serve multiple functions 
- as a signal for action 
and as an information 
source about the 
sender. Taylor et al., 
(2010) found similar 
results in their study suggesting that dogs will respond differently to 
growls from large dogs as opposed to growls from little dogs.  Many 
different factors contribute to dogs’ reactions to growls though, 
including individual dogs’ past experience such as the level and 
quality of training and socialisation they received and innate 
tendencies toward agonistic or passive behaviours. This ought to be 
remembered when experiments are being designed since many 
things will affect a dog’s reaction to another dog’s growl not just 
what is encoded into the growl. Certain vocalisations are also 
context-specific (Yin and McCowen, 2004; Faragó et al., 2010b) and 
in 2010 a study was published with evidence suggesting that dogs 
rely on context-dependent acoustic cues. Faragó et al. (2010b) 
analysed the responses to growls in a food-guarding situation. In 
Figure 2. The method of recording the growls in the 
three different contexts (a) Food guarding, (b) playing 
tug of war and (c) threatening stranger approaching 
(Faragó et al. 2010b, p.919 
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preparation, they recorded growls from dogs in threedifferent 
contexts: during play, guarding a bone from another dog, and 
reacting to a threatening stranger. Faragó et al. then analysed the 
acoustic structure of the growls and performed playback tests in an 
experimental food-guarding situation. In their analysis they found 
that play growls differed acoustically from the other two (agonistic) 
types of growls. Play growls were higher in frequency and agonistic 
growls were lower infrequency. In their study, playback of food-
guarding growls deterred other dogs from approaching and taking 
away a seemingly unattended bone more effectively than growls 
recorded in the threatening stranger situation which suggests that 
the growls and barks of dogs are context-specific. 
This study is ground-breaking because it is the first one to 
investigate the context-dependent nature of dogs’ growls; although 
anecdotal evidence from dog owners suggests that our experience 
with dogs teaches us that they do have different barks and growls 
for different situations, little research has been done in this area 
until Faragó et al.’s (2010b) study. 
In conclusion, barking and growling are important aspects of 
dog communication. Research into vocal signals from dogs is 
increasing and new research has indicated that dogs’ barks and 
growls can vary according to their frequency, tone and rhythm 
(Pongraz et al. 2010; Faragó et al 2010a and 2010b). Moreover, 
barking and growling are context-dependent methods of 
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communication: acoustic signals that are specific to certain 
situations. 
 
1.3. Learning and problem solving 
 
Experiments into learning and problem solving in dogs are 
multifarious. I have loosely divided up the studies in this section for 
easier reading from studies on those processes which require more 
dog-environment interaction, to the experiments into more abstract 
cognition.   
1.3.1 Problem solving: comparing dogs and wolves 
 
In the past, researchers have suggested that domestication has 
served to dampen the domestic dog’s cognitive abilities. Frank and 
Frank (1982, 1985) observed that tamed wolves tend to solve 
problems by trial and error learning and do so more effectively than 
domestic dogs. Therefore, they wrote, while domestication has 
selected for tractability and trainability, it has left domesticated dogs 
with weaker cognitive skills than their undomesticated counterparts. 
But perhaps in reality the cognitive functioning of the domestic dog 
is not inferior to that of wolves, just different. Problem solving ability 
merely appears to be diminished because the domestic dog’s 
reaction to problem solving tasks is redirected by the dog’s 
dependency on her human experimenter, handler or owner. Using 
twenty eight dog and owner pairs, Topál, Miklósi and Csányi (1997) 
divided the pairs into two groups: one group was classified as 
‘Companion Relationship’ and the other as ‘Working Relationship’. 
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Those dogs in the ‘Companion Relationship’ group had a somewhat 
close relationship to their owners and were part of the family home. 
Some in this category had undergone obedience training, others 
had not. Dogs in the ‘Working Relationship’ category were not 
incorporated into the family structure and not as well socialised with 
humans as the dogs in the companion relationship category. Each 
dog was faced with the same problem: that of working out how to 
access food in a dish placed on the opposite side of the fence to the 
dog. The solution to this problem was to pull the dish by the handle 
from under the fence in order to consume the food.The dependent 
variables were: 1) the number of times each dog looked at the 
owner; 2) following of the owner; 3) latency of manipulations; 4) the 
number of manipulations they gave the dish handle and 5) the 
number of food items eaten. The independent variable was the 
relationship between the dog and owner. Topál and colleagues 
reported that dogs in the ‘Companion Relationship’ group took 
longer to begin to solve the task. They waited longer before 
manipulating the dish handle compared to the dogs in the ‘Working 
Relationship’ category. In addition, dogs in the ‘Companion 
Relationship’ category looked at and followed their owner more 
frequently and performed fewer manipulations of the food dish 
before encouragement than the dogs in the ‘Working Relationship’ 
category. In short, in the unfamiliar problem solving task the 
companion dogs tended to exhibit more reliance on their owners in 
the solution of the problem. Incidentally, the breed of the dog and 
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whether or not the dog had undergone obedience training did not 
appear to modify the effect of the human-dog bond in this 
experiment. On the basis of this experiment, Topál et al. concluded 
that: 
 
This study could provide a new way of interpreting the dog’s 
problem solving ability. Manipulation test performance is thought 
to be one of the manifestations of cognitive capacities. Our results 
show that the decrement in the cognitive test performances of 
dogs demonstrated previously in comparison with wolves (Frank 
and Frank, 1982; 1985; Frank  et  al.  1989),  may  be  due  to  
the  dog’s  sensitivity  to  its relationship with humans (tendency 
to behave socially dependently) and not due to some cognitive 
disability (Topál et al. 1997, p. 222). 
 
 
The study of Topál and his team certainly seems to suggest 
that the effect of close socialisation between humans and dogs 
has led to a reliance on human cues in dog problem solving. I 
agree with their conclusion that the reliance upon human cues 
can be seen not as a diminished problem solving capacity, but 
rather a different strategy for solving problems. It would be 
interesting to repeat their study with a control group of dogs from 
both categories with their owners absent in light of 
considerations that the familiarity between the dog and the 
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person giving the cues is likely to affect the dogs’ responding to 
cues in the experimental setting. 
A more recent study by Topál, Gergely, Erdöhegyi, Csibra, and 
Miklósi (2009) has also suggested that human cues were 
responsible for dogs’ failure in object permanence studies. They 
found that if an experimenter showed the location of a reward 
underneath cup A and then hid it under cup B, in full sight of the 
dogs, the dogs would continue to search under cup A for the 
reward. Curiously, human infants do the same thing. They will 
continue to look under cup A even though they have seen the 
object moved to cup B. Tomasello and Kaminski (2009) remark that 
it seems as though by the time the adult hides it in location B, the 
infant already has 
learned a general principle about this object’s normal location. This 
result, also known as the ‘A not B error’ (Kis et al., 2012) was not 
found in human-raised wolves. The wolves will follow what they have 
seen and the human’s actions or presence does not affect 
performance (Topál et al.,2009). We will look in more detail at this 
finding below during the following discussion of object permanence. 
 
1.3.2 Dogs’ use of human gaze direction and pointing gestures 
 
It has been suggested that, in contrast with dogs, wolves are 
less skilled in communicative interaction with humans. As Kubinyi, 
Virányi and Miklósi (2007) report, this is true even with wolves that 
have been intensively socialised. There are various reasons for the 
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differences in the understanding of human communicative 
behaviour of wolves as opposed to domestic dogs (Byrne, 2003). 
Domestic dogs seem to be able to follow pointing actions made by 
someone’s hand. They can also follow a person’s gaze (Soproni, 
Miklósi, Topál, Csányi, 2002; Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál and Csányi, 
2000). This has led to several suggestions that dogs, in virtue of 
their having this ability to follow a person’s gaze or pointing gesture, 
are capable of entertaining certain mental states such as beliefs 
about what the person is looking at (Baron-Cohen,1994; Byrne, 
2003). Byrne writes: “In humans, pointing and gaze-following have 
been causally linked to reference, one of the fundamentals of 
language; moreover, pointing and gaze following are generally 
seen as part of a suite of abilities that together confer a ‘theory of 
mind’” (Byrne, 2003, p. R347). Dogs, Byrne goes on to suggest, are 
able to follow pointing by the head and eyes or pointing by the 
hand. They can follow pointing by the hand even if the hand that is 
pointing must cross the person’s body to the target item. Dogs can 
also follow hand pointing if the hand remains stationary and the 
human moves in the opposite direction to way she is pointing. 
However, Byrne does then point out that nothing in the behaviour of 
domestic dogs can give us conclusive evidence that they are 
capable of having a theory of mind: Their behaviour doesn’t 
conclusively tell us that they understand the mental states of the 
pointers. Indeed, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove that any non-
human animal has a theory of mind. 
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According to Byrne, the most likely account that we can give at 
this stage for why dogs might have acquired such a remarkable skill 
as being able to follow a person’s gaze or point, is what he calls a 
‘special-purpose adaptation. It is a skill that has perhaps developed 
from the need to interpret the movement of prey based on the gaze 
or signal of fellow human or canine hunters. 
In a separate study, Miklósi, Kubinyi, Topál, Gácsi, Virányi and 
Csányi (2003), report that even though domesticated wolves can 
follow hand pointing to an extent, they never acquired the same 
level of competence as domestic dogs. However, more recently, 
Virányi, Gácsi, Kubinyi, Topál, Belenyi and Ujifalussy (2008) did find 
that after extensive training, wolves could come to use human 
pointing gestures. Their ability increased in parallel with their 
willingness to look at the human pointer. 
The difference between the wolves’ ability to follow gaze and 
hand- pointing and dogs’ ability may come from the simple fact that 
dogs look at humans’ faces but wolves don’t very readily (Miklósi et 
al. 2003). Clearly, animals that don’t look much at humans’ faces 
have little chance of learning the contingencies between human 
gaze-direction and events in the world. Dogs’ natural tendency to 
attend to humans’ cues is affected by their species’ history of 
socialisation with humans and by the individual’s experiences. Dogs 
will attend most readily to humans with whom they have a 
relationship (Horn, Range and Huber, 2013). 
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Moreover, the tendency to attend to people’s social cues 
such as pointing can vary according to the breed of the dog 
(Passalacquaa, Marshall-Pescini, Barnard, Lakatos, Valsecchi, 
Prato Previdea, 2011). Passalacquaa et al. confronted dogs with 
an unsolvable task and found that hunting and herding dogs such 
as the Australian Terriers, Border Collies, Golden Retrievers and 
Labrador Retrievers looked toward the human more often and for 
longer than primitive breeds of dog such as the Akita Inu, Alaskan 
Malamutes and the Siberian Husky. Dogs who looked the least at 
the human were American Staffordshires, Boxers, German 
Shepherds, Bull Terriers and Rottweilers. In all breeds the 
tendency to look at humans for social cues increased with the 
age of the dogs. This led the authors to conclude that: 
 
Although the  domestication  process has  shaped  the  
emergence  of human-directed gazing behaviour (Miklósi et al., 
2003), the subsequent selection  for  cooperative  working  traits  
may  have  had  a  strong influence on its occurrence. The fact 
that this behaviour increased with the age of the subjects 
suggests that an appropriate human environment might be 
necessary for the development and learning of this behaviour 
(Passalacquaa et al., p.1049). 
 
Miklósi and his team tested the tendency of dogs to look at 
people’s fa’ces by making unsolvable a task that dogs previously 
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succeeded in resulting in a food reward. The reactions of the dogs 
were immediate: they looked at their owners’ faces and back at 
their task. This, Miklósi et al., explain by saying that the dogs’ 
reactions were those of an animal that had no understanding of 
their owners’ mental states but could learn information quickly by 
looking at their owners’ faces. They concluded that what 
domestication has done for the dog is to select for the tendency to 
look at the human face in times of uncertainty. This may have led 
the way for dogs’ and humans’ long association since it enables the 
domestic dog to read ‘the behavioural intentions and likely needs of 
another species’ (Byrne, 2003, p. R348). We should note that the 
sense in which a dog may read the behavioural intentions of 
another agent need not involve the attribution of internal mental 
states. Anticipatory planning, as I shall argue later, can occur at the 
sub-personal level using cognitive mechanisms that do not depend 
upon the attribution of internal mental states. 
Another possibility is that for wolves, direct eye contact may be 
seen as a threat or challenge. Thus, wolves are less willing to look 
at humans’ 
faces and have a lower tolerance for humans looking them 
directly in the eye (Topál, Miklósi, Dóka and Csányi, 1998; Gácsi, 
Topál, Miklósi, Dóka and Csányi, 2001). This is the case even 
after months of training and hundreds of trials for point-following; 
socialised wolves have only been found able to follow human 
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pointing at the level of naive dogs (Viryáni et al. 2008). This 
further supports the conclusion that dogs are much better at 
following human pointing cues than socialised wolves, leading to 
the hypothesis that domestication of the dog has led to sensitivity 
to human communicative gestures. 
An interesting study by Udell, Doréy and Wynne (2008) 
examined the possibility that the differences found between wolves 
and dogs in following human pointing gestures is due, in part, to the 
testing conditions. In all studies on following human pointing, they 
noticed that wolves have been tested outside (Hare et al., 2002, 
Miklósi et al., 2003, Viryáni et al., 2008, as cited in Udell et al., 
2008).  In at least one case, the wolves were tested from outside 
their fenced enclosure, meaning that in this test there was a barrier 
between the experimenters and the wolves. In contrast, the 
domesticated dogs in most studies are tested inside, with no 
barriers between the experimenters and the domesticated dogs. 
Udell et al. conducted two experiments aimed at determining 
whether domestication is responsible for the failure of wolves and 
the success of dogs in human pointing tasks or whether the 
difference is down to reasons other than genetic predispositions. In 
their first experiment they tested eight human- reared wolves and 
eight pet dogs in similar settings. Both groups were outside and 
isolated from pack mates. Another eight pet dogs were tested in 
their homes, and eight dogs from the local shelter were tested 
indoors. 
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The first experiment required the dogs to respond to a human 
pointing cue. The human experimenter stood between two empty 
paint cans and pointed to one of them. The dog or wolf was 2.5 
metres away from the human and the cans were each half a metre 
from the human on either side of him or her. When the dog or wolf 
indicated the correct choice, the experimenter clicked and dropped a 
piece of food on the chosen container. For an incorrect choice, no 
food was presented and the experimenter remained neutral. They 
found that the wolves tested outdoors and the pet dogs tested 
indoors performed at above chance levels in following the pointing 
cue. The performance of these two groups was similar but more 
individual wolves (six of the eight) followed the point in eight or more 
of the ten trials. This is in contrast to only three of the eight dog 
subjects doing the same. Both groups of pet dogs tested outdoors 
did not perform at levels above chance in responding correctly to the 
human pointing cue. None of the shelter dogs followed the human 
pointing cue and overall the shelter dogs were significantly less 
successful at following the pointing cue than the wolves. 
In summary, the shelter dogs did not respond to the pointing 
cue to a significant level when they were tested outside and their 
performance was worse than that of the wolves.  Therefore the 
experimental setting is a potential confounding variable in the study 
of cognitive skills in dogs and wolves. Thus, when considering the 
differences found between dogs and wolves we ought to look 
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carefully at the settings under which these results have been 
generated. 
In their second experiment, Udell et al. looked at whether the 
presence of a fence barrier between dogs and the human 
experimenter made a difference to the dog’s performance in 
responding correctly to human pointing cues. There were two 
groups of seven dogs, all of which were pet dogs living in human 
homes. Dogs in one group were tested with a fence between them 
and the experimenter; dogs in the other group had no fence. Once 
again, the human experimenter had empty paint cans on either side 
and stood a short distance from the dog. But this time, the 
experimenter tapped on one of the paint cans rather than just 
pointing at it as in the first experiment. In the fence condition, the 
human experimenter was always on the same side as the cans, 
behind a fence, but the dog could get his snout within 10cms of the 
paint cans. If the dog indicated the correct choice, the human 
experimenter placed food on top of the can and the dog ate the 
food. (In the fence condition the food was sometimes too hard to get 
for the dog, so the experimenter promptly pushed the can with the 
food on through the fence so the dog could consume it). They found 
that dogs tested from outside a fenced enclosure performed at 
significantly lower levels than those dogs tested from inside the 
enclosure. Thus, the presence of the fence barrier, the authors 
conclude, has a significant impact on dogs’ ability to respond 
correctly to human pointing cues. 
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Overall, Udell et al. found that wolves with proper socialisation, 
contact with humans and, most notably, appropriate experimental 
conditions were able to succeed at following a human pointing cue, 
sometimes performing better than the domesticated dogs. Udell et 
al. write that ‘unlike the wolves studied by Miklósi et al. (2003) and 
Viryáni et al. (2008), which were only mildly successful after 
hundreds of trials, the wolves in our study succeeded in using a 
momentary distal point with no prior exposure to the task and were 
presented with only a minimal number of trials during testing, 
suggesting that their performance is truly comparable to that of 
domestic dogs’ (Udell et al. 2008, p. 1771). 
In summary, Udell et al.’s studies are indicative of the possibility 
that the divergence between problem solving abilities of dogs and 
wolves may, in part, be due to the differences in experimental 
settings and socialisation. This issue needs further investigation of 
course, but the findings outlined above are an important 
consideration when comparing wolves’ and dogs’ cognitive 
capacities. 
 
Scheider, Kaminski, Call and Tomasello (2013) questioned 
dogs’ interpretations of human pointing commands. In their recent 
study they found that dogs react to commands in the form of 
pointing gestures from children differently than pointing gesture 
commands from adults. The children’s pointing gesture commands 
seem to carry less authority than adults, Scheider et al., conclude. 
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The authors favour this suggestion, but acknowledge that it is 
possible that the fact that a dog is usually trained by a particular 
adult may affect the dogs’ reactions to children since commands 
from a particular adult (or adults in general) may be those that have 
been reinforced in the dog’s experience. Contrastingly, Scheider et 
al. (2013) found that dogs did not react differently to children’s and 
adults’ pointing cues in a differently constructed study where the 
pointing gestures indicated a solution to a problem rather than a 
command. Dogs in their study could use both children’s and adults’ 
pointing cues to successfully find the food reward. The dogs did not 
differentiate between children’s and adults’ pointing cues in 
situations where the pointing gesture indicated the location of the 
food. In these situations, the dogs would choose the cup containing 
the food, based, according to the authors, on the information from 
the human pointing gesture regardless of whether the human was 
an adult or a child.This, Scheider et al. write, indicates that dogs do 
not interpret pointing as a command. This conclusion is based on 
the theory that if it were interpreted as a command, the same bias 
toward listening to the commands/cues of adults better than the 
commands of children would have been found. 
Moreover, the familiarity of the person giving cues in an 
experimental setting has the potential to confound the experiment’s 
results. Dogs, more than any other animal in general, have the 
ability to form close bonds with individual humans that they see on 
a regular basis. As a result, their responding to a human with whom 
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they are bonded is bound to be different from their responses to a 
stranger. In a recent study, Cook, Carter and Jacob (2013), set out 
to investigate the effect of familiarity on dogs’ responses in an 
experimental situation. They compared dogs’ use of information 
from a stranger to dogs’ use of information from their owner. They 
gave the dogs two possible choices, one of which was indicated to 
by their owner, the other of which was indicated by a stranger. The 
aim was determine the degree to which dogs’ responses were 
affected by the familiarity of the person providing the cue to the 
food location. Only one of the containers presented to the dogs 
contained a food reward. Cook et al. hypothesised that dogs would 
show a bias toward following the cues of the owner rather than the 
stranger’s cues. Cook et al.’s results suggest that the familiarity of a 
person providing social cues influences dogs’ behaviour. The dogs 
in their study chose to follow cues from a familiar person more 
frequently than cues from a stranger. This was the case even when 
the owner’s cues repeatedly provided information that did not lead 
to the food reward. Some dogs displayed a side bias, consistently 
choosing containers on a particular side.  Interestingly, the dogs 
with a side bias would only choose the non- preferred side when 
the owner was standing near it: 
 
… revealing an apparent combined use of one social and 
one non- social strategy to solve the task …These results also 
demonstrate that dogs are   not simply automatically deferring to       
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a   familiar   human. Instead, they are actively engaging in 
attempts to solve the task, and one of their preferred strategies is 
to attend to the behaviour        and/or location of a familiar human 
(Cook, 2013, p. 14). 
 
 
In conclusion, we must be careful before we conclude that 
domestication is a predictor of sensitivity to human cues, as the 
shelter dogs’ performance suggests. Even though the 
domesticated shelter dogs interacted readily with the 
experimenters and were picked on the basis that they would 
approach a human and accept food, their use of human pointing 
cues as an aid to problem solving was remarkably poor. Similarly, 
the presence of a fence between the experimenter and wolf 
subjects has in the past severely hindered the wolves’ 
performance in following human point cues. In fact, with 
comparable handling, appropriate experimental conditions and 
socialisation, wolves might be just as sensitive to human cues as 
domesticated dogs. 
Thus, evolution of a dog’s tendency to use human social cues 
cannot by itself account for dogs’ sensitivity to human cues - the 
socialisation and contact between humans and individual dogs (and 
humans and individual wolves) play a large part also in the 
development of sensitivity to human cues. Moreover, in the dog’s 
lifetime he will learn to follow human cues if doing so leads to 
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reinforcement.  Also the breeding (Passalacquaa et al., 2009) and 
age of the dog (Doréy, Udell and Wynne, 2010) contributes to how 
readily the dog will use social cues. It is the combination of these 
factors that gives certain domesticated dogs their remarkable ability 
to use human cues as an aid to problem solving although exactly 
how dogs interpret human cues is uncertain. 
Furthermore, the effect of handler familiarity upon the dog 
influences the dog’s behaviour. As Cook et al.’s (2013) study 
suggests it is likely that the domesticated dog will respond more 
readily to commands from people with whom they are familiar. This 
may also hold true for wolves although to my knowledge it has not 
been tested. 
Hence, there are good reasons why we should not assume 
that domestication alone has furnished the dog with heightened 
abilities tounderstand human social cues as an aid to problem 
solving. There are many factors, outlined above, which 
influence the degree to which the dog is able or willing to use 
human cues.  Plus, we ought to be careful what we conclude 
from experiments designed to test dogs’ use of human cues as 
an aid to problem solving. Individual experience, the 
experimental setting and design, and familiarity with the person 
giving the cues in the experiment will all affect how the dog or 
wolf responds to a social cue from a human. Each of these 
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factors may be confounding variables within an experiment and 
need to be considered carefully. 
 
The ability to follow human gaze or hand pointing may be an 
example of what Hare et al. (2002) meant when they wrote, ‘some 
aspects of the socio-cognitive abilities of dogs have converged 
within the phylogenetic constraints of the species with those of 
humans’ (Hare et al., 2002, p.1636). This convergence Hare et al. 
attribute to enculturation. Ontogenetic enculturation is a process 
proposed by Michael Tomasello and his group to explain why many 
hand-reared great apes succeed in cognitive tasks where zoo-
raised or lab-raised great apes fail. The idea is that skills such as 
effective communication cues and responses can be learned as an 
animal lives with humans. Certain skills such as gaze following 
might not manifest or develop as readily unless the dog has 
associated with humans for a period of time. The emphasis for 
Hare et al. (2002) is on an individual’s experience rather than 
innate ability alone, and, to repeat my earlier point, it is probable 
that the dog’s ability to communicate is a combined result of innate 
potential and the individual’s experience with humans. 
 
This makes sense; humans develop certain cognitive 
capacities because we are a part of a culture. These capacities 
are handed onto us by those who have reared us given that we 
have the innate potential to learn them. On this view, dogs and 
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the hand-raised great apes acquire certain communication skills 
because they have a natural potential to do so and because they 
were raised in a human society. In addition, dogs have been 
selectively bred to respond to human cues. 
There are, however, differences in the way in which dogs and 
wolves develop within a human society; dogs and wolves have 
different critical development periods. For example, dogs can 
begin socialisation with humans at 16 weeks old and integrate into 
human society perfectly well, whereas wolves must be socialised 
before they are 10-14 days old if they are to bond successfully with 
humans.  Udell et al. (2008) suggest that 
 
… environment and development affect a social animal’s 
ability to react  in  situation  appropriate  ways  to  the  social  
cues  of  other individuals … [and] … we propose that animals 
genetically capable of responding to social cues will still differ in 
their ability to  use    specific forms of cue depending on their 
individual histories and  environments during critical 
developmental periods (Udell et al., 2008, p.1772). 
 
 
There does seem to be a difference in the readiness with 
which dogs will use human cues in comparison to wolves. 
However, as Udell et al.’s study highlights, learning and 
communication can be affected by the environment and even be 
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situation-specific (occur in one setting, but not in another). 
Moreover, dogs’ interpretation of human pointing cues still 
warrants some investigation because it is unclear whether dogs 
interpret pointing gestures as a source of information. 
With this in mind, studies on communication between dogs 
and humans, and even between dogs and their pack mates ought 
to bear in mind the strong influence that individual histories, 
environmental factors and testing conditions may have on the 
development and execution of certain cognitive skills.  The 
situation specific nature of learning and cognition will be further 
explored in the following chapter. Recognition of the situatedness 
of cognition is an important element of the embodied cognition 
paradigm which I argue can help inform our study of canine 
cognition. 
 
1.3.3 Learning by imitation 
 
Another way in which dogs problem solve is by imitation. 
Recently, experiments have refuted Frank’s (1989) paper in which 
he suggested that dogs could not learn by observation (Kubinyi, 
Miklósi, Topál and Csányi, 
2003). It was demonstrated that dogs that watch a human or fellow 
dog solving detour or instrumental tasks are more successful at 
those tasks than dogs that have not seen the demonstrators 
perform that task (Pongrácz, Miklósi, Kubinyi, Gurobi, Topál and 
Csányi, 2001). In addition, evidence has been obtained that 
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suggests dogs are able to use a human action as a cue for showing 
a functionally similar behaviour (Kubinyi et al., 2003; Topál, et al., 
2006a). Philip, a four year old Tervueren, was able in an 
experimental setting to use different human demonstrated actions 
as models for his own behaviour (Topál, et al., 2006b). First, the 
experimenters trained him to repeat nine human demonstrated 
actions on command. When his performance was over chance in 
response to the demonstrated actions, they demonstrated a novel 
action sequence. The action sequence involved moving an object 
from one place to another. On the same command as in the training 
session, Philip copied the novel action sequence more often than 
expected by chance over a series of trials. On the basis of this 
study Topál and his colleagues suggest that Philip may have the 
ability to generalise his understanding of copying. The dog, they 
write ‘could have recognized the action sequence, on the basis of 
observation alone, in terms of the initial state, the means and the 
goal. This suggests that dogs might acquire abilities by 
observations that enhance their success in complex socio-
behavioural situations’ (Topál et al, 2006b, p.355). A similar study 
by Pongrácz, Mikosi, Vida and Csányi (2005a) reported similar 
conclusions to these. This study went one step further, however, 
and tested whether some breeds of dog were better at learning by 
imitation than others. Their results indicate that breed differences 
did not affect learning by imitation, but they did find that herding 
dogs looked back at their owners more frequently than hunting 
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dogs. They also found that the age of the dog had no effect on its 
ability to learn by imitation. 
Further to this, dogs not only seem able to learn by imitation, 
but they appear to do so selectively (Range, Virányi and Huber, 
2007). This is parallel to results found in studies done on children. 
Range et al.’s (2007) experiment found that dogs may be able to 
choose to imitate an action based on inferences about that action’s 
efficiency. Of course, more work needs to be done to confirm 
Range and his colleagues’ findings and whether other animals as 
well as dogs have this cognitive skill. Most interesting would be an 
experiment to determine whether or not wolves have the ability to 
learn by imitation and if they do, whether they can do so 
selectively. Moreover, it would be interesting to test affiliative 
imitation in dogs and compare whether dogs are more likely to 
learn by imitation from close pack mates than from other dogs. The 
age and/or status of the demonstrator dog may also influence 
whether dogs will readily learn by imitation. To my knowledge this 
has not been tested in dogs, but a study has been conducted with 
horses and found that a younger horse will learn by imitation from 
an older horse, but not vice versa (Krueger, Farmer, Heinze, 2013). 
 
1.3.4. Dogs’ sensitivity to human attentional states 
 
Recognition of a person’s attentional state could be useful to the 
dog for providing feedback on the likelihood of a desired outcome or 
interaction. For example, our Terrier is an avid stick fetcher. After 
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running to get the stick, he will stand (holding the stick in his mouth) 
in front of me. Rarely does he go behind me where I cannot see him. 
It seems, therefore, that he has learnt something about me: to get 
me to throw the stick again I need to be able to see his request for a 
game; and this is achieved by him standing in front of me. If I 
happen to be distracted and ignore him, even though he’s right in 
front of me holding a stick, our Terrier will perform vertical jumps 
which bring him almost up to the level of my face, sometimes letting 
out a woof at the pinnacle of his jump. His efforts are usually 
effective since it is almost impossible not to notice someone when 
they have leapt into mid air and woofed in your face.  Gácsi, Miklósi, 
Varga, Topál and Csányi (2004) write: 
 
When communicating by visual signals the sender either has to 
wait (passively) until the receiver’s visual attention is directed at 
him/her, or alternatively he/she should modify his/her own 
behavior (actively) to become the focus of the other’s attention. 
This could be achieved by producing attention-receiving signals, 
which direct the other’s attention to the signaller or, alternatively, 
the signaler moves into the actual visual field of the receiver. 
Although animals (including humans) probably use both 
strategies, especially the latter is taken as evidence for the 
recognition of attention (Gácsi et al., 2004, p. 144). 
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Our little Terrier begins by passively waiting for my attention 
to be directed at him, before moving on to other attention-getting 
signals including jumping into my visual field and producing an 
attention-getting bark. However, Gácsi et al. continue, 
 
There is a difference if one defines the recognition of attention at 
the behavioral  or cognitive  representational  level.  In  the  first  
case one assumes that the individual is sensitive to behavioral 
cues that are associated with seeing or “attending”. Such 
observable cues could be the presence or absence of eyes, the 
direction of head or body or simply the presence or absence of 
the other individual. In the second case the recognition of 
attention goes beyond the observation and recognition of specific 
cues, and results in a mental representation about the mental 
state of the other (Gácsi et al., 2004, p. 144). 
 
Call, Bräuer, Kaminski and Tomasello (2003) tested twelve pet 
dogs, over a series of trials. They placed a piece of food in a 
location clearly visible to the dog. They were forbidden to take the 
food. In some trials the human looked at the dog throughout. In 
other trials the human a) left the room, b) turned her back, c) 
engaged in a distracting activity or d) closed her eyes. When the 
human looked at the dog throughout the trial the dogs retrieved less 
food, approached it in an indirect way or sat more often than in the 
other conditions where the human paid less attention to the dog. 
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There were no significant differences amongst the four other 
conditions where the human was not paying so much attention to 
the dog. The dogs approached the food more readily. This is 
interesting because in the condition where the human closed her 
eyes, she was facing the dog. Thus it is possible that dogs use 
humans’ eyes as a way of reading humans’ attentional states. 
But it is possible that the dogs have simply learnt to use the 
presence of a human looking at them with their eyes open as a 
discriminative stimulus that informs the dog when it is not safe to 
disobey orders. An alternative explanation that Call et al. (2003) 
consider is that dogs may have some knowledge about visual 
perception. Call et al. cite a study by Hare, Call and Tomasello 
(1998) which found that dogs would return balls they had retrieved 
to the front of the 
human thrower. So 
even when the human 
turned his or her back 
the dog would circle 
around the human   
and drop the ball in front where, Call 
et al. suggest, the dogs knew the human could see it. However, 
this suggestion again might simply be that the dogs have learnt that 
there is a higher chance of the ball being thrown again if they drop 
it in front of the human. They need not really know anything about 
Figure 3. Arrangement of the tests  
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visual perception. Therefore, more work is necessary before we 
can conclude that dogs have knowledge of others’ visual 
perception. 
Gácsi, Miklósi, Varga, Topál and Csányi (2004) designed a 
study to establish whether or not dogs are able to perceive the 
attentional states of humans in different contexts and, based on 
their perception of the humans’ attentional state, whether the dogs 
will alter their behaviour accordingly. If the dogs changed their 
behaviour according to humans’ attentional states across different 
contexts, the authors suggest this would indicate that dogs have a 
representational understanding of attentional states and are not just 
responding to humans’ behavioural cues such as the presence or 
absence of eyes or the direction a person’s head is pointing. 
 
In their first experiment, the game situation, the owners played 
fetch with their dog. During the game the humans were asked to 
face the dog or face away from the dog before the dog approached 
them. The human participants were either wearing a blindfold or had 
one on their foreheads when facing away from the approaching dog 
or facing him. 
In the second experiment, the dog fetched an object for his 
owner sitting in a chair. The owners took up each the four postures 
described in experiment 1 in separate trials. 
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The third experiment involved the dog fetching an object for his 
owner sitting on the ground with the same conditions: the owner 
was to adopt the same postures in separate trials. From these three 
experiments, the researchers wanted to determine whether being 
able to see the owners’ eyes was an important influence upon the 
behaviour of the dogs. If so, then the authors expected to find that 
the dogs’ behaviour changed between the conditions where the 
owner was either facing the dog or facing away from the dog.  If 
dogs approached the back-turned owner they cannot perceive 
whether the owner has a blindfold over her eyes or not. Therefore, if 
dogs use the visibility of humans’ eyes to guide their behaviour, then 
a difference in their behaviour with regard to the visibility of the eyes 
would be seen only in the facing condition. 
 
In experiment four they tested whether the visibility of a 
person’s eyes changed the dogs’ behaviour in a begging situation. 
The fifth experiment tested whether the orientation of the person’s 
face changed the dogs’ behaviour in a begging situation. Overall, 
Gácsi and her colleagues found that dogs were more hesitant 
when fetching an object for a person whose eyes were covered by 
the blindfold and delays in responding indicate that the dogs were 
influenced by the change in body orientation even in the object-
fetching tasks. 
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In summary, the authors found that the dogs did show evidence 
of recognising different behavioural cues associated with human 
attention. However, their performance was variable and changed 
according to the context. In the first experiment, the game of fetch, 
the dogs did not behave differently whether the humans were 
blindfolded or not, or whether or not they were facing him. In 
contrast, the dogs were more hesitant to retrieve an object for the 
blindfolded owner, compared to the non-blindfolded owner. 
Moreover, there was a significant preference shown in the begging 
condition for the humans who had their heads oriented toward the 
dogs. In conclusion, the authors suggest that dogs may understand 
the role of the humans’ face orientation in social interactions, but 
they pay less attention to whether such facing behaviour is 
accompanied by the visibility of the person’s eyes. 
Based on this study and the one by Call et al. (2003) described 
above, dogs may be able to base their behaviour upon the 
perceived attentional state of humans, but this ability may not be 
generalisable. For example, it was not seen in the play situation as 
much as in the begging scenario. So the authors appear to rule out 
the theory of a representational understanding of human attentional 
states in dogs. The results of their experiment were expected, 
however. More likely is the thought that dogs have learned to attend 
to different aspects of their environment in different situations. 
Attention recognition may occur in some situations, but not others. 
And in certain situations, such as in experiments two and three, the 
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presence of the blindfold covering the owner’s eyes was an 
influence on the behaviour of the dog.  But, in other situations, it was 
the orientation of the owner’s face which determined the begging 
behaviour of the dog. Whether or not the dog is learning context 
specific rules is still speculation; the only conclusive statements to 
be made at the end of this section are that sensitivity to attentional 
states is likely to be, as with other cognitive skills, situation-specific. 
An interesting recent study looked at whether dogs would be 
more likely to steal food in the presence of a human when the room 
was dark (Kaminksi, Pitch and Tomasello, 2013). Testing twenty 
eight dogs, they found that dogs were more likely to take the food 
when the food and the human were in darkness. Figure 7 above 
illustrates the four conditions of Kaminski et al.’s study. They 
found that dogs hesitated the longest intaking the food when the 
room was lit, whether or not the human was illuminated at the same 
time. The authors rule out the possibility that dogs have learned to 
Figure 4 : The four conditions. 
Figure 5. The layout of the different experimental conditions. 
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use illumination of the food as a discriminative stimulus to guide 
whether or not they take the food. This is because dogs actually 
approached the illuminated food faster when there was no human 
present. Therefore, the authors conclude, their study presents 
evidence that dogs can take into account humans’ visual 
perception of the food and use this to guide their behaviour. 
However, this is a tentative conclusion. More research is needed to 
clearly determine what dogs attend to when gauging a human’s 
attentional state and whether or not there is more at work in the 
alteration of behaviour seen in the studies outlined above than could 
be explained by low-level associative processes and operant 
learning. 
1.3.5. Deduction 
 
Erdőhegyi, Topál, Virányi and Miklósi (2007) tested dogs’ ability 
to perform deductive inferences. Their hypothesis was that if a dog 
was shown two possible hiding places and then shown which of the 
hiding places was empty, he would be able to deduce that the food 
reward was in the other hiding place. Importantly, the human 
participant called the dog’s name to catch its attention, and 
alternated her gaze between the dog and the container that she 
manipulated to demonstrate that it was empty. But what happened 
was, in contrast to the finding of Scheider et al. (2013), that even 
when the dogs were shown that one of the containers was empty, 
they still chose the empty container much more than was expected 
by chance, leading the researchers to the conclusion that the dog 
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could not infer the location of the food reward by exclusion. In light 
of these results, Erdőhegyi and his team thought that maybe the 
empty container was made more attractive by the human 
participant’s manipulation of it. This would explain why the dog 
would choose the empty container despite the obvious absence of 
food in the empty container. 
To test their conclusion, Erdőhegyi et al. designed a further test. 
The experiment was set up in the same way as before except the 
experimenter handled and tapped both boxes, not just the empty 
one. In this experiment, the dogs chose the container with the food 
reward inside more frequently than was expected by chance. Miklósi 
(2008) suggested that according to these results dogs do have the 
ability to perform simple inferences but their performance in such 
tests is easily overridden by social cues. This suggestion was 
controversial though and other researchers concluded that it is 
doubtful whether the dogs in this study were solving problems by 
virtue of inferential reasoning (Watson, Gergely, Topál, Gácsi, 
Sarkozi and Csányi et al. 2001; Collier-Baker et al., 2004 and 
Collier-Baker et al., 2006). 
Reasoning by exclusion is the form of deductive inference that 
Erdőhegyi et al. (2007) were testing for in the study described 
above. Since their study, a more rigorous one has been designed 
and carried out by Aust, Range, Steurer and Huber (2008). The first 
step, they write, to testing for reasoning by exclusion is to 
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determine whether the subject is able to choose an ‘undefined’ item 
(an item that does not already have an association to the dog - 
such as a novel object). This is essentially the same skill that 
Kaminski et al. (2004) were testing when they tested fast mapping 
in highly trained dogs like Rico in the experiment described above.  
But the choosing of the undefined, novel item may be due to  
other factors; therefore, they remark, it is only ‘if stability of the 
novel association  in the presence of unfamiliar rather than familiar 
alternatives is maintained, [that] 
reasoning by exclusion can be 
inferred’ (Aust et al., 2008, 
p.588). The participants were 
trained in a computer-controlled 
two- choice procedure which 
means they were presented two 
pictures on a computer screen 
and reinforced either negatively 
(no consequence was provided) 
or positively (a reward was 
obtained) for choosing one of the 
pictures. After the initial training, 
dogs were presented with a 
picture they had not seen before 
alongside a picture that they had 
prior experience with. They found 
Figure 6. a. A pigeon, a dog, and a student 
working with their respective versions of the 
computer-controlled two-choice procedure. 
Pigeons and dogs were trained in Skinner- 
boxes to prevent distraction and social 
cueing. The human participants were visually 
separated from the experimenter by an 
opaque wall. b. The stimuli used to 
investigate reasoning by exclusion. Top panel: 
- Four training stimuli belonged to the 
positive class (S+) for half of the subjects of 
each group (Group A or Group B) respectively) 
and to the negative class (S-) for the other 
subjects. Bottom panel: Four test stimuli in 
the top row were shown together with S- in 
test 1 and together with the novel stimuli (S’’, 
bottom row) in test 2 (Aust et al., 2008, 
p.589). 
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that half of the dogs and almost all the humans in the study chose 
the novel positive stimulus (a novel picture which they did not know 
was a positive stimulus) over the negative stimulus (the familiar 
picture) reliably. Their choice, Aust et al. argue, was based upon 
inferring positive class membership to the novel picture by 
excluding the negative stimulusand showed evidence of reasoning 
by exclusion (Aust et al. 2008, p. 587). The results of Aust et al.’s 
experiment also corroborate the results of Erdőhegyi et al. that 
social cues from handlers and a bias toward using social cues can 
inhibit dogs’ use of reasoning by exclusion in experimental settings. 
Aust et al.’s experiment neatly controlled for neophilia 
confounding the results of their study. To do so, they presented the 
novel positive stimulus from the first test described above along with 
a new ‘novel’ stimulus (a picture that the participant had not seen 
before Test 2. Most of the participants showed no bias toward 
choosing the picture they had not seen before over the picture 
which had been a positive stimulus in the previous test. In their 
discussion, Aust et al. conclude that their findings demonstrate that 
dogs can reason by exclusion. We should note, however, that this 
skill has been shown in their experimental setting. This is a different 
claim to the statement that dogs will use reasoning by exclusion 
adaptively in their interactions with their environment. What is of 
interest now is whether similar reasoning processes are observed in 
dogs interacting with their daily environment. This is an important 
step because it may be that in the experimental setting the dogs 
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had learned to reason by exclusion, indeed they were taught to do 
this in the training trials, but whether dogs will exhibit reasoning by 
exclusion as they face ethologically appropriate tasks has yet to be 
shown. 
In summary, when we are examining cognition in domestic 
dogs and other animals it would serve us well to take this further 
step and see if we can find the skills demonstrated by well-
designed studies such as Aust et al.’s (2008) study in an animal’s 
interactions with his natural environment. By doing this we can 
hopefully make solid hypotheses regarding the cognitive 
processes behind the dog’s behavioural repertoire. When thinking 
about the use of deductive inference in dogs I struggle to find 
examples of when this skill may be used in their self-directed 
interactions with the world or in the actions required of them by 
humans. For example, for the behaviours (some of which are listed 
above) required from the highly trained guide dog as he guides a 
person to a location, it is not obvious that deductive reasoning is 
necessary, the guide dog is highly trained to respond in particular 
ways in specific situations. However, it would be useful to further 
examine the potential for dogs’ use of deductive inference in the 
context in which it might be used. Moreover the studies described 
above emphasise that the effect of domestication coupled with 
dogs’ experience with humans may have provided them with traits 
likely to prepare dogs to efficiently learn from humans in a wide 
range of situations (Kis, Topál, Gácsi, Range, Huber, Miklósi, and 
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Virányi, 2012). These traits may override other types of cognitive 
skill such as reasoning by exclusion and explain why dogs’ 
performance in experimental settings can be offset by erroneous 
handler cues. 
1.3.6 Understanding object permanence 
 
Tracking and hunting prey places a heavy cognitive load on an 
animal’s informational processing skills (Gibson, 1979). To pursue 
an object of prey, an animal must precisely discriminate and 
anticipate prey movements. Dogs, being cooperative hunters 
have the additional task of discriminating and anticipating the 
movements of other pack members. Furthermore, pursued prey 
can and does move out of sight. Tracking an animal requires the 
ability to locate hiding prey, and other behaviours such as hunting 
as a pack and mating demand interaction with other pack 
members that the dog may be unable to directly perceive. 
Étienne (1995) defined three different groups of strategies that 
animals use to find hidden physical or social objects. The first level 
is observed in various predatory species such as spiders and 
insects. The behaviours that characterise this first level of finding 
hidden targets involve ‘stereotyped movements or postures that 
increase the probability of contacting and catching prey that has 
disappeared. These behaviours occur over a short period of time 
and are only directed toward objects of immediate survival value’ 
(Fiset et al., 2000, p.1). At the second level, instrumental learning 
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has furnished the animal with the ability to find out of sight objects 
that they have had previous experience in searching for in that 
particular location. Rabbits and chicks reportedly demonstrate an 
ability to locate hidden objects using instrumentally acquired skills 
(Fiset et al., 2000). However, the skills acquired at level two are not 
easily generalised to novel situations and are quite rigid in their 
structure. Therefore, Fiset et al. conclude that there is a third skill 
acquired by some non-human animals in some situations. The third 
and highest level of skills related to locating hidden objects is 
‘spontaneous and active search behaviour’ (Fiset et al., 2000, p.1). 
According to Étienne (1995), creatures engaging in this type of 
searching behaviour are demonstrating an understanding of object 
permanence. The cognitive structure that is said to enable an 
animal to cope with aspects of their environment that may not 
always be visible is object permanence. 
The notion of object permanence was first developed by Piaget 
(1952). Piaget outlined several stages that human infants pass 
through which culminate in true object permanence. Since Piaget 
first developed his theory, researchers have used his framework to 
test for similar cognitive skills in animals. At stage one, an animal or 
human infant will not try to look for an object when it goes out of 
sight. Stage two is achieved once the animal or infant tries to 
pursue the object after it has moved out of sight. Stages three and 
four involve recovering a partially (three) and fully (four) hidden 
object from the place where they saw it disappear. The tasks that 
91 
 
are involved in determining whether an animal or human infant is at 
stages three or four are often called visible displacement tasks. 
Stage five is reached when the animal or infant will retrieve an item 
that has first been hidden in several locations, then exposed, then 
hidden again in several other locations. Tasks to test for stage five 
are often called successive visible displacement tasks and at this 
level some degree of object permanence is thought to be manifest. 
At stage six, the final stage, an animal or infant can master what 
is known as an invisible displacement task analogous to this one: a 
target object is hidden in a container, which is then moved behind a 
screen. The screen hides the container (and the object within it) 
from view. The target object is then transferred from the first 
container to the second (without the animal or infant seeing). The 
animal or infant is shown that the container is now empty and if he 
or she is able to infer where the item is now hidden they are said to 
understand object displacement (Piaget, 1952). 
According to Gagnon and Doré, the skills that have been 
developing in a non-human animal or human infant as it progresses 
through the stages are: an understanding that an object continues 
to exist even when it is not visible (this capacity develops from 
stage four); the ability to infer the location of an object from the 
perceptual information available to the subject ‘as well as from a 
mental reconstruction of movements that were not directly 
perceived but that were signalled’ (Gagnon and Doré, 1993, p. 
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247). Whether or not the subject does indeed use a mental 
reconstruction of the object’s movements in its inference is 
questionable, but certainly in the studies I shall review shortly on 
object permanence in dogs, the subjects do appear to make some 
kind of inference regarding the location of a no longer visible object. 
There are differences between the stages that different species 
reach. For example, in some studies, cats and dogs have 
succeeded in visible displacement tasks but not in invisible 
displacement tasks (see Doré, 1986; Dumas and Doré, 1989; Fiset 
and Plourde, 2013).  Cats, these studies conclude, can represent 
an invisible object but only when the object moves out of sight 
before their eyes.  Cats and dogs, however, reach the visible 
displacement tasks (stage five) more quickly than monkeys with 
dogs arriving at stage 5 between 5-7 weeks. But it seems to take 
another few months before they are capable of object 
displacement (Reznikova, 2007, p. 136). The precise age at which 
dogs have been said to understand invisible object displacement is 
as yet undetermined. That they do develop it is suggested by 
previous experiments and it is possible that dogs develop an 
understanding of invisible object displacement based on higher 
cognitive processing requirements, such as those required by 
cooperative hunting (Gagnon and Doré 1994). 
In the ‘80s, tests of object permanence in domestic dogs and 
wolves began. Frank and Frank (1986) tested 10 week old 
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malamutes and wolves on object manipulation tests. They found 
that the wolves’ behaviour displayed greater understanding of 
object displacement than the puppies of the same age. Thus, 
they suggested that cognitive differences may exist between 
wolves and dogs and these differences may be the result of the 
different species being faced with tasks of differing complexity. 
Despite the promising research on dogs and object displacement, 
Reznikova tells us that only great apes and parrots so far have 
been found to consistently pass corresponding tests to achieve 
stage 6 of the tests for object permanence (Reznikova 2007, 
p.136). However, until recently, researchers of dog cognition 
have been more confident than Reznikova suggests. This is 
largely due to the work of Gagnon and Doré on object 
permanence in domesticated dogs. 
Gagnon and Doré (1994) tested sixty nine domestic puppies. 
Five groups of ten dogs were formed to examine object 
permanence in domestic dogs between the ages of four and six 
weeks. Three boxes were used and placed in the subject’s most 
familiar environment, the litter nest (a pilot study showed that testing 
the puppies in an unfamiliar setting had a detrimental effect on the 
puppies’ ability to respond to the task). Different sets of boxes were 
used depending on the height of the puppy. Two experimenters 
were involved, one to restrain the puppy in front of the boxes, 
another to manipulate the target item behind the boxes either in 
sight of the pup or out of sight of the pup, depending on whether the 
94 
 
test was for visible displacement or invisible displacement. To keep 
the target object out of sight of the pup, it was moved behind a 
fourth box. Gagnon and Doré found that pups at 5 weeks began to 
search behind the boxes for a mobile object and could find it if the 
object was only partially hidden. By 7 weeks, pups could search for 
and find the object if it was totally hidden. However, they would only 
do this if search behaviour began before the object disappeared 
from view entirely. In these trials, the object was hidden in full view 
of the pups (visible displacement). However, none of the 8 week, 3 
month or 9 month old pups succeeded at levels beyond chance in 
the invisible displacement problems. Trial and error learning 
seemed to best account for the success of some of them during 
these trials. Older dogs of 11 months of age did better at the 
invisible displacement problems. Gagnon and Doré conclude that 
dogs do develop an understanding of object permanence. Each 
stage of object permanence is acquired gradually until somewhere 
between 9 and 11 months dogs are able to succeed at invisible 
displacement tasks. They refer back to Gibson’s remark that 
predators like the dog must be able to cope with a large amount of 
information processing in order to succeed at hunting and dealing 
with conspecifics. Although Gagnon and Doré are hesitant to 
attribute as necessary an understanding of invisible displacement to 
the development of complex social interactions, they do 
acknowledge that understanding invisible displacement might assist 
other, higher cognitive processing in dogs. 
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In Gagnon and Doré’s 1992 study, they performed an 
experiment to test whether dogs were using scent cues to solve 
invisible displacement tasks by using rose water to disguise the 
scent of the target objects. In the scent controlled condition, the 
objects were sprayed with rose water and fans were set to blow the 
scent around the room. In the other condition, there was no attempt 
at odour masking. The dogs performed better in the visible 
displacement tasks than the invisible displacement tasks, in line with 
other results. And there was no significant difference in the results 
between the scent-controlled condition and the condition without 
control for scent cues.  On the basis of this experiment, there was 
little control for odour cues in their later 1994 experiment. The odour 
controls in their 1994 study involved the placement of the target 
objects in the litter nests of the pups and the boxes in which the toys 
were hidden were rubbed with the toys before the trials began. 
However, it is possible that in their 1992 study, the odour cues were 
not successfully masked and the dogs were still using scent cues to 
track objects. Controlling for scent cues in experiments with dogs is 
an immense, maybe impossible, task. 
In a different study Fiset, Beaulieu and Landry (2003) examined 
whether dogs’ success in visible displacement tasks declined if 
there was a time interval between the hiding of the food reward and 
the dog being allowed to search for it. They hypothesised that dogs’ 
performance would decline as the time interval got incrementally 
longer. In their first experiment, the time intervals increased by 10 
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seconds each time, and as expected the dogs’ performance did 
decline as they got longer but remained above chance. In their 
second experiment, the increase in time intervals got bigger, this 
time increasing by 30 seconds after each trial. The dogs’ 
performance still declined, but remained above chance until the 
interval lasted 240 seconds. During the time intervals an opaque 
screen was placed between the dog and the place where the object 
had been hidden. Throughout the time intervals the dogs tended to 
turn their heads from side to side. This behaviour, which was not 
predicted, lent weight to the idea that the dogs were not orienting 
their heads to the location of the hidden object as a non-mnemonic 
way of locating the hidden food. The most likely explanation of the 
dogs’ success in the tasks set is, according to Fiset et al. (2003), 
that dogs encode and maintain an active representation of the 
hiding location in working memory during the retention intervals. 
When the dogs failed to find the hidden object, they were still 
searching in the correct general area, suggesting that they 
remembered roughly where the object went but could not locate its 
position specifically. According to Fiset et al., their results support 
the hypothesis: 
… that dogs do rely on a mental representation to 
memorise the spatial information of the target hiding 
location. This suggests that the strength of the memory 
trace of the hiding location decreased gradually in the 
dogs’ working memory in the minute following the 
97 
 
object’s disappearance behind the target  location.  
However,  how  dogs  maintain  the  spatial information 
about the hiding location in working memory for a 
relatively long period of time (240 s) is still unknown. One 
possibility is that dogs might use a form of rehearsal to 
keep the hiding location active in memory. However, our 
experiments did not provide any cues about this 
possibility and for the moment, this remains purely 
speculative (Fiset et al., 2003, p. 8). 
 
Despite their outward success, there are some troubling issues 
with the experiments on object permanence with domesticated dogs. 
The most prominent of these is that there appears to be inadequate 
control for the effect of scent cues on the performance of dogs in 
these tasks. Moreover, dogs are extraordinarily perceptive of human 
social cues and we should determine, therefore, whether they might 
be responding to environmental or social cues rather than an 
understanding of object displacement. Social cues can even be as 
slight as the detection of adrenaline from an experimenter if the dog 
begins to respond correctly, or the perception of visual cues. 
Collier-Baker, Davis and Suddendorf (2004) found that dogs 
failed invisible displacement tasks when tested under stricter 
conditions. Their experiment involved hiding the target item 
underneath a displacement device (the box behind which the object 
was moved in the invisible displacement trials). The displacement 
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device was then moved between boxes visible to the dog. The 
target item was hidden in one of the boxes and the dog had to work 
out which one was the target box (where the item ended up being 
hidden). They compared the performance of dogs under the 
following conditions: when the head and body of the experimenter 
who performed the manipulations were hidden, and when the first 
and last box visited by the displacement device was not the target 
box, and the final position of the displacement device relative to the 
target box. They found that the performance of the dogs was similar 
to chance when the last box visited by the displacement device was 
not the target box. The movement of the displacement device was 
the environmental cue by which the dogs seemed to be searching. 
In addition, when the displacement device was non-adjacent to the 
target box after the object had been hidden, the dogs mainly failed 
the invisible displacement tasks. Interestingly, they found that 
whether or not the experimenter was visible did not seem to affect 
the dogs’ performance on invisible displacement tasks. So in this 
study the dogs did not appear to be using information from the 
experimenter to solve the task. Instead their responses seemed 
most affected by the position of the displacement device and 
whether or not the last box visited was the target box. This gives us 
some insight into the environmental cues the dogs were trying to 
use to solve the invisible displacement task and obtain the target 
object and highlights the importance of allowing for the possibility 
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that our initial thoughts about what dogs may attend to in such 
situations may not be accurate. 
Even though Collier-Baker et al.’s study (2004) revealed no 
effect of experimenter presence on dogs’ performance in the 
invisible displacement tasks, Fiset and LeBlanc (2007) looked more 
deeply at the issue of whether dogs might be responding to cues 
accidentally given by the experimenters. In one condition, visual 
perception of the experimenter who manipulated the object was 
blocked by a screen. In the other condition, the dogs could see the 
experimenter. They set the experiment up in the same way as 
Gagnon and Doré (1994); there were four boxes displayed on a 
platform in front of the dogs and the displacement device was 
always placed at either end of the row of boxes. They conducted 
visible displacement trials and invisible displacement trials. During 
the visible displacement trials, the dogs mostly watched the object 
the whole time in both conditions. In these trials the dogs mainly 
succeeded in the tasks. However, in the invisible displacement 
trials, the dogs looked at the experimenter manipulating the boxes 
for most of the trial (in the condition where the experimenter was 
visible). In this condition, the dogs succeeded in the tasks at a 
significant level. But when the experimenter was not visible the 
dogs’ performance decreased. 
 
This study suggests that domestic dogs do use the 
experimenter to increase their chance of success in invisible 
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displacement problems. However, this effect was relatively subtle 
because it increased the performance of dogs solely in the invisible 
displacement trials in which the target location was one of the two 
boxes adjacent to the experimenter. In summary, Fiset and LeBlanc 
found that the dogs seemed to be using the experimenter as a 
landmark for guiding their search behaviour when the displacement 
device was moved behind one of the boxes next to the 
experimenter. Thus, they conclude: It appears that the dogs also 
hierarchically organized the visual cues available in an invisible 
displacement task: the dogs primarily searched as a function of the 
displacement device but when the experimenter was visible, they 
showed a tendency to use both sources of information. In 
conclusion, the present study supports the assumption that 
domestic dogs do not understand invisible displacement problems 
but rather search as a function of the final position  of  the  
displacement  device  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the position of the 
experimenter (Fiset and LeBlanc, 2007, p. 223). 
 
Therefore, in this study Fiset and Leblanc still found that the 
positioning of the displacement  device  played  a  large  role  in  
determining  the responses that the dogs produced. The use of the 
experimenter’s position also appeared relevant but only in connection 
with the position of the displacement device. Similar results may have 
been found in Collier- Baker’s study had the experimenter been in 
closer proximity to the displacement device. 
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In 1994, Rutkowska hypothesised that studies that appeared to 
demonstrate a human infant’s understanding of object permanence 
were merely a case of the infant’s eyes continuing to track an object 
along the same path that the object was taking when it disappeared 
out of sight. In Rutkowska’s study, infants were presented with an 
object moving on a course which involved its being out of sight for a 
moment. She noticed that as the object moved out of sight the infant’s 
head and eye movements simply did not change. They continued at 
the same speed and direction so that when the object reappeared, 
the infant’s gaze was at more or less the correct place. 
In light of the findings outlined above, we must be really careful 
when attributing cognitive skills to non-human animals, and before 
we can be confident of domestic dogs’ understanding of object 
permanence, further studies need to be conducted using strict 
controls for scent and social cues because these can have a 
confounding effect. One of the traits that domestication has 
furnished dogs with is the tendency to use human cues readily 
when problem solving. Kis et al. (2012) found that dogs have a 
strong tendency to commit the A not B error (recall from the above 
discussion on page 60). In their experiment, when the potential for 
the dog to use handler cues was removed from the trial, dogs’ 
performance in finding an object that had just been moved to a new 
location substantially improved. On their results they write: 
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We replicated the finding that dogs have a strong tendency to 
commit the A-not-B error after ostensive-communicative hiding 
and demonstrated the crucial effect of socio-communicative cues 
as the A- not-B error  diminishes  when  location  B  is  ostensively  
enhanced. These findings further support the hypothesis that the 
dogs’ A-not-B error may reflect a special sensitivity to human 
communicative cues. Such object-hiding and search tasks 
provide a typical case for how susceptibility to human social 
signals could (mis)lead domestic dogs (Kis, et al, 2012, p. 737).  
Humans’ subtle cues have even been shown to affect dogs’ 
performance in scent detection trials, so it is quite possible that in 
object permanence experiments unintentional experimenter cues are 
affecting the dogs’ performance. Moreover, sometimes dogs’ 
reliance on human cues is such that information provided by 
humans can override other environmental cues such as the scent of 
a desired object. For example, Szetei, Miklósi, Topál and Csányi 
(2003) found that half of the dogs in their study would choose an 
empty bowl of food on the basis of a human’s cue rather than a bowl 
in which the dogs were able to see and smell food.  
In a similar vein, Lit, Schweitzer and Oberbauer (2011) 
hypothesised that dogs will use human cues over environmental 
ones. Lit et al. suggested that handler beliefs may affect trained 
scent detection dogs’ performance in virtue of the Clever Hans effect 
- the unintentional giving off of subtle behavioural and postural cues. 
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They found that handler beliefs did affect the dogs’ performance. Lit 
et al., set up a study using trained explosive detection dogs and their 
human handlers. Their experiment involved placing decoy scents, 
paper markers (decoy signs indicating falsely to handlers the 
presence of a target scent) and target scents (marijuana and gun 
powder) in different locations around a church (a location which had 
never been used before for scent detection training or experiments). 
It was a double-blind experiment and each dog/handler team 
searched the church twice. Handlers were told that each condition 
might contain up to three target scents and target scent markers (the 
paper markers) would be present in two conditions. No information 
was provided about the decoy scent. The aim of the experiment was 
to see if despite decoy scents for the dogs and decoy markers for 
the handlers whether the dogs would alert correctly at the place 
where the target scent was laid. 
Interestingly, many incorrect alerts from the dogs were 
given. In particular, more alerts were identified on the locations 
marked by the paper marker than on locations where the target 
scent had really been placed, or where there was a decoy scent 
(i.e. sausages and tennis balls). 
 
The authors ruled out the possibility that handlers were 
mistakenly signaling their dogs’ alerts since the handlers were all 
experienced in responding to a clear and discrete ‘alert’ behaviour 
from their dog. Moreover, when the handlers were debriefed at the 
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end of the study all were visibly surprised at the results of the 
experiment in which they’d just been involved. 
Therefore, it seems that in this study the dogs were affected by 
their handlers’ perception of the paper markers and signaled an 
alert in response to the handlers’ unintentional cues. The authors 
write that a likely explanation is that dogs respond not only to 
scent, but to additional cues issued by handlers. This is likely since 
in training alerts are obtained from the dog in response to overt 
cues, such as vocal cues and physical prompts from their 
handlers. The authors go on to suggest that: 
 
When considering alternative explanations for the incorrect 
responses, it is further possible that some alerts resulted from 
target scent contamination during initial set up of conditions. This 
is unlikely, given the  emphasis  of  alerts  toward  marked  
sites,  particularly  when considering that the initial pattern of 
alerts was modified by human influence. The array of alert 
locations also does not support this explanation notably because 
no dogs alerted on or around the doors where the scent 
containers had briefly been placed. Moreover, detection  dogs  
are  trained  to  identify  scent  source  rather  than scattered 
residual scent. For example, dogs trained to alert on gunpowder 
are not expected to alert in an airport area simply because an 
armed officer passes through (Lit et al., 2011, p.393). 
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In summary, dogs are exceptionally susceptible to subtle cues 
from humans which can influence their behaviour in certain 
experimental conditions. Although it was not always the case in the 
studies outlined in this section, as Lit and her colleagues have 
shown in their experiment, the beliefs of handlers and 
experimenters does (at least) have the potential to significantly 
affect the behaviour of dogs. This, coupled with the finding that 
human cues can be used over and above environmental cues such 
as the presence of a scent (Szetei et al., 2003; Kupan et al., 2011), 
makes controlling for the Clever Hans effect vital to the reliability of 
experimental conclusions such as conclusions regarding whether or 
not dogs understand object permanence. Moreover, we need to 
consider the possibility that dogs may be more likely to be affected 
by unintentionally given cues from humans they are familiar with; it 
may be that the confounding effect of unintentional experimenter 
cues is less potent when the experimenter is a stranger to the dog. 
We ought also to consider the possibility that understanding object 
permanence is task and situation specific. The embodied cognition 
paradigm emphasises that cognitive skills such as understanding 
object permanence are likely to be task and situation specific 
because cognition is a dynamic interplay between the dog and the 
environment. When we add into consideration that dogs’ 
domestication and experiences with people have fostered a 
tendency toward their using social cues from humans above other 
sources of information and their own problem solving tactics it is not 
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surprising that the understanding of object permanence is tricky to 
demonstrate in an experimental setting. It would be more useful 
perhaps to examine dogs in their different walks of life and observe 
any instances during which an understanding of object permanence 
might explain their behaviour. 
1.3.7 Understanding the connection between means and ends 
 
Piaget observed that around 8 months of age, human infants 
moved beyond what he called ‘circular reactions’. By this, he meant 
that the infants progressed from simply relying on operant 
conditioning in learning about the world to understanding cause and 
effect.2 Since Piaget, researchers of animal cognition have been 
interested in whether animals are capable of this further level of 
understanding: 
understanding the 
connection 
between an action 
and its effect. One 
reason why this 
skill is so 
interesting is that 
knowledge of the 
connection between means and.ends is argued to underpin the 
                                                             
2 In classical conditioning, the behaviour from the animal is brought about by the conditioned 
stimulus, such as Pavlov’s dogs’ salivation response to a bell. In contrast, operant conditioning 
involves voluntary behaviour in that the animal’s behaviour is not automatically caused by the 
stimulus. The probability that a response will be elicited by a stimulus is instead a function of prior 
reinforcement. That is, the consequences a particular behaviour has received in response to a 
stimulus affect the chance of the animal producing it in future presentations of the same stimulus 
Figure 7 The experimental set up. In this picture, the dog is 
attempting to access the food reward by pawing at the box 
(Osthaus et al., 2005). 
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capacity to transform an intention into a plan (Osthaus Lea and 
Slater, 2005, p. 37). Osthaus, et al. (2005) tested whether or not 
dogs were capable of understanding the connection between means 
and end. They looked at whether dogs would learn that pulling on a 
piece of string dragged a piece of food previously out of reach into a 
position where they could consume it. They set up a low, flat box 
with a transparent top so the dog could both see and smell that 
there was a reward in the box but out of reach. Attached to the 
reward was a long piece of string that lay on the floor and poked out 
through the side of the box nearest to the dog. When confronted 
with this problem, Osthaus et al. found that the dogs two problem- 
solving strategies: Either they would paw close to applied the food 
regardless of. whether the string was at the site they were pawing. 
Or, if the string was in the site that was closest to the food, the dogs 
would still paw close to the food and paw at the string as well. If the 
latter of these strategies proved successful, its performance was 
rapidly perfected; eventually, the string was reliably pulled and the 
food reward obtained. Thus, Osthaus et al.’s study showed that dogs 
were able to learn to obtain the food by pulling at the string. 
However, they concluded, rather than doing so by learning the 
connection between the string and the food, dogs do so by through 
operant conditioning over several attempts. They do not develop a 
means- end understanding in relation to the task. 
To explain this result, the researchers suggest that perhaps 
dogs have lost some of their ability to solve problems. That is, they 
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fail to learn the means-end connection because in their cooperation 
with humans, the human provides cues to aid the dog’s problem 
solving. An analogous experiment was conducted on string pulling 
using language-trained and non-language trained African grey 
parrots by Irene Pepperberg in 2004. Pepperberg found that two 
language trained parrots demonstrated no means-end 
understanding when confronted with the same task. The parrots 
simply asked their human trainers to give them the treat. In 
contrast, the parrots with no language training solved the problem 
easily. 
Osthaus et al. (2005, p.46) conclude their discussion by 
saying ‘it appears that the availability of human-aided solutions to 
problems can sometimes inhibit the expression of animals’ 
cognitive abilities’. The results of this experiment are similar to 
those of other problem solving tasks that dogs are faced with. 
We saw above that dogs seemed to perform quite badly in 
problem solving tasks such as pulling a handle to drag a 
container bearing a food reward toward them. Their performance 
appeared to be quite poor especially in comparison with wolves 
faced with the same problem. 
A more recent study, however, compared dogs’ ability to solve 
string- pulling tasks to wolves’ ability (Range, Moslinger and 
Virányi, 2012). They found was that neither wolves nor dogs 
demonstrated the ability to solve string-pulling tasks and so there is 
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no evidence of an understanding of means-end connections. This 
leads to the possibility that domestication is not at fault for dogs’ 
lack of understanding of a means-end connection, as the authors 
concluded. There was a difference between the dogs’ and wolves’ 
performance but it existed in the types of errors they made, not in 
an aptitude for understanding the means-end connection in the 
experiment. 
Moreover, it may be misleading to couch the dogs’ performance 
in these experiments in terms of a lack of understanding or a deficit 
in problem-solving ability.  Rather, as has already been suggested, 
they might just be accustomed to using a different method of 
problem solving. Much as we would use a calculator to solve a hard 
sum, dogs likely simply refer to their human for the solution. This is 
still problem solving, just as our solving the sum by using a 
calculator is still problem solving. The dog is problem solving in 
Osthaus et al.’s study by off loading cognitive work onto an aspect 
of their environment. This is an important thought because it applies 
to all the other experiments in which dogs may use social cues as 
an aid to problem solving. Our co-evolution with the dog has 
adapted him to do just that, so separating his use of social cues 
from his ability to problem solve may be tricky. This is because for 
domestic dogs, problem solving in certain situations simply involves 
reliance on human cues. Often, in the presence of humans, dogs 
will paw at a door, or near an unobtainable yet desired item in what 
seems like a request that an object be retrieved, or manipulated on 
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their behalf. Whether or not the dog is aware of what he is doing 
makes no difference to whether his activity counts as problem-
solving. When a child rotates a block to work out whether it will fit 
into a slot, she does not necessarily need to be aware that she is 
rotating the block as a means to solve the problem she faces. The 
fact that she does it is enough for her action to count as problem 
solving by reducing some of the cognitive load by rotating the block. 
But what does this tell us about the dog’s understanding of the 
relationship of means to ends? We have seen in previous 
experiments that dogs tend to solve problems by ‘looking up’ the 
answer in referring to a human, and this could be what they were 
doing in the string pulling experiment. The authors acknowledged 
this possible explanation for the dogs’ behaviour, but they 
overlooked the possibility they may still have an understanding of 
using certain means to achieve an end. Pepperberg’s language 
trained parrots, if their non-language trained counterparts are 
anything to go by, were able to solve a means-ends task analogous 
to Osthaus et al.’s experiment, but they chose to refer to the humans 
for aid with the task instead. Perhaps the same thing happens with 
dogs. An interesting experiment would be to repeat Osthaus et al.’s 
study with human experimenters present in one trial and with human 
experimenters absent in another. 
Furthermore, tasks such as learning to pull on a string to achieve 
a goal bear little relation to the problems that dogs face in their 
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natural environments, especially where food is involved. An 
additional explanation for dogs’ failure in the string pulling task could 
be due to what is known as the proximity bias. The proximity of food 
is thought to trigger an inherited predisposition to just go for the food 
directly, especially if the dog has beenfood deprived for the 
experiment. This instinctive reaction may overshadow any 
recognition of means-end connections, and in combination with the 
inability to inhibit this response, could lead to the proximity bias of 
dogs and their failure in string pulling tasks (Lea et al. 2006). 
Moreover, if we bear in mind that dogs’ cognitive capacities are 
context and action specific, then we ought to realise that a means-
end understanding will also be context and action specific. In a 
dog’s natural environment (say the sheep farm of a working dog) a 
means-end understanding may be present. 
Even if the dog is not aware of the connection between the 
means and end, the connection is there nevertheless. For example, 
even if he is not conscious of it, there must be a connection for the 
dog between his actions and what the flock of sheep will do. This is 
integral to the Collie’s success in herding sheep. However, take the 
same dog and confront her with the string pulling task and she may 
simply not be able to generalise this knowledge to the task. The 
Border Collie’s cognitive skills have been learned in direct relation 
with her performance (and evolved from her ancestors’ 
performance) of certain tasks. Therefore, the sheep dog has 
evolved to herd sheep and demonstrate an understanding of 
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means-end connections which is context dependent rather than an 
abstract skill. 
 
But the question may come to mind, ‘isn’t the Collie just acting 
from instinct? Does she really have an understanding of the effects 
her actions will have on the sheep? This is a line that many people 
adopt but it implies that for cognitive skills, such as means-ends 
understanding, there must be conscious thought processes. This 
need not be the case. For example, when my niece was first 
learning to walk, her dad would sit with her standing across the 
room from me and I would sit a few metres away and beckon her 
with my arms open. Keira’s goal was to reach me. Doing so involved 
leaving my brother and walking the short distance between us. It is 
uncertain whether Keira was explicitly conscious of the means-end 
connection: that ‘to get to aunty, I have to walk the distance between 
me and her’. Whether or not she was actively aware of that fact 
does not negate the possibility of a cognitive link between her 
walking across the room and her goal of getting to me. My point is 
that in the cases of Keira learning to walk and the Border Collie 
rounding up the sheep, understanding may not be a conscious 
awareness of a representation of her present state, coupled with a 
representation of her desired future state plus the means by which 
the two are connected. Rather, a means-end connection may 
instead (in animals and infants) reside in voluntary, controlled 
actions that are performed in response to a situation. Perhaps a 
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conscious understanding of means-ends connections is integral to 
human understanding of cause and effect, but it need not underpin 
understanding in non-human animals or infant humans. 
 
 
1.3.8 Counting 
 
West and Young (2002) 
suggested that domestic 
dogs may have the ability to 
count. Individually, 11 dogs 
were encouraged to watch 
three biscuits being placed 
behind an opaque screen. 
On one trial, the 
experimenter (out of the 
dog’s line of sight) removed 
one of the biscuits. The 
screen was subsequently 
removed. The length of the 
dog’s gaze at the two 
remaining biscuits was then 
measured. On another trial 
the same procedure was 
repeated but no biscuits were removed from behind the screen. 
Figure 8 The experimental setting for West and 
Young’s experiment. 
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West and Young found that the dogs’ gaze duration was 
significantly longer on the trials where a biscuit was removed 
compared to the trials where all three biscuits were left behind the 
screen. Measuring gaze duration is a method that Piaget 
developed for use with children. It is called the technique of 
observing ‘expectancy violation’. West and Young (2002) 
concluded that their results showed that dogs gazed for longer if 
there were either more or fewer biscuits than they expected 
(images from Cooper et al.,2003). The reason for this, they 
tentatively hypothesised, was that the dogs may have been able 
to count or use simple arithmetic to determine the number of 
biscuits there ought to be after the screen was removed. However, 
there is little direct evidence to support this conclusion from the 
dogs’ overt behaviour. Alternatively, the results may be interpreted 
as a simple form of object permanence or delayed matching to 
sample.3 This interpretation would be fair except that the dogs 
never actually saw the biscuits behind the screen, but rather the 
placing of the biscuits. Consequently, they would have had to 
transfer observed information involving movement to a position 
behind the screen to location information once the screen was 
removed, rather than actually having seen where the biscuits were 
placed. This transfer implies, at the very least, some concept of 
                                                             
3 In delayed matching to sample, a short delay (or retention interval), typically in the range of 0 to 10 
s, separates the sample and onset of the choice stimuli. For example, a pigeon would be presented 
with a sample, a red square for example. After a short delay, the pigeon would be presented with 
three squares of different colours, one of which is red. The pigeon must match the choice stimulus 
to the sample presented earlier. 
115 
 
number of objects, though it would not be fair to infer any more 
than simple subitising of number.4 It may therefore be that dogs 
only represent numbers of objects as “one”, “two” and “lots” 
(Cooper et al., 2003, pp. 235-236). But, the number of potential 
confounding variables present in this study renders it very difficult 
to assess whether it was appropriate to measure gaze duration. 
For example, when a dog’s sense of smell is focussed he will, if 
instructed not to move, point his nose in the direction of the 
interesting scent. The scent of the food rewards would have been 
strong in this experiment and rather than gazing at the number of 
biscuits revealed behind the screen, the dogs may have just been 
sitting obediently focussing on the scent of the food rewards. 
This experiment is a good example of why it is often 
problematic to take human-centred experimental measures and 
apply them to non-human animals. Measuring gaze duration in 
human infants seems appropriate. But in dogs it is difficult to 
assess whether the dogs were gazing longer at the biscuits 
revealed, or whether the primary sense at play was olfaction 
since the nose would also be directed toward the area of 
interest. Therefore, at this stage, we ought to hesitate before we 
accept West and Young’s conclusions from this experiment, the 
hypothesis that dogs are capable of even the simplest arithmetic 
                                                             
4 Subitising refers to immediately knowing how many items lie within a visual scene for a small 
number of items. It is to have a rapid and confident judgement to know at a glance and without 
counting to identify the number of items in a group.  For example, when a dice is thrown the 
observer at a glance immediately and accurately knows how many dots lie on the face of the dice 
without counting. 
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needs to be much more thoroughly tested. One area of 
examination is whether testing gaze duration is an appropriate 
measure in animals whose sight plays a less significant role 
than for humans. 
 
Such a project is worthwhile though, since at a most basic level 
it may be adaptive to be able to be able to discern how many dogs 
there are in a hunting pack or how many members of a rival pack 
there may be. This most basic ability might be akin to simply being 
able to act differently depending on the perceived quantity of pack 
members on a hunt. For example, Bonanni, Natoli, Cafazzo and 
Valsecchi (2011) examined free- ranging dogs in social conflict 
situations and found evidence to suggest that dogs could assess 
the numbers of opponents in another social group. They found that 
the overall probability of a dog aggressively approaching opponents 
increased as the size of the opposing group decreased. They write: 
… the probability that more than half the pack members withdrew 
from a conflict increased when this ratio increased. The skill of 
dogs in correctly  assessing  relative  group  size  appeared  to  
improve  with increasing the asymmetry in size when at least 
one pack comprised more than four individuals (Bonanni et al, 
2011, p.103). 
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Based on Bonanni et al.’s study it is possible, therefore, that 
dogs are capable of some assessment of number. This may be quite 
different from being able to count, in the human sense, though. For 
example, the authors note that it is possible that the dogs in their 
study were basing their assessments of group size not on the 
number of individuals in the opposing group, but on another variable 
which is a reliable indicator of the size of the opposing pack. A 
variable of this kind might be, they write, ‘the total surface area 
occupied by pack members’ (Bonanni et al., 2011, p. 
113). Another, perhaps more likely, indicator of pack size may be 
related to the strength of the scent stimulus provided by the 
opposing pack - for example a stronger, or more complex scent, 
emanating from the opposing pack could be a reliable indicator of 
pack size (I will return to this point shortly). 
So, even with the results of Bonanni et al.’s experiment, we 
should be wary of coming to the conclusion that dogs can count. 
The beauty of Bonanni et al.’s study is the manner in which it was 
conducted. The authors sought to test a hypothesis by observing 
dogs in an ethologically appropriate setting to see if they could find 
evidence of a skill within the dogs’ natural behavioural repertoire. 
Moreover, Prato-Previde, Marshall-Pescini and Valsecchi (2008) 
found that dogs could discriminate between larger or smaller 
quantities of food on a plate. In their study, the dogs would, more 
times than would be expected by chance, approach a plate holding 
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the larger quantity of food. Moreover, in a later condition, when dog 
owners encouraged the dog toward the plate holding less food the 
dog chose that plate over the fuller one. These results, the authors 
conclude, provide evidence that the dog could discriminate 
quantities; hence they could choose the fuller plate over the emptier 
one. But, the dogs would allow human cues to override their 
perception of greater or lesser quantities when the human 
encouraged them toward the emptier plate. Horowitz, Hecht and 
Dedrick (2013) recently asked whether dogs could discriminate 
quantities using their sense of smell. In Horowitz, Hecht and 
Dedrick’s (2013) study, dogs were also presented with quantity- 
discrimination, but in one condition the quantities of food to be 
compared were covered, rather than being visible to the dogs. This 
was in order to test whether quantities could be assessed by smell, 
rather than by sight. The first condition gave the choice of two plates 
to the dogs: one was laden with five pieces of hot dog; the other 
held only one piece. On the assumption that dogs will, if given the 
chance, choose more food over less they expected that if the dogs 
could discriminate between the two quantities presented to them, 
then they would always choose the larger. The plates were placed 
equal distances from the dog and the dog was released and allowed 
to make a free choice between the two covered plates. 
Horowitz, Hecht and Dedrick found that in contrast to Prato-
Previde, Marshall-Pescini and Valsecchi’s (2008) study, the dogs 
did not reliably choose the plate with the larger quantity of food on 
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it. Only ‘Sixty-one percent of dogs (39 of 64), given a choice 
between closed plates with one and five morsels of food, 
approached plates with the larger quantity: not significantly more 
than approached plates with the lesser quantity’ (Horowitz, Hecht 
and Dedrick, 2013, p.212). In their second condition, however, 
they replicated Prato-Previde et al.’s (2008) findings, except the 
plates of food remained covered. Their results showed that owner 
enthusiasm over a plate holding less food reliably led the dogs to 
choose that plate in the experiment. So whether or not dogs do 
assess quantities such as ‘more’ or ‘less’ on the basis of smell 
remains uncertain and future research is needed into the issue of 
whether dogs can assess numerical quantities and how they 
might do so. What is clear again from the studies I have just 
outlined is the influence of the cues of a familiar person over the 
dogs’ responses. 
 
1.3.9 Forming expectations about the near future 
 
It has long been believed that animals are only capable of 
planning for events in the immediate future (anticipatory planning).  
‘Anticipatory behaviour is behaviour that is influenced by 
expectations about the future, such as future states of the 
environment, future actions or merely anticipations about the way 
things work in a given situation’ (Reznikova, 2007, p. 93). Classical 
and operant conditioning results in an organism being able to 
anticipate, at least on a sub-personal level, future events on the 
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basis of aspects of the immediate environment or present actions. 
But the idea that animals could anticipate events further into the 
future in novel situations has met with much resistance (Gulz, 
1991). In support of the theory that animals are capable of basic 
planning and predictions of future events, Hunter (1912) found that 
chimpanzees reacted with what appeared to be unhappiness when 
their preferred rewards were replaced by less desirable items. 
Being able to form basic expectations about the consequences of 
behaviour in novel situations would be an adaptive cognitive skill 
because it would facilitate anticipatory behaviour, so this topic is 
worth investigation. For a dog to effectively herd sheep she must 
be able to anticipate the sheep’s actions in response to her 
behaviour. The sheep’s behaviour may be novel to the dog 
depending on the landscape she is working on or the handler’s 
commands.  Also when a dog is hunting prey, the prey’s 
movements may not be the same as the movements of prey in 
previous hunting occasions so it seems possible that there are 
cognitive adaptations allowing the dog to anticipate future events in 
situations where operant conditioning alone cannot furnish him with 
the appropriate response. One mechanism by which the dog may 
be able to anticipate future events is through the use of context 
dependent representations of his body’s movements and the 
movements of his prey. I will argue that in this instance, as with 
many others, the theory of embodied representation that I adopt 
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can provide a possible explanation for how this adaptive behaviour 
may be achieved. 
 
1.3.10 Categorisation of objects 
 
Some ability to categorise objects in a non-human animal’s 
environment must be innate; to be able to categorise types of 
foliage as ‘food’, or ‘not food’ is fundamental. Zentall and his 
colleagues (2008) report an experiment conducted on 
categorisation in chimpanzees (Fujitsa and Matsuzawa, 1985 as 
cited in Zentall et al. 2008). A chimpanzee was shown a picture on 
a screen. In order to keep viewing the same picture,the chimp had 
to continuously touch a response key. Analysis of the intervals 
between responses and the duration of responses revealed that the 
chimpanzee preferred to view the photographs which contained 
people.  He or she rarely pressed the key repeatedly to keep 
viewing photographs that did not contain people. Sands, Lincoln 
and Wright (1982) conducted a similar experiment with rhesus 
monkeys. Rhesus monkeys were trained to move a lever in one 
direction if two successively shown pictures were similar. They 
found that the monkeys tended to respond ‘same’ to monkey and 
human faces, and to trees and flowers. These results seem to 
suggest that the monkeys were able to categorise the pictures of 
humans and monkeys into one category and the trees and flowers 
into another. 
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Also on this topic, Sands et al.’s study highlights an important 
point: what are clustered together somehow may be different across 
animal species. For example, a human participant would most likely 
have formed two separate categories for the trees and flower, yet 
the monkey grouped them together. Dogs might choose a different 
way of grouping again, perhaps based upon scent or the actions 
associated with objects. Much of how an animal categorises must 
depend on their perceptual acuity across the senses. For example, 
humans might use visual features more than any other features to 
categorise items. Zentall et al. write: ‘to our eyes, cats resemble one 
another much more than they resemble flowers, cars or chairs’ 
(2008, p.17). Dogs, in contrast, might place cats in the same 
categories as ducks, rabbits and sticks: things to chase. 
Categorisation by the monkeys in Sands et al.’s study might depend 
on some kind of representation of features of the previous slide. This 
would explain their responding ‘same’ when presented with the slide 
that they categorised as similar. 
Categorisation, being able to sort objects and events into classes 
of some type, allows the animal to transfer knowledge about 
previously encountered aspects of the environment to novel yet 
similar ones: ‘if a new environment can be identified as being similar 
to an old one, then prior learning can be applied, thereby reducing 
the costs and risks associated with new trial and error learning’ 
(Zentall et al., 2008, p.13). It has seemed, however, that research 
on human categorisation is disconnected from research on non-
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human animal categorisation, except perhaps in the work of 
developmental psychologists (Wasserman and Rovee-Collier, 
2001). In their paper, they suggest that the ability to perceive 
similarity may be something that we are just born with and is an 
ability that underwrites our capacity to form perceptually based 
representations. Furthermore, they suggest, there seems no reason 
why this trait is not built into certain non- human animals either. 
 
Wasserman et al. (1988 as cited in Zentall et al., 2008) did an 
experiment which examined the relative speeds of pigeons’ learning 
to sort the same pictorial stimuli into human conceptual categories 
or into totally arbitrary categories. The experiment showed that 
pigeons learned to sort the pictures into the human conceptual 
categories much faster than they learned to sort the pictures into the 
arbitrary categories. Another experiment conducted by Astley and 
Wasserman (1992, as cited in Zentall et al., 2008) had pigeons 
learn to distinguish between positive stimuli (those reinforced with 
food) and negative stimuli (not reinforced) using 60 slides. Twelve of 
the slides were S+ stimuli (positive stimuli) and 48 were S- stimuli 
(negative stimuli). All eight birds were given the same S- stimuli: 12 
people, 12 flowers, 12 cars, 12 chairs. Different birds had different 
S+ stimuli: one bird’s might be 12 different cars, or 12 different 
chairs, 12 different flowers or 12 different people. The authors write: 
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Assuming that the S+ stimuli are equally similar to all 48 S- 
stimuli, the errors should be randomly distributed among the 
four S- categories, including the one from which the S + stimuli 
were picked.   But,   if,   to pigeons, members of a given human 
conceptual category more closely resemble one another than 
they resemble  members      of      different conceptual 
categories, then errors should be non randomly distributed and 
should be disproportionately committed to the S- stimuli from 
the same category as the S+ stimuli (Zentall et al., 2008, p.18). 
 
Zentall et al. (2008) found that the errors were significantly non-
random with respect to whether the S+ slides were of people, 
flowers, chairs or cars. This experiment concludes that pigeons 
group similar stimuli together even when that grouping is unrelated 
to them getting reinforcement because the study did not reinforce 
the pigeons for grouping together the S+ stimuli with the similar 
members of the S- Stimuli. As we saw, it counted as an error. Here, 
the birds showed an untrained propensity to commit errors in 
classing the members of the S- stimuli group with members of the 
same conceptual category in the S+ group.  ‘A strong perceptual 
basis for conceptualization is clearly implicated by the results of this 
study’ (Zentall et al., 2008, p.18). Studies into categorisation in non-
human animals gained popularity after Herrnstein and Loveland 
(1964) found that pigeons could be trained to peck at pictures 
containing humans and not to peck at those that did not contain 
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humans. They suggested on the basis of these results that pigeons 
were capable of forming a concept of humans. 
 
Very little research has been done, however, on categorisation in 
domesticated dogs. In fact, before 2008, the only experiment that I 
could find is Heffner’s (1975) study on acoustic categorisation in 
dogs. Heffner trained dogs to distinguish between two types of 
sounds: ‘dog’ sounds, like barks and growls, and ‘non-dog’ sounds. 
After training, Heffner’s dogs could categorise correctly ‘dog’ and 
‘non-dog’ sounds which they had not previously encountered during 
training. In regards to visual categorisation in dogs, the first 
experiment was conducted very recently. Range, Aust, Steurer and 
Huber (2008) examined three aspects of visual categorisation in 
dogs. They looked at whether dogs are able to distinguish between 
complex colour photographs, on the basis of what they depicted; 
and whether they could then sort novel photographs according to 
the same experimenter-intended rule by looking at the visual 
properties of the photograph. They also examined whether the rule 
the dogs were using to sort the photographs was similar to one a 
human would use. Using four companion dogs with basic obedience 
training, Range and his colleagues trained the dogs to firstly 
distinguish between a S+ stimulus and an S- stimulus. Their 
apparatus was a computer touch screen which flashed up the visual 
stimuli. The dogs were trained to touch the stimuli on the screen with 
their nose. Correct responses elicited a short tone and a food 
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reward. Incorrect responses elicited a buzz, followed by a red 
screen and then the stimuli were re-presented. Gradually they 
trained the dogs to distinguish between landscape pictures (S-) and 
dog pictures (S+). In their experiment, test one required the dogs to 
distinguish between novel dog pictures (S+) and novel landscape 
pictures (S-). Test two had the dogs distinguishing between novel 
dog pictures on a familiar landscape (S+) and a novel landscape (S-
). The dogs were being tested to see if they could classify the 
pictures by the presence or absence of dogs. In the first test, they 
found that the performance was excellent. The dogs transferred to 
the novel stimuli very well and performed at levels significantly 
above chance. The second test required the dogs to choose a 
stimulus on the basis of one aspect of the picture (whether there 
was a dog in the picture). In this test, three of the four dogs’ 
performance was worse on the test stimuli than it was on the training 
stimuli. Nevertheless all the dogs still gave correct answers at a 
significant level. A similar study performed with pigeons by Aust and 
Huber (2001) produced analogous results. In a test like the Range 
et al.’s second test, the extraneous information in the pictures also 
did not significantly prevent the pigeons from being able to classify 
the pictures on the basis of the presence or absence of a target 
stimulus. The combination of Aust and Huber’s pigeon study and the 
present one, Range et al. write, ‘suggests that both dogs and 
pigeons made use of a category-based response rule with 
classification being coupled to category-relevant features’ (2008, p. 
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345). However, in their discussion, Range et al. cite several studies 
similar to theirs which found contrasting results; results which 
suggest that the subjects weren’t responding to the experimenter-
intended target at all but were using some alternative response 
strategy (see D’Amato and Van Sant 1988; Greene 1983; Huber et 
al. 2000; Troje et al. 1999). 
 
Therefore, it seems that the dogs of Range et al.’s (2008) study 
could learn to classify the pictures, but it is unclear whether they are 
classifying them on the presence or absence of dogs or whether 
they are using some other selection strategy. The worst case 
scenario is that the dogs were simply basing their responses on 
items that dependably correlated with the presence or absence of 
dogs in the stimulus. The same concern applies to all the 
experiments mentioned above with different species of non-human 
animal. We must be very careful when discussing categorisation in 
non- human animals. Rather than trying to figure out the basis upon 
which dogs are categorising stimuli we should look at how their 
categorisations are being used in their interactions with their natural 
environment. 
 
1.4 Summary 
 
In summary, this chapter has made the following main points: If 
we are to design and conduct experiments to learn about the 
cognitive skills of dogs, we should be hesitant about applying tests 
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designed for humans to animals. Many of these tests may not be 
appropriate for non-human animals and it is likely that we need to 
design species-specific tests for effective investigation into the 
cognitive skills of animals. Moreover, scent cues and social cues 
pose an almost immeasurable threat to the validity of experiments 
on dogs and I believe that much research is needed upon the 
effective control of scent cues in the experimental setting before we 
can be sure that they have been effectively addressed. Moreover, 
in all cognitive skills that we study in the dog, the question should 
be asked ‘how does this skill manifest in the dog’s daily 
interactions?’ and ‘how might this skill be adaptive?’ For example, 
in the experiments upon whether dogs make deductive inferences it 
was possible that the dogs learned how to do so in the 
experimental setting, but less certain was whether they would use 
this skill in their normal interactions with their environment. An 
important question to ask is ‘Would there be a time when this skill 
within the dog would be useful to the dog or cultivated for its 
usefulness to humans?’ Lastly and perhaps most importantly, we 
ought to remember that most, if not all, of the dog’s cognitive 
capacities are action-based and context specific. So while we may 
or may not see a particular cognitive skill within an experimental 
setting it may be present in a certain context. For example, the 
dog’s ability to count has proven hard to assess, yet observational 
studies of dogs may elicit information on this ability in a natural 
context. 
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Observational studies can provide a spring board for more 
rigorously controlled experiments refining our tests for context-
specific, action-based cognition that we observe in dogs’ diverse 
walks of life. I will argue in Chapter Two that we should focus on 
what we do know about the cognitive skills of the domesticated 
dog. There are philosophical principles from the embodied 
cognition paradigm that we can use to guide us in thinking about 
dog cognition. These principles lay the foundation for 
understanding cognition in dogs, from the ground (or the dog) 
upwards. In Chapter Two I outline embodied cognition as a set of 
guiding principles by which we can approach our study of non-
human animal cognition. Chapter Three demonstrates how they 
can be successfully applied to thinking about cognition in the 
domesticated dog by showing us what we can be confident of when 
thinking about the cognitive skills of dogs. 
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Chapter Two: Embodied cognition 
 
A new way of thinking about cognition and representation has 
emerged called ‘embodied cognition’.  Although its rise in popularity 
has been recent, the embodied cognition thesis has roots that go 
back to early 1900s. Vygotsky wrote: 
 
The use of notched sticks and knots, the beginnings of writing and 
simple memory aids all demonstrate that even at early stages of 
historical development humans went beyond the limits of the 
psychological functions given to them by nature and proceeded 
to a new,  culturally-elaborated  organization  of  their  behavior  
(Vygotsky,1978, p.39). 
 
Shortly after Vygotsky’s English translation of his book was 
published in 1978, Gibson, in his 1979 work The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception, laid further foundations for a more 
holistic view of the mind. Part of Gibson’s contribution was to point 
out that from the point of view of any human or animal, the 
environment is simply a series of opportunities for action. The 
world around is seen by agents as a collection of affordances: 
‘Affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, 
what it provides or furnishes either for good or ill (Gibson, 1979, 
p.127). Gibson’s theory emphasises the interaction between 
animal and environment. He takes it as fact that the animal 
agent’s cognitive processes and behaviour can be causally 
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dependent on features in the environment and builds upon this 
notion his theory of affordances. Elsewhere, Gibson remarks that 
‘the observer may or may not perceive or attend to the affordance, 
according to his needs, but the affordance, being invariant, is 
always there to be perceived’ (Gibson, 1979, p.139). In short, 
Gibson emphasised cognition as a dynamic interaction between 
the environment and a human or animal, preparing the ground for 
embodied cognition. After Gibson’s (1979) book came out, there 
was a corresponding shift within the growing field of robotics. 
Researchers began to emphasise routines for interacting with the 
environment rather than the use of internal representations for 
thought (Wilson, 2002, p. 625). This kind of approach is 
fundamental to embodied cognition and consequently, ‘there is a 
growing commitment to the idea that the mind must be understood 
in the context of its relationship to a physical body that interacts 
with the world (Wilson, 2002, p. 625). 
Embodied cognition involves a paradigm shift in the way we 
view the mind, cognition and behaviour.  It is often construed as a 
rejection of the main tenets of traditional cognitive science. While 
most researchers within cognitive science no longer conceive of the 
mind as an immaterial substance as opposed to the body as a 
physical substance, mental processes, according to traditional 
cognitive science, are still something ‘inner’, separate from physical 
actions and the environment; the controlling force, responsible for 
producing behaviour. On this view, the emphasis placed on 
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cognition is restricted to the domain of the brain. Embodied 
cognition theorists, on the other hand, hold that cognitive processes 
are not just confined to a person’s neural structures within the brain. 
For advocates of embodied cognition, our cognitive processes are 
heavily influenced and constrained by and distributed across our 
physical bodies. In this way, cognitive processes are often played 
out in the behaviour of a person, deeply affected by the 
environment a person is in, and, in short, a person’s surroundings 
and physical body are integral to cognitive processing. For 
example, Rob Wilson discusses the children’s puzzle game Rush 
Hour. Rush hour involves moving rectangular wooden blocks 
around in a wooden frame. He writes, 
 
… we solve the problem by continually looking back to the board 
and trying to figure out sequences of moves that will get us closer 
to our goal, all the time exploiting the structure of the environment 
through continual interaction with it. We look, think, we move. But 
the thinking, the cognitive part of solving the problem, is not 
squirreled away inside us, wedged between the looking and the 
moving, but developed and made  possible  through  these  
interactions  with  the  board  (Wilson, 2004, p.194). 
And van Gelder elucidates the thought that, 
 
The cognitive system is not just the encapsulated brain; rather, 
since the  nervous  system,  body,  and  environment  are  all  
constantly changing and simultaneously influencing each other, 
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the true cognitive system is a single unified system embracing all 
three. The cognitive system does not interact with the body 
and the external world by means of the occasional static 
symbolic inputs and outputs; rather, interaction between the inner 
and outer is best thought of as a matter of coupling, such that 
both sets of processes continually influencing [sic] each other’s 
direction of change (van Gelder, 1995, p. 373). 
 
2.1 Three important aspects of embodied cognition 
 
Three main aspects of the role of the body are emphasised 
within the embodied cognition thesis. I touched upon these briefly 
above and will expand upon them further now. 
 
2.1.1 Bodily boundaries 
 
Firstly, the body sets the boundaries and potentials for 
perception; in other words, our body constrains the sorts of 
perceptual processes we can have. Clearly, a dog’s sense of smell 
opens up a world of scent which is unattainable to human beings. 
There are scents and sounds, imperceptible to us, which can be 
used in a dog’s cognitive processes such as the development of a 
dog’s memories and his learning. The bodily structure of human 
beings entails less developed olfactory-based cognition than the 
dog possesses. Indeed some forms of cognition may just be 
impossible to achieve given a creature’s physical nature and the 
limits placed on what she can perceive. For example, dogs’ poorer 
discrimination of colour renders fine distinctions between many 
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shades of colour such as shades of yellow and orange impossible 
for them. Therefore, tasks which involve discriminating objects 
based upon their colour may be impossible for dogs when the 
colours of the objects are shades of yellow and orange. To 
summarise, the physical body sets the boundaries for cognitive 
processing; it determines what is possible and what is impossible 
for an agent to perceive and, therefore, cognise. 
2.1.2 Body as regulator 
 
In addition to constraining cognition, it makes sense to 
suppose that the body regulates cognition. The body acts out our 
decisions and provides a connection between the environment 
and an agent’s responses which enables quick reactions to the 
situations we find ourselves in. The type of body we have 
determines the types of responses we can perform. For example, 
hunting behaviours of dogs are very different to hunting 
behaviours of cats. The cat’s body is built for stealth: silence, 
camouflage and fluid motion. The dog on the other hand will 
typically hunt in a pack and use speed and strength over the 
cat’s stealth tactics. The thought here is that an agent’s physical 
body determines the nature of her responses and the nature of 
her cognitive processing. 
 
2.1.3 Body as distributer 
 
Lastly, the body takes on some of the work involved in cognitive 
processing. An often cited example is the use of gesture as an aid to 
communication. Here, much of the meaning of our words can be 
135
135
135 
 
conveyed through the gestures which accompany them. Another 
example of the body distributing cognitive processing to include non-
neural structures is when a child is attempting to fit jigsaw puzzle 
pieces together. She will rarely sit and study the pieces to determine 
their fit; rather the child will try to join a pair, perhaps fail, rotate one 
or both of the pieces and then try again. In this way, the child is 
working out a solution to the puzzle not via internal thought alone, 
but by getting involved with the pieces and physically rearranging, 
rotating and refitting. 
The three concepts outlined above are a useful, albeit general, 
way to introduce embodied cognition (Wilson and Foglia, 2011). 
There are various theories within embodied cognition and what 
follows next is a discussion of these main views. Later on, I will 
outline the main principles which underpin these predominant 
views within embodied cognition. These principles form the most 
significant strands of embodied cognition within the current 
literature. 
 
2.2 Embodied action 
 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s (1991) book The Embodied 
Mind is a starting point for many who are new to the subject. 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch reject traditional cognitive science 
and propose their own theory called ‘embodied action’. Central to 
the embodied action thesis is the notion that an agent’s body 
directly affects its perception of the world, and its cognitive 
processes. For example, a sea mammal such as a dolphin will 
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perceive and cognise differently to a land mammal such as a horse. 
The differences between the perceptual abilities of these mammals 
will lead to different actions and different perceptual abilities. The 
idea at the heart of Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s thesis is that 
perception and action are inseparable. They each determine the 
other; and it follows that the species-specific perception-action 
cycle of each type of agent results in accordingly species-specific 
types of cognitive processes. Here is a quote from their book: 
 
By using the term embodied, we mean to highlight two points: 
first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that 
come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, 
and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded ina more encompassing biological, 
psychological and cultural context. By using the term action we 
mean to emphasize once again that sensory  and  motor  
processes,  perception  and  action  are fundamentally 
inseparable in lived cognition (1991, p.173). 
 
In this passage, the authors mention that sensorimotor 
capacities are embedded in a biological, psychological and cultural 
context. What they mean is that because members of a species 
share the same types of neural hardware, perceptual apparatus 
and  bodily  structures,  they  will likely share a worldview.   The 
worldview of members of two different species, however, is 
probably very different. This point highlights further the  notion  
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from  the  discussion  in  the  opening  chapter  that  studies 
designed to test cognitive capacities of the dog need to be 
designed for that species; it is questionable whether the application 
of a study designed for another species (such as humans) is 
appropriate for testing cognition in dogs given their difference in 
worldview. The other important point to take from Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch’s passage is that it is not possible to separate cognition 
from action. Thus, when studying cognitive skills of an animal, like 
the dog, we are essentially studying their actions also. This is a 
slight shift in thinking, for often actions are considered an indicator 
or indirect sign of cognitive processing; but on this view, cognition is 
manifest in actions, it is literally visible in the actions themselves. An 
example of cognitive processing being literally visible in action is 
that form of problem solving in dogs that consists of a dog looking 
to the human handler for cues regarding the appropriate course 
of action. In the same way, the search behaviour of a dog can be 
seen as the visible workings of the dog’s cognitive processes as he 
searches his environment. 
 
Viewing cognition from this alternative angle has implications for 
how we view representations. Representations are traditionally 
considered to be  an  inner,  invisible  to  the  observer,  structure  
or  process  within  an agent’s brain which may or may not guide 
behaviour. As I will argue in later chapters, if cognition is visible in 
behaviour then it makes sense that components of cognition, i.e. 
representation, are also visible in behaviour. 
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2.3 Thelen’s conception of embodied cognition 
 
Esther Thelen applied dynamical systems theory to cognitive 
science and her theories are also foundational to the embodied 
cognition trend. In their 2001 article, Thelen, Schöner, Scheier and 
Smith write: 
 
To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily 
interactions with the world. From this point of view, cognition 
depends on the kinds of experiences that come from having a 
body with particular perceptual and motor capabilities that are 
inseparably linked and that together form the matrix within which 
reasoning, memory, emotion, language and all other aspects of 
mental life are meshed (2001, p.1). 
 
On the face of it, the quote above provides no rejection of 
traditional cognitive science. Even Jerry Fodor, who adopts an 
explicitly internalist view of representations, would accept that 
perception and action influence an agent’s cognitive processes. 
Indeed there are few traditional cognitive scientists who would take 
issue with this claim. However, the key to understanding Thelen et 
al.’s comments lies in grasping the fact that for Thelen, as with Varela 
and Rosch, perceptual and motor capabilities are inseparable from 
an agent’s cognitive processes. The standard cognitive scientist will 
argue that cognitive processes are a pre-curser to perception and 
action. For example, my making a sandwich arises from the cognitive 
decision to make lunch – the making of the sandwich is no part of the 
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cognitive processing surrounding lunch making, rather it’s an output 
of such a process. As Shapiro puts it ‘cognition [for Thelen et al.] is 
embodied insofar as it emerges not from an intricately unfolding 
cognitive program, but from a dynamic dance in which body, 
perception and world guide each other’s steps (Shapiro, 2011, p. 61). 
That the relationship between an animal’s body and actions is 
dynamic is the key point here. Moreover, the relationship between 
cognition, action, experience and perception is holistic; each 
influences the other in a constant  interplay.  This  strand  of  
embodied  cognition  helps  us  to recognise   the   interconnected   
nature   of   environment,   experimental settings, past experience and 
cognitive functioning. 
 
2.4 Clark and Chalmers’ extended cognition 
 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers use the phrase ‘a coupled 
system’ to describe cognitive processes that incorporate the 
physical body. They write: 
 
In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external 
entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that 
can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. All the 
components in the system play an active causal role, and they 
jointly govern behaviour in the same  sort  of  way  that  cognition  
usually  does.  If  we  remove  the external component the 
system’s behavioural competence will drop, just as it would if we 
removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled 
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process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or 
not it is wholly in the head (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p.2). 
 
 
Clark and Chalmers’ view of embodied cognition is more 
encompassing than that of Thelen and Varela and Thompson and 
Rosch. For Clark and Chalmers, cognitive processes involve an 
agent’s body, but also the environment. For some theorists within 
embodied cognition, such as Clark and Chalmers, cognitive 
processing is an activity made up of neural and bodily structures 
and certain aspects of the world. This is often called the 
constitution hypothesis. It is, in other words, the argument that 
constituents of cognitive processes extend beyond the brain 
(Shapiro, 2011, p. 158). Clark and Chalmers’ view is a radical 
version of the constitution hypothesis. They argue that the mind 
literally extends beyond the body and into the world, a view which is 
often called extended cognition; a more radical view than embodied 
cognition. The main challenge for advocates of extended cognition 
is providing an explanation of how elements of the external world 
can comprise cognitive processes. The example which Andy Clark 
gives to defend this point is that of a person doing long division 
manually. When someone is doing long division manually, they will 
use a pencil and paper. The cognitive processing here involves the 
neural structures engaged in the task and the parts of the 
body which are also engaged in the task, for example looking at the 
paper, manipulating the pencil and perhaps steadying the paper are 
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all tasks which are undertaken by the physical body. In addition, the 
tools used - the pencil and paper - are part of the cognitive process 
of figuring out the long division. That is, according to the extended 
mind hypothesis, each element involved in the task, the neural 
structures, the body and the tools, becomes a part of the cognitive 
process. 
Extended cognition has come under fire from several angles. 
The most  notable  objection  is  from  Adams  and  Aizawa  who  
argue  that extended  cognition  commits  what  they  call  the  
coupling-constitution fallacy. 
 
2.4.1 The coupling-constitution fallacy 
 
Adams and Aizawa argue that none of the advocates of the 
extended mind thesis have yet provided adequate support for the 
move between a causal connection between the brain and external 
elements to the claim that the brain, body and environment together 
constitute a cognitive process. They think that, ‘advocates of 
extended cognition do not take into consideration the possibility that 
what makes a process cognitive is something internal to the 
process, something to do with how it works, rather than what it is 
connected to’ (Adams and Aizawa, 2008, p. 99). 
Other writers have also criticised the extended mind hypothesis 
on this point (Block, 2005; Prinz, 2002 and Rockwell, 2010) and 
there have been some replies. Susan Hurley claims that it is up to 
the critic to specify the difference between coupling, or causation 
and constitution. She sees reason to doubt that such a distinction 
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between coupling and constitution exists. Indeed, it does 
sometimes appear that whether or not an element involved in a 
process is causally related to or constitutive of that process is to be 
decided by stipulation rather than appeal to the nature of that 
element’s relationship to the process. 
For example, Menary (2006) uses the lack of clarity between 
constituent and cause to object to the coupling-constitution fallacy. 
He remarks that Adams and Aizawa’s objection begs the question 
against the extended mind thesis and doesn’t take into account how 
the argument is supposed to work (Adams and Aizawa, 2008, p. 
101). In other words, Adams and Aizawa’s argument first assumes 
that there must be a distinction between coupling and constitution in 
order for the move from an argument about coupling to a statement 
about constitution to be fallacious. However, Adams and Aizawa do 
try to demonstrate that there is a difference between coupling and 
constitution with various analogies.  An analogy that occurs early on 
in Adams and Aizawa’s The Bounds of Cognition goes like this. The 
process of nuclear fission involves a large atomic nucleus being 
broken down into smaller atomic nuclei. Nuclear fission happens 
when the nucleus is split as a result of being bombarded by 
neutrons. The process of bombardment with neutrons causes the 
nuclear fission, but does not constitute nuclear fission. Objectors to 
the distinction between cause and constituent might respond that 
when we define nuclear fission, we could limit our explanation to the 
actual splitting that occurs after the neutrons have done their bit. But 
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this would not be a whole explanation; the bombardment of the 
atomic nucleus is part of the process of nuclear fission. The 
neutrons’ movements are part of the overall process of splitting the 
atom. This is a tricky area and a resolution would be tangential. Until 
the distinction (or lack of distinction) between cause and constitution 
is clarified, the coupling-constitution fallacy will remain a live issue in 
the extended mind thesis. The present discussion accepts the main 
tenets of embodied cognition, but does not follow Clark and 
Chalmers’ lead into the more radical extended mind hypothesis. The 
embodied cognition thesis argues for greater emphasis on the part 
the body and environment plays in cognition, but allows that 
environmental factors may remain outside the realm of what 
constitutes a cognitive process. 
To my knowledge, the coupling-constitution fallacy has only 
been directed at the extended mind hypothesis. However, the 
same objection could potentially be made against the embodied 
cognition paradigm. For example, a critic might object to the 
notion that the physical body and its behaviour constitute part of 
an agent’s cognitive processing. The fallacy within the embodied 
cognition thesis, the critic might continue, lies within the thought 
that the argument that ‘cognitive processing is intrinsically linked 
to behaviour and the body, therefore the body and behaviour are 
part of cognitive processing’ is a fallacious one. 
My take is that the reason the coupling-constitution fallacy is not 
generally levelled at embodied cognition is because the inseparable 
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role of the body in cognitive processing is more readily accepted 
than the parallel role of the environment in cognitive processing 
inherent within extended mind theories. Moreover, the use of the 
body in the development of cognitive skills is apparent from early 
childhood. The way a child learns how to do a jigsaw puzzle in my 
explanation above is one example of many that could be given. 
Children’s interactions with their world are heavily physical. Objects 
are explored and learned about according to their touch, sound, 
smell, taste and feel. Knowledge of things is acquired by the 
physical manipulation of them. Knowledge of cause and effect is 
acquired by trying things out. In short, beginning in babyhood our 
cognitive processing relies upon physical movements and 
manipulation of our environment. As our brains develop we engage 
more and more in abstract reasoning uncoupled with physical 
movements, yet still engage in a substantial amount of cognitive 
processing which involves behaviour and our physical body. 
This explanation has not addressed the coupling-constitution 
fallacy though. The critic could still object that in early childhood 
cognitive processing is simply coupled more frequently with 
physical movements, tapering off slightly as our brains mature. 
There is still no basis from which we could argue that physical 
movements are an intrinsic part of cognitive processing, the slide 
from coupling to constitution is still fallacious, one might argue. 
Accepting Adams and Aizawa’s point that there is a distinction 
between coupling and constitution, (and their point that we cannot 
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assume that because behaviour is coupled with a cognitive process 
that it is therefore part of it), I suggest that there are instances where 
behaviour is merely coupled with a cognitive process and instances 
where the relationship between behaviour and cognition is more 
intimate. 
More precisely, in some cases, cognitive processing is 
internal and may be coupled with physical movements as an aid 
but not a necessary component. In other situations, the physical 
movements of an agent are integral to and constituent of the 
cognitive process. 
For example, in young children, the putting together of a jigsaw 
puzzle would be impossible without the ability to manipulate the 
pieces, rotate and refit them until the child finds the solution. To 
prevent the child from acting in that way would prevent her from 
solving the problem. 
In this situation, the behaviour constitutes an important part of 
the cognitive process and is not merely coupled with an inner 
mental state. In adults we can look at the puzzle pieces and, while it 
might be trickier, the solution can be found using internal thought 
processes alone. In the event that an adult does pick up a puzzle 
piece to rotate and refit until she has found its spot, this behaviour is 
complementary to the cognitive processing, not constitutive of it. 
In a nutshell, if a cognitive process cannot take place in the 
absence of bodily movements and behaviour, then those physical 
elements are constitutive of the cognitive process. In contrast, if the 
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cognitive process is possible (within reason) in the absence of bodily 
movements and behaviour then those physical elements are 
coupled with the cognitive process not constitutive of it. 
Clark and Chalmers’ point from above applies also here: ‘If we 
remove the external component the system’s behavioural 
competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain’ 
(1998, p.2). In these situations, the behaviour (and in Clark and 
Chalmers’ extended cognition thesis, aspects of the environment) is 
part of the cognitive process. When a similar effect can be 
competently achieved without the physical component then the 
behaviour is coupled with the cognitive process, not part of it. 
In summary, nothing in the embodied cognition literature entails 
accepting that behaviour is always an integral part of cognition. In 
some cases behaviour does constitute cognitive processing 
because without certain actions the agent’s cognitive processing is 
impeded. Because the focus of this dissertation is canine cognitive 
processing, the types of cognitive processing I focus on are those 
likely to be constituted by certain actions and behaviours, more so 
perhaps than if I were writing about normal adult human beings 
where the focus might be more on abstract cognitive skills and inner 
mental states. The following section outlines the basic principles of 
embodied cognition and begins to demonstrate the suitability of fit 
that embodied cognition has in the study of the cognition of non-
human animals such as dogs. 
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2.5 Basic principles of embodied cognition 
 
The environmental niche that a being has evolved to occupy 
affects the types of cognitive processes it develops. This is not a 
controversial claim and most traditional and embodied cognitive 
scientists would agree. In addition, the physical shape and the type 
of neural structures and networks that an agent has determines the 
types of cognitive processes he or she is capable of developing and 
using. For example, Lakoff and Johnson write that every creature 
categorises; ‘even the amoeba categorizes the things it encounters 
into food or non-food, what it moves toward or moves away from’ 
(1999, p. 17). However, the sorts of categorisation a creature is 
capable of will largely depend upon that species’ perceptual 
apparatus and on how the creature can move around and 
manipulate objects within its environment.  For example, humans 
are visual and verbal creatures. On this basis, we tend to categorise 
our items in the world according to what they look like or according 
to a verbal definition. Dogs, on the other hand, if they do categorise 
would probably do so according to the affordances associated with 
it. For example, the smell and the movements another animal is 
making may go a long way in helping the dog decide whether it is 
prey or not prey. 
Even in humans, Lakoff and Johnson argue, a large portion of 
our categorisation occurs subconsciously and automatically but 
‘most important, it is not just that our bodies and brains determine 
that we will categorize; they also determine what kinds of 
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categories we will have and what their structure will be’ (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999, p.18). Whether or not Lakoff and Johnson are 
correct in what they say about categorisation being a skill 
possessed by every living being, an agent’s physical body and its 
natural environment shape cognitive processing. To clarify the 
embodied cognition movement by making explicit the fundamental 
tenets, Margaret Wilson (2002) outlines six basic principles that 
underlie a theory of embodied cognition. Here I loosely follow the 
structure of her paper with various additions. 
 
2.5.1 Cognition is situated 
 
The claim that cognition is situated is the claim that cognitive 
processes are inseparable from the environment. Perception and 
action are fundamental to cognitive processes being situated 
because so much of our cognitive processing involves receiving 
inputs from the environment and producing responses that affect 
the environment. Examples of situated cognition in our everyday 
lives are plentiful. For example, cooking a meal, driving a car, 
grocery shopping at the supermarket, all are types of situated 
cognition. They all involve responses to and from the environment 
via our bodily actions and perceptual experiences. Clearly, 
though, there are cases where cognitive processing does not 
involve task-related responses to and from the environment. For 
example, doing sums in your head, or imagining what it would be 
like to win the lottery. These are known as ‘offline’ cognitive 
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processes and do not count as examples of situated cognition 
(Clark, 1997). 
 
With regards to human cognition, it could be argued that not 
many of our cognitive processes are, in fact, “online” or situated 
ones. But in response to this, some have claimed that situated 
cognition is actually fundamental to human cognition because early 
humans would have survived in virtue of situated cognitive 
processes. As William Calvin suggested, it is likely the case that 
some of our ‘higher’ cognitive skills may have evolved from having 
to acquire skills such as accurate throwing and tool-making in order 
to be successful at hunting (Calvin, 2004, p.102). However, even 
when our human ancestors did hunt, it is more likely the case that 
most food was gathered, rather than hunted (Leaky, 1994). This 
being the case, the role of situated cognition becomes less 
important since offline cognitive processes such as planning the 
next day’s search and remembering the locations of areas that in 
the past have provided food are more likely to have been used. 
Therefore, the argument that human cognition is situated is not well 
supported by the evolutionary claim that situated cognition was 
necessary for survival. However, the debate over the extent to which 
human cognition is situated is secondary. Some, possibly most, of 
human cognition is situated, without a doubt and possibly more than 
critics may think. For example, riding a bike, skiing down a hill or 
even doing the dishes involve cognitive processing for which 
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immediate perception of a response to the environment is 
necessary. 
 
2.5.2 Cognition is time pressured 
 
A person in the real world has to cope with events as they are 
presented to her. As we go about our daily lives, events occur 
quickly and often our response times have to be fast to ensure our 
survival. For example, you take a ten minute walk from the train 
station through the city to your workplace. During those ten 
minutes, from the second you step off the train, you are required to 
respond to the physical aspects of the city. It is rush hour. There 
are many cars on the road that you need to cross so you must 
attend to what they are doing and assess when it is safe to cross. 
There are also curbs, lampposts and buildings to navigate your way 
around. And then there is your social environment. You must be 
aware of and respond to the people around you too. Don’t bump 
into anyone; pass those who walk slowly ahead of you in your path; 
and so on. In this short ten minute walk you are required to respond 
to your environment continuously and immediately. In this sense, 
your responding is time pressured. And because your responses to 
your environment are part of your cognitive processing, your 
cognitive processes are also time pressured. 
The time pressure that our cognitive systems must cope with is 
one reason why mental representations are thought to play a lesser 
role, or no role at all, in certain versions of embodied cognition. 
When situations demand fast and continuously evolving responses, 
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there may simply not be the time to build up a full blown mental 
model of the environment, from which to derive an action plan. 
Instead, the claim goes, quicker, more efficient processes come into 
play. As humans, much of what we do is not time pressured. For 
example, going for a walk, reading a newspaper or doing a 
crossword puzzle are usually all performed under little or no time 
pressure. Time pressured tasks such as changing lanes in heavy 
traffic or playing a video game may even be the exception in some 
people’s lives. But I wonder if this is the right way to look at it. It 
seems likely the case that rather than there being either no time 
pressure or time pressure inherent in an activity, the activities we 
perform fall somewhere along a ‘time pressure continuum’. For 
example, going for a walk would be somewhere along the low level 
of the continuum. However, driving down a quiet country road is 
slightly more time pressured than taking a walk. And mountain 
biking down a steep track filled with slippery tree roots would fall 
quite high on the continuum. The time pressured nature of cognition 
is important within embodied cognition because it serves to further 
emphasise the dynamic interplay of environment, cognitive 
processes and physical responding. 
2.5.3 Cognitive work is off-loaded onto the environment 
 
Work on embodied cognition draws on the view that cognition 
deeply depends on the natural and social environment. By focusing 
on the strategies organisms use to off-load cognitive processing 
onto the environment, this work places particular emphasis on the 
ways in which cognitive activity is distributed across the agent and 
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her physical, social, and cultural environment (Suchman, 1987; 
Hutchins, 1995). Fundamental to embodied cognition is the claim 
that we manipulate our environment to take some of the cognitive 
load off our brains. Good examples of this are a child’s use of an 
abacus to help with sums; the use of a pencil and paper when trying 
to figure out which words you can make with your letters in 
Scrabble; writing a list of things to fetch from the supermarket and 
so on. Times when we off-load cognitive work onto the environment 
are ‘typically the cases in which the world is being used as its own 
best model’ (Brooks, 1991, p. 139). In other words, ‘rather than 
attempt to mentally store and manipulate those details about a 
situation, we physically store and manipulate those details out in the 
world, in the very situation itself’ (Wilson, 2002, p. 629). In humans, 
gesturing while speaking is an interesting form of off-loading onto 
the body and provides environmental cues for the listener regarding 
what’s being said. It has been shown that gesturing while speaking 
adds clarity to what is being verbally expressed and helps the 
listener to understand more easily what is being said (Goldin-
Meadow, 2003). The person gesturing is enabling the listener to 
understand what she is saying by providing physical cues (gestures) 
as an aid to understanding. In her book Susan Goldin-Meadow 
argues that, often, listeners are not even aware of the information 
they are receiving from a speaker’s hand gestures. On the topic of 
why we gesture when we speak Goldin-Meadow writes that gestures 
during speech ‘reflect a speaker’s thoughts in a medium that 
happens to be relatively transparent to most listeners’ (Goldin-
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Meadow, 2003, p. 144). Conversely, gestures also reduce the 
cognitive load of the speaker. Goldin-Meadow conducted a study 
that asked children and adult participants to solve a maths problem 
on the blackboard. After having solved the maths problem the 
participants were given a list of things to remember and then asked, 
while still retaining the list in memory, to explain how they solved the 
maths problem. In one condition, the children and adults were 
allowed to gesture and in another condition; the children and adults 
were not allowed to gesture. Those participants that were permitted 
to gesture remembered significantly more items than those who 
were not permitted to gesture. Therefore, she concludes, ‘gesturing 
reduces demands on the speaker’s cognitive resources, thereby 
freeing cognitive capacity to perform other tasks - it lightens the 
speaker’s cognitive load’ (2003, p. 150). 
Another example readily used to demonstrate the claim that we 
can off- load our cognitive load onto the environment is the Tetris 
player’s rotating of the objects to decide whether it will fit into the 
slot beneath it. Similarly young infants will rotate a block to test 
whether it will fit into a slot. This physical manipulation of the object 
saves the effort of rotating the object mentally (Kirsh and Maglio, 
1994). In this way we use the environment, not a representation of 
the environment, to solve problems we are faced with. 
Clark’s version of the idea that we off-load cognitive work onto 
our environment is manifest when he remarks ‘we reduce the 
information- processing load by sensitizing the system to particular 
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aspects of the world- aspects that have special significance because 
of the environmental niche the system inhabits’ (Clark, 1997, p.24). 
We can use Clark’s idea to great effect when we consider the ways 
in which dogs may use their environment as an aid to problem 
solving. For example, in the opening chapter I outlined several 
studies conducted on problem solving in dogs. In a few of them, it 
was commented upon that dogs’ problem solving ability seems to 
rely more upon human cues than wolves’. This is a great example of 
how dogs have come to off-load some of the work involved in a task 
by relying on humans’ cues. That is, they are off-loading cognitive 
work into their environment. While it may appear that dogs’ problem 
solving abilities are diminished in comparison to wolves, it may be 
that dogs have learned a different, more efficient, method by which 
to solve problems. 
 
2.5.4 The environment provides the agent with affordances 
 
How an embodied cognition theorist treats this claim is the 
best indicator of where he or she sits on the moderate-radical 
scale of perspectives within embodied cognition. The moderate 
way to interpret this claim, the route that this thesis adopts, is to 
assert that the environment plays a fundamental role in cognitive 
processing, yet aspects of the environment are not constituents 
of cognitive processes. Extended mind theorists, as we have 
seen above, claim that certain bits of the physical environment 
form part of a person’s cognitive processes. On this view, the 
paper and pencil that you use for your long division are just as 
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much a part of your cognition as the neurons that fire inside your 
brain. 
Whether or not one ascribes to the extended mind hypothesis, 
the organism’s interactions with the environment are emphasised to 
the extent that cognition is seen the dynamic interactions between 
an agent’s neural hardware, body and its environment. However, we 
need to be clear on what counts as a system. Systems are 
comprised of elements that interact in significant ways so as to 
support activities at the level of the whole. The elements must be 
affected by their role within the system and we must also take into 
account the fact that these systems are situated. Consider glow-
worms. Here in New Zealand there are limestone caves that are 
home to glow-worms. All day and night they hang on the ceilings of 
the caves with glowing bottoms. To catch their prey they release a 
sticky string which captures moths that enter the caves attracted by 
the light the glow- worms emit. One way of characterising the glow-
worms’ system is as a system comprised of the glow-worm, his 
sticky string, and the moths he feeds on. But we must recognise the 
fact that the glow-worms’ system is situated in the cave’s system, 
which includes the water within these caves that provides the glow-
worms with the damp environment they need and so on. In the 
same way cognition may be a system, situated within a larger 
system - the biological environment. This is analogous to the 
moderate embodied cognition thesis and is, for our purposes here, 
the most useful approach to take. My overarching aim in this project 
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is to show how embodied cognition can helpfully inform the study of 
non-human animals’ cognitive abilities, and to adopt the extended 
mind thesis does not enhance this. Recognition that cognition is 
irrevocably situated within the environment is enough. The agent’s 
cognitive processing is a system involving neural processes and 
behaviour within the larger system of her environment. 
When considering the agent-environment system in cognition, 
we should also be clear on the context in which the system is 
situated. Often, what count as the constituents of a system is a 
matter of judgement and, as the organism moves around its 
environment, the constituents of the system change. As suggested 
above, the distinction between the role of the environment in a 
moderate embodied cognition thesis and a more radical extended 
mind thesis lies in the extent to which the environment is part of the 
cognitive processing system. For Clark and Chalmers, the cognitive 
processing system includes parts of the environment. For moderate 
embodied cognition theorists, the cognitive processing system is a 
system of its own situated within a larger biological, cultural or 
psychological system. In other words, the cognitive system would be 
a system consisting of interacting neurons in a network. But, ‘in 
order to guarantee a proper functioning of cognition, the process 
has to be synchronised with the environment’ (Riegler, 2002, p.344).  
Furthermore, we should notice that systems can be multi-agent 
systems. For example, when a dog and human come together, or 
when two dogs and a human come together, they form a unit which 
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jointly use aspects of the environment. This can be something as 
simple as a dog and a human walking together down a footpath. 
Both are successfully navigating their way together through their 
environment by using the path. Thus, the system consists of the 
dog, the human and the path that they are using to find their way 
through the park. Recognising that systems can be multi- agent is 
important for social creatures. We must not omit pack mates and 
other agents from the system if we are to understand it, for they are 
an important part of the larger system in which an agent is situated. 
 
2.5.5 Cognition is for action 
 
Our cognitive processes have evolved to help us with 
successful interactions with our world. So it makes sense to say 
that a large part of cognition is for action, and this is especially the 
case with non-human animals like dogs. Many of our cognitive 
processes are taken up with bodily actions and reactions for one 
purpose or another. However, within embodied cognition, the ties 
between cognition and action run deeper than this might imply. 
For example, studies with human infants have shown that 
knowledge is action-specific. Infants will learn to be wary of steep 
slopes when crawling, but when they start to walk, they have to 
learn about steep slopes all over again (Clark, 1997, p.37). 
This shows that infants do not use their experience during 
crawling to acquire knowledge about slopes in general. Rather 
they acquire knowledge about how slopes figure in contexts 
involving specific actions. There are many examples of this; even 
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memory can be situation specific. For example, it is easier to 
remember someone’s name when you can recall the context in 
which you met her. Also a useful way of remembering what you did 
with your lost car keys is to retrace your steps and act out what 
you did the last time you remember having them. 
Moreover, perception seems tied to specific motor routines. The 
example that Clark (2007) gave above of infants’ perception of the 
slopes was connected to whether they were walking or crawling. 
Perception, viewed this way, is no longer the passive reception of 
information, but is another cognitive ability which is linked to action.  
Svensson, Lindblom and Ziemke (2007, p. 242) argue that ‘many, if 
not all, higher level cognitive processes are action-based in the 
sense that they make use of (partial) simulations or emulations of 
sensorimotor processes through the use of neural circuitry that is 
also active in bodily perception and action’. 
An example of this is the action-sentence compatibility effect. In 
2002, Glenberg and Kaschak conducted a study that supports the 
case for the involvement of the motor system in understanding 
language. In their study, Glenberg and Kaschak asked subjects to 
indicate whether or not a sentence made sense by making a 
response that required either movement toward or away from their 
bodies. For example, the sentence might read ‘close the drawer’ and 
the bodily counter movement required the subject to draw his/her 
arm toward their body. They found that response times were longer 
when the bodily movement required was incompatible with the 
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movement suggested by the sentence itself. Furthermore, recent 
studies have shown that perceptual input stimulates motor neurons 
thereby enhancing the link between action and cognition (Svensson 
et al., 2007).5 In recognition of the fact that cognition in humans and 
animals is largely action-based, studies into cognitive skills of dogs 
can take into account the fact that certain cognitive skills such as 
object permanence, may only manifest in certain contexts involving 
certain actions. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.5.6 Cognition has evolved 
 
While most will agree that cognition has evolved, Michael 
Anderson takes an explicitly evolutionary approach in his version of 
embodied cognition. His emphasis is on the thought that cognition is 
an adaptive process; it has contributed toward our reproductive 
success as a species. Anderson remarks that cognition has evolved 
because it is adaptive and like any other adaptation, it has an 
evolutionary history. From this, we can reason that cognition 
‘evolved in specific environments and its solutions to survival 
challenges can be expected to take advantage of the concrete 
structure or enduring features of those environments’ (2005a, p.2) 
He then points out that ‘cognition evolved in organisms with specific 
physical attributes, bodies of a certain type with given structural 
features, and can therefore be expected to be shaped by and to 
                                                             
5 Lawrence Barsalou, a prominent defender of embodied cognition, also argues that cognition is 
rooted in perception. Cognition is rooted in perception because, according to Barsalou, it shares 
many of the same neural systems. He writes, ‘perceptual states arise in sensory–motor systems. A 
perceptual state can contain two components: an unconscious neural representation of physical 
input and an optional conscious experience’ (Barsalou, 1999, p. 577). 
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take advantage of those features for cognitive ends’ (2005a, p.2). As 
we know, certain cognitive traits do aid the organism in survival. 
Because of this, they have been preserved by evolution. These 
cognitive traits are likely to have been those that enhanced existing 
traits of the organisms such as already established dispositions to 
manipulate the environment in a way that is beneficial to the 
organism. Therefore, many of the evolutionary solutions to cognitive 
problems involve tight perception-action feedback loops, the 
reliance on and even the intentional alteration of environmental 
structures to reduce cognitive load and the use of other cognitive 
scaffolds. It is this phenomenon which we see in dogs’ use of 
human cues as an aid to problem solving. We can recognise that 
the dog’s close association with us on an evolutionary timeline has 
led him to use humans as an information source. 
 
2.5.7 Cognition is body-based 
 
Embodied cognition advocates the idea that cognition deeply 
depends on aspects of the agent's body other than the brain. This is 
not a radical claim on reflection, for without the involvement of the 
body in both sensing and acting, thoughts would be empty, and 
mental states would not have the characteristics and properties they 
do. For example, remembering the walk we had with our little 
Terrier this evening involves the smell of the leaves on the ground, 
the sounds of the river and the training wheels on my son’s bike, the 
feel of my dog tugging determinedly at a stick I was trying to get 
from him to throw. These are all bodily sensations which comprise 
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to a large extent the content of my memory of this evening’s walk. In 
other words, ‘the nature and structure of perception, cognition and 
its constituents (e.g. our representations and concepts), as well as 
procedures of thinking, logical rules and the like, depend on (or are 
grounded in) the nature, structures and behaviours of the body’ 
(Wilson, 2002).The idea that cognition is body-based does not 
depend upon any particular claims about mirror neurons. However, 
as part of their project Lakoff and Johnson (1999) develop a 
position in light of the research on mirror neurons called embodied 
realism. Basically, this is the idea that the neurons that control 
perception and motor skills are also responsible for the formation of 
representations. In their words, ‘our concepts [representations] 
cannot be a direct reflection of external, objective, mind- free reality 
because our sensorimotor system plays a crucial part in shaping 
them’ (1999, p.44). Lakoff and Johnson are not alone in this theory. 
Gallese (2007) also tells us that the ‘so-called “motor functions” of 
the nervous system not only provide the means to control and 
execute action but also to represent it’ (Gallese, 2007, p. 23). 
In primates, two classes of visuomotor neurons (neurons that are 
involved with vision and motor skills) have been found in a structure 
of the brain called the premotor cortex. These two classes of 
neurons are canonical neurons and mirror neurons (Garbarini and 
Adenzato, 2004, p.101). The canonical and mirror neurons fire when 
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an organism is manipulating an object.6 But they have also been 
found to fire when the organism is watching the object being 
manipulated (Kohler, Keysers, Umilta, Fogassi, Gallese, and 
Rizzolatti, 2002 and Rizolatti & Craighero, 2004). More interesting, 
though, is studies have shown that the canonical and mirror neurons 
fire when an identical object is being manipulated (or that 
manipulation is observed) are the same as those that fire in 
response to a group of objects that can be used or interacted with in 
the same way (have the same affordances) (Garbarini and 
Adenzato, 2004, p. 102).This suggests that an object is identified 
and represented with regards to the types of interactions that it 
invites. It does not seem to be a big leap, therefore, to wonder if the 
types of affordances an object offers an organism become a major 
part of an organism’s representation of it. ‘In other words, different 
objects can be represented in function of the same type of 
interaction they allow’ (Garbarini and Adenzzato, 2004, p.102). In 
the same paper, Garbarini and Adenzato go on to remark that the 
ability to represent different objects, in terms of the affordances of 
that object, relies on the ability of the brain to simulate the neural 
responses as if the organism were interacting with it: ‘what makes 
this type of object representation possible is a mechanism of as-if 
neural stimulation: while observing an object the neural system is 
stimulated as-if the observer were interacting with it’ (2004, p.102).  
                                                             
6 Canonical neurons respond to presentation of an object while mirror neurons respond to 
performance of an action and observation of an object directed action. The mirror neurons 
are triggered by any action that involves the interaction between a the body and an object. 
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This idea is the beginning of the notion of representation which I will 
argue for in later chapters. The way we think about representations 
in the light of the embodied cognition paradigm leads quite naturally 
into the view that representations of the sort an animal can use are 
body-based representations of affordances, or actions surrounding a 
particular state of affairs. 
In summary, the action of mirror neurons that help us simulate 
actions we observe provides a way of understanding the 
relationship between performing an action and representing it. 
Garbarini et al. (2004) tell us that ‘a motor schema allows us to 
execute an action as well as represent the object the action refers 
to’ (2004, p.103). Embodied cognition opens up a new way of 
approaching cognition. The hypothesis is this: the internal, neural 
states are coupled with external states of the body and environment 
to form a system. The neural states exhibit causal dependency on 
the external states thus creating what Clark and Chalmers call a 
coupling, or what Haugland (1995) calls integration. Furthermore, 
this integration or coupling of the brain and behaviour counts as a 
cognitive process in embodied cognition. In short, the bodily 
movements that an agent uses to cognise become part of the 
cognitive process. In this chapter I have begun to suggest how 
greater emphasis on the principles of embodied cognition may help 
us to study and understand dogs’ cognitive skills. In this next 
chapter I expand upon these points. 
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Chapter Three: Embodied dog cognition 
 
Until now, studies within the framework of embodied cognition 
have largely focussed on humans. The study of animal minds, 
however, can and should be enhanced by approaching non-human 
animal cognition using the principles being developed in embodied 
cognition. This chapter demonstrates that embodied cognition is 
well suited to clarify the study of non-human animal cognition and 
provide useful and productive ways forward in understanding 
animal thinking. 
 
3.1 The value of applying embodied cognition to dog 
cognition 
 
In the context of human cognitive capacities, embodied cognition 
meets with some criticism. For example, Benjamin and Bjork argue 
that an embodied interpretation of memory ‘underestimates human 
capabilities’ (1997, p.20). They argue that while some 
representations and processes used by humans may be embodied, 
not all of them are. They argue also that there is danger in thinking 
that memory is embodied. The danger stems from the assumption 
that if memory can be embodied all memory is embodied, an 
assumption which will ultimately constrain psychological research. In 
addition, Habel, Kaup and Kelter (1997, p.26) write that ‘we ought to 
combine the level of embodied representations with representations 
of a more abstract character in a heterogeneous level’. Many of 
these worries do not arise when we are discussing animals. This is 
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because we do not so readily attribute abstract concepts such as 
higher mathematical concepts to animals and it is more generally 
agreed thatmost animals have little use for abstract concepts. How 
well this applies to great apes though is questionable. What is more, 
thinking about embodied cognition and dog cognition in particular is 
especially interesting because the domestic dog's natural 
environment tends to be one in which they regularly communicate 
and interact with people. As a species, dogs have more overall 
interaction with humans than any other animal and human-dog 
interactions have shaped dog (and possibly human) cognition over 
time. 
For example, studies outlined in Chapter One show that dogs 
rely heavily on cues from their owners in their solving of tasks, 
especially novel tasks (Topál et al., 1997, see page 58; Kubinyi et 
al., 2007, see page 40; Soproni et al., 2000, see page 41; Byrne, 
2003, see page 41; Miklosi et al., 2003, see page 42). The cues 
supplied by the human counterpart play a significant role in the 
dog’s finding a solution to problems to the extent that in some 
experiments, human cues were used by the dog over and above the 
use of environmental cues. In fact, the preference of dogs to use 
human cues as an aid to problem solving is a significant 
confounding variable in studies where it is not controlled for. Recall, 
for example, Lit et al.’s (2011) study on page 73 which found that 
handler beliefs can inadvertently affect scent detection in dogs. In 
this double blind study, cues unintentionally given off by the handler 
caused the dogs to register false alerts at the spots where the 
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handler thought there was a target item. This occurred even though 
there were some real scent targets in the same building. The dogs 
and handlers in the study were experienced scent detection dogs 
and their handlers and the results were remarkable in their 
demonstration of the extent to which human cues are used by dogs. 
Lit et al.’s study suggests that dogs will use human cues as a more 
reliable indicator of the correct course of action than their own 
perceptual cues. 
The dog’s ability to use human social cues probably springs from 
a much older disposition (older in evolutionary terms). Before 
domestication, the dog would have made use of his pack mates’ 
social cues as information about the environment and as an aid to 
survival. It is therefore unsurprising that they have developed the 
ability to use humans as providers of cues for problem solving. The 
trouble is that the dog, in comparison to wolves, will rely on human 
cues for problem solving to the extent that they will not attempt to 
solve a task without them as readily as wolves as we saw on page 
44 (see Udell et al., 2008). 
The fact that the dog does rely so much on human cues in 
problem solving has led some to the conclusion that problem solving 
ability in the domestic dog has been reduced by domestication (Fox, 
1982). However, the guiding principles of embodied cognition can 
lead us to view the use of humans for cues in problem solving tasks 
as problem solving nonetheless. It is an example of the dog off-
loading cognitive work onto an aspect of his environment (the 
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human). This is not much different to a human looking up an answer 
in a book, an action which is problem solving by calling on 
environmental resources. In what follows, I show in more detail how 
the study of animal cognition can benefit from the adoption of the 
principles of embodied cognition. 
3.1.1 Dog cognition is situated 
 
Cognition is situated when it is inextricably tied to the 
environment. The environment, perception and action are 
dynamically interacting in situated cognition and examples of 
situated cognition in humans are legion. For example, walking down 
a busy street, building a structure from wood, baking a cake, talking 
to someone, are all types of situated cognition. They all involve 
responses to and from the environment through our bodily actions 
and perceptual experiences. Many of a dog’s cognitive processes 
are involved with responding to and interacting with the 
environment, possibly more so than in humans. There may be times 
however when the dog remembers past events or locations that 
have been important to him. Moreover, there may be occasions 
when he formulates some kind of plan for upcoming actions. But the 
frequency of these non-situated cognitive events is more likely lower 
than those times when the dog’s cognitive processes are online and 
situated. In fact, when we think of the types of cognitive processes 
dogs are likely to be capable of a large majority of them seem to be 
situated. 
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For example, a day in the life of a working farm dog is guided 
heavily by cues from his handler. By environmental cues (supplied 
by a human) he is directed through tasks. His first task might 
involve a sheep muster across hill country. Using a series of 
whistles, verbal cues and body movements the handler 
communicates to the dog actions required of him.The dog 
responds to the handler’s commands, to the sheep’s actions, and 
the terrain he is working on. Every second the dog is out mustering 
sheep there is a stream of rich environmental information to be 
perceived and responded to. His responses must be fast, accurate 
and goal-oriented – his goal being the movement of the sheep in 
the direction indicated by the handler. The dog’s cognition can be 
thought of as situated. Rather than viewing the dog’s brain as an 
isolated control centre for the dog’s sheep mustering, recognising 
the situated nature of cognitive processing in this context allows us 
to see that cognitive processing is a dynamic interplay of the dog’s 
brain, body and environment. It is a fluid system in which the parts 
- the dog’s physiology, the environmental cues and features - are 
interdependent and his behaviour and responses constitute his 
cognitive processing.  Viewing cognition this way will hopefully lead 
us to a realistic notion of representation for non-human animals 
and allow us to generate ethologically appropriate hypotheses on 
their nature and use within animal cognition. The next chapter 
discusses this point further. 
Because cognition is situated, it is important to note that 
cognitive skills may be tied to a particular situation. Recall from 
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above that it is often the case that learning can occur in one 
scenario but not be automatically transferred to a different context. 
Take, for example, housetraining a pup. Often a pup must receive 
additional training to help him transfer what he has learned at home 
to different locations. It is common (yet embarrassing) for young 
dogs to be fully housetrained in their own home, yet urinate in 
another house. The situated nature of cognition is also important to 
remember when considering the cognitive skills a dog might 
possess. Many cognitive skills, such as object permanence, an 
understanding of the connection between the means and an end, 
the ability to attend and respond to verbal cues, the ability to count 
(in an ethologically appropriate interpretation of the word) and so 
forth may not be seen in certain experimental settings, or not 
conclusively anyway. To review the experiments conducted on 
object permanence in dogs, see page 61. This is not to say, 
however, that dogs do not possess such cognitive skills. The point to 
take from the situated nature of embodied cognition, with regards to 
studying non-human animal cognition is that if we are to look for 
evidence of particular cognitive abilities then we should study the 
dog in his normal interactions with the world, because often a 
cognitive skill may be tied to a situation and not transferred to the 
laboratory setting. 
3.1.2 Dog cognition is time pressured 
 
A hunting dog, in the depths of a mountain range with his 
handler, must respond quickly to the scents of various animals. He 
must decide which to follow, which to ignore. At the same time, he 
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must safely move around the terrain, navigate around fallen trees, 
through thick parts of bush, streams, rivers and over slippery tree 
roots. On top of this, his handler is sending him signals which he 
must attend to related to their direction or speed. All of this, the dog 
must be aware of and respond to continuously. This dog at work 
does not have the luxury of considering his responses; the 
demands of his environment are constant and immediate. 
But, as with humans, some of the dog’s cognitive processes are 
not under time pressure. When a family dog is hanging out in the 
living room or eating and drinking, there is little time pressure. 
These activities do not require much in the way of immediate and 
effective responses. And most of the cognitive processing of 
domestic dogs that live as family pets will be like this. Their actions 
are unhurried; their cognitive processes are not required to interact 
with their environment under much time pressure at all. On the 
other hand, for working dogs these times could often be in the 
minority during daylight hours. Time pressured cognitive processes 
are behind most of the work that these dogs have. To call on an 
earlier example, herding sheep would be highly time pressured 
especially if the sheepdog is working as part of a gang of sheep 
dogs, with large flocks of sheep and so on. Not only would the dog 
have to respond quickly to the sheep’s movements, but those of 
the other dogs and his handler too. Similarly, a guide dog out with 
his owner has to constantly attend to his master and the 
environment and produce immediate and effective responses to 
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both. The police dog tracking an escaped convict, too, must 
constantly interact with his environment and respond as quickly as 
possible to track a scent. 
 
3.1.3 Dogs off-load cognitive work onto the environment 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, humans off-load cognitive work on 
to the environment frequently. One way is through the use of 
gesture in speaking. Gesturing is communication through physical 
actions, it can be more effective than verbal communication and by, 
for example, gesturing to an object rather than naming it, the 
speaker is essentially off-loading cognitive work onto her 
environment. Gestures also provide the listener with environmental 
cues to aid understanding of what is being said. The reciprocal 
effect of gestures is a way in which the speaker facilitates the 
offloading of cognitive work onto the environment for the listener. 
There are numerous ways in which domestic dogs off-load 
some of their cognitive work on to aspects of their environment. As 
social animals dogs can use the actions of other members of their 
social group as a short cut for learning about a situation 
themselves. For example, see the studies on learning by imitation 
in the opening chapter, page 65. When confronted with a problem, 
humans will often ask an expert or look it up on the internet rather 
than spend time and energy figuring out something ourselves. 
When confronted with a novel problem, they often refer to 
members of their social environments (both human and canine) as 
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an aid to problem solving, instead of possibly expensive trial and 
error learning. 
For example, scent is a predominant way in which dogs use 
the environment for communication. Scent cues perform a variety of 
functions. Scent markers are maintained for boundary marking. By 
conveying the gender, reproductive situation, age and social position 
of a dog a scent marker provides other dogs with a wealth of 
information which can save a costly encounter (in the case of an 
accidental territory transgression) and assist with finding a suitable 
mate. Moreover dogs will use scent trails in their environment to 
track prey or objects, animals and humans they have been trained to 
track. The use of scent is probably the most significant way in which 
a dog uses the environment to convey and receive information 
necessary for daily life. Even domesticated dogs rely upon scent 
trails. Rather than a time consuming and labour intensive trial and 
error search, our Terrier will frequently put his nose to the ground 
and track scent trails to find my son wherever he is hidden. One 
notable time when our Terrier used scent cues in his environment 
was when he tracked my son and me through a large department 
store full of people covering multiple levels. Having got fed up with 
waiting by the door, he entered the store and must have weaved his 
way through the racks and sections of the department store, up an 
escalator following the scent trail my son and I had inadvertently left. 
He quickly and efficiently found us despite the presence of many 
thousands of scent trails from other people and no visual information 
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or past experience to rely on. Unfortunately the store’s security 
guards were not so impressed and we were asked to leave. But I 
didn’t mind, impressed as I was by how he found us. 
Not only do dogs use scent as information about the 
environment, but auditory cues can play a large part in telling dogs 
quickly what they need to know. In the opening chapter, we saw 
that dogs are capable of understanding barks in different contexts, 
and can encode information in growls by varying the pitch and 
length of a growl.  It may even be possible for dogs to assess the 
size of an opposing pack based on an environmental cue. They 
may then base their decision regarding whether or not to engage 
with the opposing pack on their assessment of its size (Bonanni, 
Natoli, Cafazzo and Valsecchi, 2010, see page 147). 
As another example, many dog trainers will tell their human 
pupils that a dog’s response to a new stimulus depends largely on 
the reactions of those around him. For example, when dogs first 
encounter a heavy storm with thunder, their responses depend 
greatly on the responses of other members of their social group.  It 
is likely that young dogs determine the nature of this new state of 
affairs (whether it be dangerous or not) by the reactions of those in 
their social environment. This is another way in which a dog off-
loads cognitive work on to his environment. A good dog trainer is 
careful to behave as if everything is normal in potentially fearful 
situations for a puppy, such as loud thunder. ‘Normal behaviours’ 
can include behaviours which are not associated with frightening 
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episodes - this may include making the dog some dinner if it is his 
usual dinner time, or by engaging in play if that is something you 
would usually do. By doing so, the pup may learn more quickly that 
it is nothing to be afraid of than he would with repeated exposure to 
the stimulus in isolation. Note, though, that once a phobia has been 
created and a fear response has been learned additional training 
measures may be necessary to work through a situation. In this 
respect, learning by imitation (discussed in Chapter One on page 
65) can be seen as a method of off-loading cognitive work on to the 
environment. The dog can use a human or canine as a model for 
successfully performing tasks and solving problems.7 
 
Much of a pup’s early learning comes from copying the reaction 
of the bitch and litter mates. The extent to which dogs use social 
cues over and above trial and error learning has been 
demonstrated in recent studies. For example, the dogs in Collier-
Baker’s (2004) experiment explained on page 75 attended to the 
experimenters’ bodily positions to ‘solve’ object permanence tasks. 
These findings highlight the fact that experiments into the cognitive 
skills of a dog, particularly problem solving tasks in which humans 
are (and have been) typically present need to take into account that, 
at least initially, dogs will attend to human social cues rather than 
directly try to problem solve by themselves. Recall from 
Chapter One, page 67, that Range et al. (2012) set up an 
                                                             
7 We will return to this situation in Chapter Six, where I discuss the implications of embodied 
cognition for dog training 
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experiment to test the problem solving abilities of dogs and wolves. 
The species were separated into two different cages; both the dogs 
and wolves were well socialised. Then a piece of string with a 
chunk of meat attached to the end was attached to the dogs’ and 
wolves’ cage within their reach. Members of both species began to 
pull at the rope to try and get the meat, but the dogs quickly started 
to look at the human who was present. The young dogs looked 
sooner and for longer than the young wolves suggesting that 
the dogs were more inclined to use human cues as an aid to 
problem solving than their wild counterparts. 
 
Structurally, the dog’s brain has developed in direct relation to 
its external environment, so it is not surprising that dogs are more 
inclined than wolves to look to humans as a source of information, 
given that humans are now part of the domestic dog’s natural 
environment. Moreover, puppies especially after weaning learn 
that humans are a food source, source of activity, play and 
security. What starts with a behavioural tendency passed down 
through years of his ancestor’s domestication is confirmed and 
strengthened throughout his life in human society. As Clark and 
Chalmers write, ‘within the lifetime of an organism, too, individual 
learning may have moulded the brain in ways that actively 
anticipate the continued presence of those ubiquitous and reliable 
cognitive extensions that surround us as we learned to perform 
various cognitive tasks’ (1998, p. 5). We should take this into 
account when designing experiments into the cognitive skills of the 
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domesticated dog and never underestimate the extent to which a 
dog might use human cues (perhaps inadvertently given) as an aid 
to problem solving. For example, humans are generally providers 
for dogs. In most cases, it is a human that provides food to the dog 
on a daily basis; excepting strays few dogs living in domestication 
need to hunt for their food. Thus it is particularly important to take 
into account the fact that an individual dog’s learning may dispose 
him to look to the human as a food provider during experiments 
involving food. 
It would be interesting to study the use of humans as an 
information source by dogs who have not learned by experience that 
humans can help them. This might be achieved by human-neutral 
environments. For example, from weaning, the enclosures could be 
set up in such a way that the humans are neutral; food could be 
supplied via an automatic feeder, the pups housed in a large 
stimulating enclosure with access to space to run and play with 
other dogs independently from humans. The resulting study would 
demonstrate whether the dogs were still inclined to use human 
social cues for solving tasks despite a lack of individual experience 
of using humans in this way. 
In summary, when we are thinking about the effect of dogs’ use 
of people as an information source, we should consider the 
importance of separating what an individual is genetically designed 
to do via evolutionary history versus what is learned at an individual 
level through experience. This is because the dog’s use of human 
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social cues will be a result of both an inherited tendency and 
individual experience. 
As we have seen with scent, dogs also off-Ioad cognitive work 
on to their environment independent of human cues. When dogs 
walk in parks with their owners, if given the choice, most of the 
time the dogs will be in front. Aside from places where the path 
splits, the dog does not need to maintain his attention on his 
owner for information about which direction he is to go in, even if 
the path is novel. This may be an obvious point but the dog is 
using his perception (probably guided by olfaction) of the path to 
judge which way to go. There is little input needed from the owner 
on the matter of direction when it comes to following a path 
because the scent of the hundreds of people and dogs who have 
followed it in the past will make the trail very obvious to him 
(Laurier, Maze & Lundin, 2006). The minor role that vision plays in 
path following is clear when following a path through a heavily 
wooded, or deep area of bushland. The way is clear to the dog if 
there are scent trails to follow from previous hikers and it has 
become a regular practice for our family when in thick forest and 
poor lighting to just follow the dog. Occasional detours aside, he 
generally keeps us going the right way, and this is one of many 
examples of people off-loading cognitive work onto dogs.8 
 
                                                             
8 People off-load cognitive work on to dogs just as dogs do to people. Guide dog owners are the 
best example that springs to mind. For people with physical impairments dogs literally serve as a 
replacement for human physical functioning. And it is truly remarkable how much and how willingly 
and effectively dogs can do this 
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3.1.4 The dog perceives the environment as opportunities to act 
 
But, we must be careful when we identify which features of the 
environment dogs are interacting with in their cognitive processing 
since their perceptual world and the affordances of their 
environment are vastly different to our own. A path for us probably 
consists of a range of visual cues; the footsteps of previous 
people, perhaps some flattened grass or forest floor weaving 
through the trees. For our dogs the path is predominantly a range 
of scents, with maybe some visual cues as an extra. West and 
Young’s (2002) study outlined in Chapter One on page 83 
described the use of a measure called ‘gaze duration’ in the 
assessment of a dog’s ability to count. The idea was that if the dog 
looked for longer at the biscuits revealed from behind the screen 
when one of them had been secretly removed, then the dog had 
an expectation about the number of biscuits there should be (West 
and Young, 2002). In the light of what we know about dogs’ 
perceptual apparatus, however, it is questionable whether gaze 
duration is an appropriate experimental measure. Moreover, the 
animal perceives the environment as a series of opportunities for 
action and the perception of these affordances will be guided by 
the physical nature of his perceptual apparatus. Humans are visual 
creatures, and it makes sense to base a measure of expectancy in 
humans upon gaze duration. But for dogs, especially in visual 
perception is not the main sense; smell is the dominant sense. 
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In short, each species’ perceptual world is unique. The way in 
which the dog perceives the same scene as us is vastly different. 
Therefore, experiments into the cognitive skills of a dog should be 
designed for dogs. Using human measures and designs seems 
inappropriate. 
 
3.1.5 Dog cognition is for action 
 
Nowhere is the point that cognition is for action more salient 
than in non-human animal cognition. If animals have cognitive 
processes, then they arise to allow them to act in such a way that 
they can exploit their environment for their own benefit. Thus, 
much cognition is specific to a particular situation or action. 
Moreover, cognition can be specific to a particular part of the 
body. For example it is possible to teach a dog to raise a paw, 
but the teaching will likely have to be repeated for each paw you 
want him to lift, although as with house training, learning should 
occur more quickly than with a totally novel lesson. Moreover, 
because cognition is action based, our cues will be more 
effective if they reflect the action being requested. For example, 
a downward physical cue, coupled with a lowered tone in the 
verbal cue can be used to request a cessation of movement or 
decrease in activity. Most people will intuitively do this, for we 
have a natural understanding that our actions and thoughts are 
related. But it is good to be aware of why we do this naturally 
(because actions and cognition are intrinsically linked) so we can 
consciously apply it to our communication with dogs. 
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Moreover, when we are thinking about dogs’ understanding of 
verbal cues it is most likely that for a dog a verbal cue is a request 
for action. Even a word such as ‘ball’ which obviously denotes an 
object to humans is probably associated with an action in dogs. In 
Chapter One, we saw some astonishing evidence of dogs reportedly 
being able to learn the names of many objects. However, given the 
action-orientation of cognition, particularly cognition of non-human 
animals it is difficult to prove that words are associated with discrete 
objects, not the actions that surround them. This is especially the 
case when we consider dogs’ association with humans over the 
course of history. For a dog to be useful as a hunting tool or for work 
on the farm he must be able to readily acquire associations between 
commands and particular actions. There is little value in teaching a 
dog the word for an object which is not the subject of an action. For 
example, guide dogs are taught to fetch the house keys, find the 
slippers and so on. Each command revolving around an object 
involves the dog performing a task related to it.  Therefore, the dog’s 
inherited tendencies plus his individual learning renders it more 
likely that he will come to associate words with actions and not 
objects. 
Similarly, when we consider that cognition is for action, it makes 
sense that representations are also for action. Thus, theories of 
representation which may have explanatory value and be useful in 
their attribution will also be focused on actions, rather than static 
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representations of objects as is the case with many human-based 
theories of representation. 
 
3.1.6 Dog cognition has evolved 
 
The dog’s cognitive skills have adapted over time to allow them 
to flourish in their environment. One of the factors that allowed dogs 
to adapt so successfully into our human world was sensitivity to 
social cues from members of other species. Another possible factor 
was the presence of a reduced fear response to people in certain 
individuals which may have sparked a closer association. Dogs are 
also adaptable; most dogs will adapt into diverse walks of life, even 
those they are not bred for, and this adaptability into diverse human 
societies has surely contributed to the dog’s success. 
The dog’s close association and long cohabitation with human 
beings have influenced the dog’s cognition heavily because the 
environment plays a crucial role in developing and constraining 
canine cognitive processes. On this point, Clark writes, ‘minds 
make motions, and they must make them fast - before the predator 
catches you, or before your prey gets away from you. Minds are 
not disembodied logical reasoning devices’ (1997, p.1). In other 
words, the types of challenges and situations the dog faced over 
the course of history have shaped his body and cognitive 
processes alike. 
In summary, dogs’ cognitive processes reflect a history of 
interactions with the environment. For example, the methods by 
which dogs and humans can communicate are a result of evolution 
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and individual learned experience. The dog’s ability to understand 
human pointing cues, verbal cues and to follow human gaze is 
possibly a result of his long association with humans, coupled with 
individual learning.  Furthermore, the dog’s reliance on human 
cues as an aid to problem solving may have also evolved over 
time, possibly leaving the dog with less independent, although not 
necessarily inferior, problem solving skills to wolves. By studying 
the history of the dog’s interactions with his environment we can 
make progress into understanding the nature of his cognitive skills 
since such interactions will reflect the nature of dog cognition. A 
fruitful approach to the study of dog cognition would be to look at 
the types of interactions which evolution has equipped him to be 
successful in and take what we can from these. We can also ask 
this question about the cognitive skills which are currently under 
investigation in dogs. For example, is it the case that an 
understanding of object permanence would help the dog interact 
successfully in his or her environment? If so, then embodied 
cognition teaches us to first identify and study the contexts in which 
such a cognitive skill would be adaptive rather than trying to elicit 
evidence of the skill in a context which the dog has not evolved to 
encounter. 
 
3.1.7 Dog cognition is body based 
 
As we have seen in the embodied cognition paradigm, cognition 
involves bodily structures and is not constrained to neural hardware. 
Therefore, the types of cognitive processes open to the dog are 
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constrained by his physical nature. For example, dogs’ perceptual 
experiences are a huge part of the content of his cognitive 
processing. As we saw in the opening chapter dogs’ sense of smell 
is inconceivable to people; we cannot imagine what it might be like 
to smell as acutely as our dogs. Yet dogs’ vision is poorer than ours 
for detail of stationary objects and colour discrimination (Miklosi, 
2008) but their visual acuity is better than ours for moving objects. 
And this makes sense; dogs are hunters and have little use for 
things which sit still in broad daylight, unless scent cues indicate that 
there is an opportunity for scavenging.9 Therefore in experimental 
settings the constraints and influences of the body upon cognition 
cannot be overestimated. This is especially the case in terms of 
controlling for scent cues, which may be almost impossible under 
any but the most rigorous of settings.10 
 
In von Uexkull’s (1957) paper, ‘'A Stroll through the Worlds of 
Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds' he argues 
that each species has its own worldview, or umwelt, a notion which 
heavily influenced Konrad Lonrenz (1903-1989) and Nico 
Tinbergen (1907-1988). He asks his reader to walk with him 
.through a meadow, one which is alive with humming insects and 
fluttering butterflies: 
                                                             
9 Some prey animals, rabbits for example, play on this and will often freeze if they detect a dog. By 
doing so the rabbits around our house regularly go unnoticed by our three dogs 
10I return to ways in which we can control for scent cues in the final chapter. I also give 
suggestions for optimal lighting conditions and target object placement in experimental settings  
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First blow, in fancy, a 
soap bubble around 
each creature to 
represent its own 
world, filled with the 
perceptions which it 
alone knows. When 
we ourselves then 
step into one of these 
bubbles,  the familiar 
meadow is 
transformed. Many of  
its  colourful features   
disappear,   others no  
longer  belong  
together but appear in 
new relationships. A 
new world comes into being. Through the bubble we see the 
world of  the  burrowing  worm,  of the butterfly, or of the 
field mouse;   the   world   as   it appears to the animals 
themselves, not as it appears to us. This we may call the 
phenomenal world or the self-world of the animal (von 
Uexkull 1957, p. 5). 
The perceptual focus of a human or non-human animal is that 
which is meaningful for them perceived through a diverse 
Figure 9. The top image represents the meadow as 
it is perceived by people. The bottom image 
depicts the bee’s perception of the same meadow 
(von Uexkull, 1957). 
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range of perceptual abilities. In von Uexkull’s description, bees 
land on figures that exhibit broken forms, such as stars and 
crosses, and avoid compact forms, such as circles and 
squares. The figure, 
 
… which was designed on this basis, contrasts a bee's 
environment with its umwelt. The bee is seen in its environment, 
a blooming field, in which blossoming flowers alternate with 
buds. If we put ourselves in the bee's place and look at the 
field from the point of view of its Umwelt, the blossoms are 
changed to stars or crosses according to their form, and the buds 
assume the unbroken shape of circles. The biological significance 
of this newly discovered quality in bees is evident. Only 
blossoming flowers have a meaning for them; buds do not (von 
Uexkull, 1957, pp. 350-1, emphasis added). 
 
As the dog moves through the meadow above, he would be 
bombarded by hundreds of thousands, if not millions of scents, 
layered on top of each other, some from creatures that passed 
through long before, some recent. He will notice those scents which 
may be relevant to him, those of potential prey, other dogs, human 
scents, scents of food on which to scavenge and so forth. In short, a 
dog’s umwelt is made up of the affordances that the environment 
presents to her, mostly through scent. The affordances presented to 
the dog are shaped by the individual dog’s history of interaction with 
her environment and those that are innate. Over time, the dog’s 
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perceptual apparatus has been fine tuned to detect these 
affordances and make them salient to him. The cognitive processing 
of which he is capable is determined by the sorts of things he 
perceives and the sorts of responses he can make. Clearly, aspects 
of cognition, such as the use of representations will also be affected 
and constrained by the dog’s body. Therefore, if we are to suggest 
that dogs might use representations to interact in the world, it 
makes sense to suppose that these representations are body 
based. That is, representations are influenced, constrained by and 
manifest in the dog’s physical body. In the following chapters the 
theories of representation I outline are theories of embodied 
representation; they are body based and I will show how they can 
be applied to dogs. 
 
3.2 Summary 
 
I have argued so far that our studies into the cognitive skills of 
the domesticated dog and other non-human animals would 
benefit from adopting the principles of embodied cognition by 
bringing to the foreground important aspects of dog cognition. 
The principles can also help us draw appropriate conclusions 
from the studies which have been done and help us to design 
studies which take into account the constraints and influences on 
dogs’ cognitive processing. The main points to take from the 
embodied cognition paradigm to a study of cognition in non- 
human animals are: 
1.  Cognition is situated 
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Dogs’ cognitive capacities such as understanding 
object permanence, categorisation, an ability to 
reason by deduction, counting and attention to 
human states are likelyto be situation specific and 
may not be generalised to other contexts including 
laboratory settings. Genuine evidence of these 
capacities may be hard to obtain, therefore, in an 
artificial experimental setting as seen in the 
discussions of the opening chapter. 
2.  Cognition is time pressured 
 
Time pressure pushes on dogs’ cognitive functioning 
in certain situations such as hunting as a pack, or 
mustering sheep. In these situations the cognitive 
processing must be immediate and effective. This 
point becomes salient in the next chapter when 
considering representations. For representations to 
be useful, they must assist the dog in situations 
where his cognitive processes must be fast and 
efficient. 
3.  Cognitive work is off-loaded on to the environment 
 
Recall from Chapter One that dogs, like humans, use 
their environment as an aid to problem solving. 
Humans are part of the dogs’ environment and it is no 
surprise, therefore, that dogs will refer to human cues 
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when confronted with a task. The extent to which dogs 
will use human cues ought not to be underestimated 
since the natural tendency to do so coupled with an 
acute sensitivity to human body language, posture and 
perhaps even hormonal changes may confound 
experimental results. 
4.  The environment presents opportunities to act 
 
The affordances which an environment offers to an 
agent differ among species. Each species has its own 
worldview and the key to understanding the cognitive 
skills of another species lies in understanding the 
affordances that their environment presents to them. 
The perception of, and responses to, affordances are 
influenced and constrained by the physical make-up of 
an agent. For dogs, their sense of smell is so much 
superior to ours that some of the affordances within 
their environment are imperceptible to us. We should 
remember this when studying dog cognition since they 
may be using aspects of their environment of which 
we are not aware to guide their behaviour. These may 
include shifts in air currents in a laboratory-based 
study into object permanence, scent cues and 
unintentional handler cues. 
5.  Cognition is action-based and body-based 
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Cognitive processing for dogs revolves around 
actions. Therefore it makes sense to suppose 
that their understanding of words is also action 
based. The association is probably word/action 
rather than word/referent as it is in humans. 
Moreover, our verbal cues can be more readily 
understood when they embody the required 
action in some way. For example, an upward 
hand signal will more readily elicit an upward 
response from the dog, such as when requesting 
the dog to stand from a lying down 
position.Similarly, aspects of cognition such as 
the use of representations is likely to be action 
based. 
6.  Cognition has evolved 
 
The dog has evolved to cope with his environment and 
these required responses have shaped his body and 
cognitive processes alike. The example used above of 
the dog’s ability to understand human pointing cues, 
verbal cues and to follow human gaze is possibly a 
result of his long association with humans, coupled 
with individual learning.  By looking at the history of 
dogs’ interactions with his environment we can make 
progress into understanding the nature of his cognitive 
skills. With this in mind, the following investigation into 
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representation in the domesticated dog will be 
ethologically appropriate and follow the basic principles 
of embodied cognition outlined. 
 
The next chapter introduces two accounts of representation to 
come out of the embodied cognition paradigm. I will explain them 
both and begin to show how they might be applied to the 
domesticated dog. 
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Chapter Four: Embodied representations 
 
The literature on representation in animals is diverse, but a 
common view is that internal abstract representations are required 
for flexible behavior. Beigler and Pfuhi write ‘A hallmark of higher 
cognition is the flexible use of information. This requires an abstract 
representation of the information’ (2012, p. 833). The flexible use of 
information underlies the ability to use environmental and social 
cues to problem solve. It also underpins the ability to learn new 
behaviours and respond effectively in novel situations by applying 
past successful responses to a new situation or by generating new 
responses to the novel situation. In short, the flexible use of 
information is the foundation for being able to behave flexibly; a 
skill which gives an animal a higher chance of survival in 
unpredictable circumstances and problem solving skills that extend 
beyond trial and error learning. 
 
Behavioral flexibility is an important adaptive response to 
changing environments for many animal species. Such plasticity 
may also promote the invasion of novel habitats by introduced 
species by providing them with the ability to change or expand 
their ecological niche, a longstanding idea with recent empirical 
support (Wright, Eberhard, Hobson, Avery and Russello, 2010, p. 
393). 
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In the case of many dogs with active lives the ability to make 
flexible use of environmental and social cues is an advantage; 
there will be novel situations to be navigated and problems to 
solve. Representations can be used in these situations. But what 
these representations are in non-human animals such as the dog 
is unknown: ‘domesticated dogs likely utilise representations of 
objects in their everyday life for such tasks as searching and 
retrieving objects. Yet, we largely lack information to judge how 
similar or different their representations are from our own’ (Kundey 
et al., 2010, p.497-505). As with Beigler, cited above, it is 
commonly thought that representations are internal, mental 
entities. This is the standard view of human mental representation. 
But theories of representation developed with human cognition in 
mind are not always helpful in the explanation of non-human 
animal representation because they often involve language- based 
representations to explain internal categorisation and higher order 
cognitive functioning. 
 
Since Von Frisch (1937) discovered that honeybees can 
communicate information about distant resources to their hivemates 
and Baerends (1941) suggested that wasps could calculate and 
remember how many caterpillars were needed to fully stock a nest, 
representation in non-human animals has been the focus of much 
research. The general upshot of this research is that of members of 
the animal kingdom, primates might not be alone in their internal 
representation use. For example, Herrnstein (1964) concluded that 
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pigeons can learn concepts such as FISH, TREE or HUMAN in tests that 
required the birds to categorise objects based on an abstract 
property that was independent of the exemplar they were shown 
originally. Herrnstein’s notion of a representation is similar to the 
Prototype Theory, a theory which is commonly used to describe or 
test representation in non- human animals. Prototype Theory was 
formulated in the 1970s in response to data from recent human 
psychological experiments.  According to the Prototype Theory, 
concepts such as FISH are mental representations ‘with a 
probabilistic structure, in that something falls under C just in case it 
satisfies a sufficient number of properties encoded by C’s 
constituents’ (Margolis and Laurence, 2012). 
 
In other words, encoded into mental representations is the 
likelihood that an object, person or state of affairs will have certain 
particular features and resemble a prototypical member of that 
category. The Prototype Theory has roots in Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
idea that things which share a category such as ‘game’ bear what 
Wittgenstein called ‘a family resemblance’ to each other. In short, 
the structure of a mental representation is determined by the 
resemblance that objects that fall under that concept bear to the 
prototypical item of that category. If an item bears enough 
resemblance to the prototypical representation, then it is judged to 
fall under that concept (Medin, 1989). For example, a magpie would 
be classified as a bird because it bears enough of a resemblance to 
195
195
195 
 
the prototypical member of the bird category. (The prototypical 
member might look something like a blackbird, for instance.) 
The types of representation under discussion here - internal 
ones, from traditional theories of cognitive science - would, if they 
exist, play an intermediary role between a dog’s behaviour and his 
environment. Assuming their existence, their role is to be the 
cause of certain adaptive behaviours. 
However, representations so construed are internal. The actions 
are caused by representations; the actions are not representational 
in themselves. In contrast, taking an embodied approach to 
cognition and representation can lead to an entirely different view of 
representation in animals. Embodied cognition, as we have seen, 
emphasises the action- based, body-based, situation specific nature 
of cognition and this view covers representations also.  Thus, there 
is an alternative way of thinking about representation and 
representation use in animals. It is one that recognises the body-
based and action-based nature of representations, and which 
emphasises the interconnectedness of representations, the body 
and the environment. In some instances representations may be 
situation specific. Representations of this kind are likely to be more 
common, I believe, in animals because they are something the 
animal can use on a daily basis and will aid in her direct, time 
pressured responses to an immediate situation. 
I do not deny that animals may possess internal 
representations which may also serve to guide behaviour such as 
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those posited by Prototype Theory. My view is that our starting 
point for investigating representation use should be with those 
possible types of representation which are, like most other aspects 
of animal cognition, embodied. 
Most work on representation in the philosophy of mind has 
developed by focussing on the most high-end cognitive abilities; 
rational thought and deliberation. But much cognition in the broad 
sense cannot be much like that; for example, the mental lives of 
young children, of adults in unreflective activities and non-human 
animals. Much of this cognitive processing involves fast and adaptive 
responses to the environment, but human-based theories of mental 
representation such as the Prototype Theory do not give a very 
convincing idea of the majority of cognitive processing in such 
agents. As I have outlined in earlier chapters, embodied cognition 
gives a better picture of unreflective, but still skilled human cognition. 
When we apply the embodied cognition approach to animal 
cognition, the advantages become clearer still. 
The following discussion contains the argument that the 
attribution of embodied representations gives a productive picture of 
dog cognition, one which can explain flexible behaviour and 
cognitive capacities such as problem solving, short-term planning, 
forming expectations and making predictions about possible 
environmental events and the actions of others. I also suggest that 
embodied representations can provide a deeper explanation of 
dogs’ use of human cues as an aid to problem solving, learning by 
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imitation and cooperative behaviour such as is seen by pack 
members hunting together. 
 
4.1 Embodied representations: Background notes 
 
Embodied representations, I will argue, can enable a creature 
to plan, form expectations and make short-term predictions about 
possible environmental events and the actions of others. They can 
facilitate problem solving and in short, aid the agent to adapt his or 
her behaviour to the demands of the environment. In virtue of 
embodied representations a creature might be able to transfer 
learning from a previous situation and apply it to a novel yet similar 
one, thereby reducing the amount of time spent on trial and error 
learning. In short, being able to represent and store representations 
for future use increases an animal’s chances of continued survival; 
therefore embodied representations retain this advantage usually 
attributed to the possession of internal mental representations. 
 
It seems likely that when we are thinking about representation 
use in non-human animals such as dogs there will be some cases 
where there is not enough evidence to say for sure whether they 
are using representations, some cases that are borderline and 
some cases when they clearly are. Representation use, like other 
aspects of embodied cognition, is bound to the dog’s interactions 
with his environment, since the dog’s cognitive capacities come 
from perfecting his behaviour in response to real world events (for a 
discussion of this in relation to people, see Clark, 1997, p.4). The 
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preceding examination of dog-environment interactions therefore 
underpins the present discussion of representations. 
 
In place of abstract representations of formal logic expressed in 
propositional format, representation proves to be intrinsically 
linked to the sphere of action and is expressible in the same 
terms that control it. Therefore representation does not consist 
in a duplicate of reality, but in the virtual activation of perceptual 
and motor processes that, when actually executed, allow us to 
recognise objects and interact with them (Garbarini et al., 2004, 
p.106).  
 
In other words, embodied representations are the sorts of things to 
exist in behavioural, perceptual or motor processes. They are not 
internal abstract representations of objects. They are not confined to 
mental states and neural structures. The types of representations 
dogs use will be ones that aid successful dealings with the dog’s 
environment, and are therefore based on what he can perceive. 
 
4.1.2 Two theories of embodied representation 
 
To recap, traditional theories of representation have confined 
representation to the agent’s brain and until the rise of embodied 
cognition, there had been little discussion of the possibility that 
representation might not only be found in an agent’s neural 
structures. Embodied cognition, however, leads to the hypothesis 
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that as a cognitive state, representation can be distributed over the 
body. 
The possibility remains open that in navigating the world an 
agent uses a combination of neural and non-neural representations. 
Recent theorists have attempted to provide accounts of non-neural, 
body-based representation. The following discussion outlines two 
notions of representation from the embodied cognition approach: the 
theory of minimal representations and the theory of representation in 
action. These are the leading theories of representation to come 
from the embodied cognition framework. Although they are separate 
theories, they were developed from the same basis; that 
representation can reside within movement and behaviour. No 
attempt was made in their formulation by their authors to make the 
theories compatible; however I will argue here that they are. My 
main point is that both representation in action and minimal 
representations can be useful in the way we think about 
representation in non-human animals. 
 
4.1.3 Body and action-based representations 
 
Embodied representations are quite different from traditional 
representations. In traditional cognitive science, the plethora of 
theories of representation which exist all locate representations 
solely inside the agent’s head; carried by internal neural structures. 
As Keijzer puts it, ‘being a form of internal modelling and being 
the source of behavioural regularities [are] the defining conceptual 
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criteria of traditional representation in traditional cognitive science’ 
(Keijzer, 2002, p. 280). So what becomes of the way we think about 
representations if we accept embodied cognition? There are few 
cognitive processes which are not distributed across an agent’s 
body and behaviour in embodied cognition and this statement 
includes the way we think about representation. In fact, 
representations within the embodied cognition paradigm might be 
unrecognisable as representations in the traditional sense, given 
that the embodied cognition theorist adopts the idea that 
representations are body or action based, situated and closely tied 
to the agent’s environment. 
However, I argue that at the most basic level, across all 
accounts of representation, a representation by nature is a 
mediating state of some kind (Markman and Dietrich, 2000). 
Traditional theories of representation claim that representations are 
inner brain states that stand between an agent’s behavioural goal 
and environmental stimuli. In theories of embodied representation, 
representations are mediating states which may include non-neural 
structures such as the body. 
Based upon Markman and Dietrich’s theory, there are three 
conditions under which a system, or agent, uses representations, 
(aka mediating states): 
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1) The agent has internal states (including goal states) which 
undergo changes. (A goal state is a desired state to which the 
agent can compare the current state of the environment); 
2) The agent has representational states that are affected 
by the environment; and 
3) Information must be able to pass back and forth between the 
agent’s environment and the representational states (Markman 
and Dietrich, 2000, p. 144). 
 
Regardless of whether you think that representations are 
exclusively neural entities or action based entities, they are 
mediating states for an agent, providing they meet the three criteria 
above. Rowlands also lists five criteria which he tries to 
demonstrate that representations in action can meet in order for 
them to count as representational states. In what follows I will 
outline the criteria and explain how Rowlands’ representation in 
action might be thought to meet these criteria. Note that the five 
criteria he lists are applicable to neural representational states too. 
They are reasonably well accepted standards which a state must 
meet in order to count as representational. 
4.1.4 Representation in action involves the action carrying 
information about something other than itself 
 
Informational approaches to representation claim that what 
makes X a representation of Y, something in the world, is the fact 
that it carries information about Y. Some argue that the simple fact 
that there is a causal relation between X and Y is not enough to 
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warrant the claim that X carries information about Y. The example 
Rowlands uses to illustrate this point is smoke and fire. We cannot 
say that smoke (X) carries information about fire (Y) on the basis 
that there is a causal relation between fire and smoke. The reason 
that the causal relationship between X and Y is not enough to claim 
that X carries information about Y is the fact that X might obtain in 
the absence of Y. That is, there may be smoke but no fire. So, yes 
there is a causal relationship between smoke (X) and fire (Y) but the 
thought is that smoke can also arise in the presence of other states 
of affairs and thus is not a reliable signal for fire. Smoke does not 
reliably carry information about the presence of a fire. This leads 
some informational approaches to representation to make this 
stipulation: That X is a representation of Y (X carries information 
about Y) if and only if it is a law that if X then Y obtains. 
Theorists differ as to whether the laws in question need to be 
exceptionless. For example, Dretske asserts that the probability of Y 
given X must be 1. So what makes X a representation of Y is the 
necessary connection between X and Y, in other words, where there 
is smoke there is always fire. But Rowlands points out that we need 
not adopt Dretske’s strict approach when putting representation in 
terms of information. Lloyd (1989) argues that there need not be a 
necessary connection between X and Y for X to count as 
representational of Y. Instead, it needs only to be more likely that Y 
obtains, given X but this probability does not need to be (Rowlands, 
2006, p.115-116). 
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4.1.5 Representation in action is teleological 
 
This is the claim that an action counts as representational only if 
it has the function of representing the state of affairs that produces 
it, or if it facilitates the achievement of a goal by tracking that state 
of affairs. Let us look here at Millikan’s notion of function: 
 
: 
An item X has proper function F only if (i) X is a reproduction of 
some prior item that, because  of  the  possession of  certain 
reproduced properties, actually performed F in the past, and X 
exists because of this performance; or (ii) X is the product of a 
device that had the performance of F as a proper function and 
normally performs F by way of producing an item like X (Millikan, 
1993, p.123 as cited in Rowlands, 2006, p.127). 
 
 
 
For example, an action such as the growl of a dog has the 
function of representing a state of affairs (i.e. the presence of a 
potential threat) only if in the past the dog’s growl has represented 
the presence of a potential threat and the growl behaviour exists to 
indicate this threat. Or, the dog’s growl is the product of a 
behavioural sequence which includes the growl to indicate the 
presence of a threat. For Millikan, what a representation 
should do is determined by evolution, a representation represents 
because it has been selected to do so. That is, the functions of 
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representations are determined by the environment and evolution, 
which for the dog has included the process of domestication 
possibly spanning three hundred thousand years.  
Central to Millikan’s account is the idea that there are 
representation‘consumers’ and ‘producers’. The producers are the 
agents or mechanisms which produce the representation and the 
consumers are those which use it. For Millikan, what determines the 
function of a representation is how it is used by consumers, those 
who perceive and use the representational behaviour. There are 
two levels at which a representation may be consumed. For 
example, personal-level consumers are the beavers who jump into 
the water at the sound of another beaver’s tail splash. However, 
there are stages of cognitive and motor processing that must be 
passed through before the end result is achieved, before the beaver 
succeeds in jumping into the water. For example, the sound of the 
tail splash must be registered by the beaver’s ear and the signals 
passed onto different parts of the beaver’s brain and motor 
systems. The beaver’s auditory mechanisms and motor processes 
are consumers at the sub- personal-level. 
As another example, let’s look at Dretske’s example of a sort of 
marine bacterium that contains magnetosomes. The magnetosomes 
ensure that the bacteria move toward magnetic north in northern 
hemisphere bacteria. In the southern hemisphere, the bacteria 
move toward magnetic south. In doing so, the bacteria are moving 
away from oxygen-rich sea water. The oxygen free water is what 
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the bacteria benefit from, but the stimulus that provokes the 
movement away from oxygenated water is the geomagnetic pole. 
Whether we focus on the benefit to the organism or the stimulus 
that produces the movement determines what type of account of 
representation we give. For Millikan, what the magnetosomes 
represent is the direction of oxygen free water, for that is what the 
consumers need in this system (Millikan, 1989). However, an 
alternative way of looking at what the magnetosomes represent is 
provided by Dretske. He argues that what the magnetosomes 
represent is the direction of magnetic north (in the northern 
hemisphere bacteria), for this is the stimulus that produces the 
movement (Dretske, 1988). 
On the face of it, these look like opposing accounts but they can 
be seen as compatible. And this compatibility lies in the notion that 
to attribute fully fledged representational systems to an organism, 
the organism needs both to be a consumer at the personal-level 
and, in the case of animals, to have components such as perceptual 
apparatus and automatic behavioural responses to stimuli that are 
consumers at the sub-personal level. Consumers at the sub-
personal level respond to representations of stimuli, whereas 
consumers at the personal level respond to representations of states 
of affairs beneficial to the organism. The beaver’s jumping into the 
water relies on his auditory systems and motor systems responding 
to another beaver’s tail splash. His auditory and motor systems are 
consumers of a representation. These consumers are sub-personal 
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and track the stimulus (the actual sound and sight of the tail splash). 
On the other hand, the beaver jumping into the water at the sound of 
a tail splash is also indicative of the beaver, at the personal level, 
being a consumer of the representation (the tail splash) - the beaver 
takes the tail splash to mean “danger”. 
The distinction between the sub-personal and personal levels of 
responses to representation is useful because animals have sets of 
motor programs that respond to stimuli reflexively. For example, the 
horse’s perceptual mechanisms will perceive a threat provoking the 
flight response from the horse as a reflex motion. The motor 
response can occur concurrently or even before the personal level 
response from the horse, much in the same way that our arm 
muscles pull our hand away from a hot object almost before we are 
conscious of the object being hot and potentially dangerous. 
Conversely, there will also be times when the sub- personal level of 
responding is driven by a response at the personal level. For 
example, a great need for water will have me reaching for my cup 
on the sub-personal level. It is important to note that while sub-
personal behaviour may sometimes be the case, it is not always so 
and can be non-reflexive behaviour such as reaching for a glass of 
water, moving around one’s environment, navigating obstacles on 
the way to work and so on. The key distinction between sub-
personal and personal level processes lies in the location of the 
explanation of the behaviour. Personal level processes are located 
within a larger realm of rational activity, whereas sub-personal 
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processes are explained typically with reference to the working of 
the body for example. 
 
4.1.6 The representational action can misrepresent X 
 
It is a standard feature of what might be called intentional 
representation that it can be mistaken. I can have “goat” thoughts in 
response to sheep seen at a distance under bad lighting conditions, 
for example. Or a beaver’s tail-splash might communicate ‘Danger’ 
to another beaver on an occasion on which there is no danger. 
Compare this to what is sometimes called ‘natural meaning’: if those 
spots mean measles, then the person with the spots must have 
measles - if you discover that they haven’t, then you stop thinking 
that the spots mean measles (Grice, 1957).  
4.1.7 Representations may be decoupled from the 
environmental stimulus 
 
Clark and Toribio (1994) talk about certain states of affairs that 
are what they call representation-hungry. An example of a 
representation- hungry state of affairs is a dog’s pursuit of a prey 
animal. There are times when the creature of prey moves out of 
sight, smell and/or hearing to the dog. During these times, the dog 
must continue to conceive of his prey even as it is absent. In this 
case, something must ‘stand in’ for the object of prey and be 
decoupleable, capable of standing in for the prey even when it is 
not perceptually present to the dog. In humans, much of our offline 
thought appears to involve decoupleable representations, from 
planning next weekend’s activities to wondering what to make for 
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dinner and it is no surprise that philosophers and cognitive 
scientists have often thought that any representations worth 
having are decoupleable. 
The decoupleability criterion is also present in John 
Haugeland’s (1995) claim that representations should (i) 
facilitate the coordination of the agent’s behaviour even at times 
when relevant environmental information is not available to him 
or her and (ii) do this in virtue of their being able to represent in 
the absence of the represented. That is, a representation must 
be able to stand in for an item when the item is not present to 
the agent. Haugeland expressed his position in this way: 
 
An organism is using a representation if it can (i) co-ordinate its 
behaviours with environmental features which are not always 
reliably present to the system via some signal; (ii) cope with such 
cases by having something else (other than the signal directly 
received from the environment) stand in and guide behaviour in 
its stead; and (iii) the 'something else' is part of a general 
representational scheme which allows the standing in to occur 
systematically and allows for a variety of related representational 
states (Clark and Toribio, 1994, p.404). 
 
Clearly, there will be times when representations are neither 
necessary nor used. For example, at times when the environment 
serves as a model and affordances are present to the animal agent 
she does not rely on representations in order to deal successfully 
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with the situation. However, when the significant environmental 
feature is absent, then representation of those absent features 
would facilitate successful interaction with the environment. 
The decoupleability criterion rules out cases where the 
environmental signal alone controls an animal's behaviour, for 
example if an action is directly controlled by the environment and is 
not elicited in the absence of a stimulus then it is not likely to be 
representational. Haugeland’s second stipulation (ii) says that a 
representation can simply be anything that stands in for the 
environmental state of affairs. But, then he (iii) limits 
representations to only those entities which stand in for objects, 
states of affairs or other agents as part of a system of other things 
which also play the same role; so gastric juices cannot be 
representations of future food because gastric juices are not part of 
an overall system of representing entities. 
Rowlands remarks that this feature of representation, 
decoupleability, is most pressing in offline situations such as the 
planning of an action that is distal. Planning a trip to Australia in six 
months’ time, to use Rowlands’ example, will require the use of 
decoupled representations. In addition, decoupled representations 
could also come into play during online cognitive processing, such 
as when the dog is hunting prey yet relevant environmental stimuli 
are perceptually absent to him. 
Decoupleability for Clark and Grush is necessary for what they 
call ‘full blooded representations’. On this topic, they note ‘our 
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suggestion is that a creature uses full-blooded internal 
representations if and only if it is possible to identify within the 
system specific states and/or processes whose functional role is to 
act as de-coupleable surrogates for specifiable (usually extra-
neural) states of affairs’ (Clark and Grush, 1999, p. 8, their 
emphasis). 
 
4.1.8 The combinatorial constraint: Representation in action 
must occur as part of a general system of representation 
 
Behaviour can be thought of as composed of simpler units of 
behaviour that combine to form a more complex bodily movement. 
For example, a dog’s search behaviours are comprised of a 
particular set of postures, with olfaction as the main search tool.  
Rowlands even claims that certain actions such as the scan paths of 
people’s eyes when observing a picture can be broken down into 
smaller units of behaviour. On this point he writes: 
 
Crucially, it is not simply that the scan path carries information 
about the shape of an object, and has the function of tracking 
objects of this shape, but also that the scan path is decomposable 
into aspects or vectors, and these carry information about 
aspects of the shape of theobject, and, indeed, have the function 
of tracking aspects of this sort’ (Rowlands, 2006, p. 222). 
 
If an action is representational, then the representational 
nature of it can be viewed upon two levels: the level of the whole 
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behavioural sequence, and the level of the units of behaviour 
which make up the overarching behaviour. For example when you 
catch a ball, the individual movements of your hands and arms in 
their reach toward the ball can be seen as representational of the 
ball’s trajectory. In addition the whole smooth action of your reach 
and catch of the ball is also representational in virtue of their 
meeting the same criteria. In this way, Rowlands argues, 
representational actions meet the combinatorial constraint: the 
smooth movement of catching a ball can be broken down into 
component parts (say, the movements of your arms and hands, 
and possibly legs and feet). These component movements carry 
information about the ball’s trajectory and in combination comprise 
a representational action. 
 
 
A slightly different way of looking at this stipulation is that a 
representation must exist as part of a system that can be broken 
down into units. In other words, a representational system is 
homuncular, which means that ‘it can be compartmentalized into a 
set of hierarchically organized, communicating subsystems, each of 
which performs a well- defined subtask that contributes toward the 
collective achievement of an adaptive solution’ (Wheeler, 2005, p. 
218). For instance, in the dog’s search behaviour, a sub-system of 
the overarching system could be the lowering of the head to the 
ground, which involves engaging the nose at ground level. Another 
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subsystem of the search behaviour could be the quick multi-
directional movements which occur when tracking a scent. 
Each of the sub-systems of the overarching behaviour retrieves 
environmental information which is passed from one subsystem to 
another and together they generate the complete search behaviour. 
On this, Wheeler writes: ‘such an arrangement surely warrants a 
description according to which the homuncular subsystems use the 
information- bearing elements to stand-in for worldly states of affairs 
in their communicative dealings’ (Ibid, p. 219). Another way of 
thinking of the homuncular subsystems Wheeler describes is to 
remember Millikan’s personal and sub-personal level consumers. 
The idea here is that there is a sub-system, or sub-personal 
consumer, which can use representations to contribute to an 
overarching behaviour. In the dog, a sub-personal consumer would 
be his nose and the structures contained within it. The dog’s 
olfactory apparatus, plus his other perceptual systems at work all 
contribute toward making the dog carry out search behaviour. 
 
4.1.9 Summary 
 
In summary, there are five generally accepted criteria that an 
action or bodily state should meet if it is to count as 
representational. Actions themselves may be representational if 
they meet the five criteria above; moreover, Millikan argues that 
bodily states (in the form of sub-personal consumers) can use 
representational states from the environment to contribute to an 
overarching system of action. 
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4.2 Rowlands’ representational actions 
 
Next, let us turn to Rowlands’ theory of representation in action. 
This theory is an account of how actions can be representational. I 
will explain it here and show in the next chapter how it can be 
productively applied to the study of dogs. 
 
Certain types of actions are representational according to 
Rowlands. He states that ‘certain sorts of deeds form part of the 
activity - the deed - of representing the world [...] Deeds can 
represent the world to no lesser (and no greater) extent than 
internal representations traditionally construed [...] Certain ways of 
acting can literally be representational’ (Rowlands, 2006, p.12-13). 
This is not too controversial a claim on the face of it. As Goldin-
Meadow made clear, many gestures we make during speech are 
representational, such as the nod or shake of a head, and by 
representing what they do, they contribute to the meaning of what 
the speaker is saying (Goldin-Meadow, 2003). 
Rowlands explains that bodily movements and structures can 
carry representations. Rowlands goes a step further than Millikan 
who argues that bodily structures can be the sub-personal level 
consumers of representations. That is, a bodily movement on 
Rowlands’ theory could be representational of something within the 
environment of relevance to the agent. For example, when I was 
asked last week how tall my miniature pony is, rather than give a 
measurement figure in centimetres, I automatically indicated with 
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my hand and arm her height from the ground. In this example I use 
an action to quickly and effectively represent an aspect of the 
environment; namely the height of a mini pony. We do this naturally 
and frequently: measurements of, say, five centimetres can be 
visualised using thumb and forefinger; giving directions to someone 
on the street is naturally done using hand and arm gestures and so 
on. The frequency with which we use actions to represent is such 
that to consciously not perform them in a direction giving, or mini 
pony describing, situations feels terribly unnatural. 
Rowlands makes several key claims which are outlined and 
explained below. 
 
1)  ‘The world is an external store of information relevant to 
cognitive processes such as perceiving, remembering, 
reasoning and so on’ (Rowlands, 2006, p.33). 
 
This claim is hard to deny. That there are aspects of the 
environment that bear information relevant to an agent’s cognition 
is obvious. As Rowlands points out, information in the environment 
can be natural (such as the presence of dark rainclouds signalling 
imminent rain) or non- natural, like writing on a computer screen. 
In addition to the environment offering the agent information 
relevant to her adaptive fitness: 
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2)  ‘Cognitive processes are (often) hybrid - they straddle both 
internal and external forms of information processes’ 
(Rowlands, 2006, p. 34). 
 
Again, this claim must also be right if we agree with 
embodied cognition. This information processing can occur 
internally to the agent and externally. Recall, the earlier example 
of a children’s game whereby a box has different shaped holes 
in the top and there are corresponding blocks for each hole.  In 
figuring out which block will fit through which hole, my young 
son rotates the blocks manually and attempts to put them in the 
hole. After several attempts at the different holes, he succeeds 
and moves on to the next block. Rather than work out a solution 
to the puzzle internally, the child manipulates his environment, 
specifically the block, to come to the solution. In this example, 
the child’s cognitive processing is happening externally. And we 
continue to do this into adulthood: generally people figure out 
the best arrangement for furniture not by sitting down and 
thinking about it but by heaving it around the living room until a 
satisfactory arrangement is found. Also, my husband’s disregard 
for reading and internalising the instruction manual for putting 
together our son’s cot in favour of assembling the pieces and 
trying to fit them together by trial and error can (charitably) be 
seen not as a male quirk but as him finding a solution to the task 
at hand via external cognitive processes rather than internal 
ones. Therefore, cognitive processes are not limited to being 
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internal brain processes; they can also be external, or action-
based. These examples also demonstrate the following 
statement that Rowlands makes: 
 
3)  ‘The external processes involve the manipulation, 
exploitation and transformation of environmental structures 
that carry information relevant to the accomplishing of the 
cognitive task at hand’ (ibid, p.34). 
 
That is, information in the organism’s environment is available to 
the organism for use within its online cognitive processes when it is 
performing a certain task. As I mentioned, Rowlands’ conception of 
representation is based on the three principles above, principles 
which are already familiar from the earlier discussion of embodied 
cognition. 
Much hinges on the third point for Rowland, the thought that 
environmental structures carry relevant information, or affordances, 
about the task at hand, coupled with the thought that 
representation can be thought of in terms of action, rather than 
internal mental states. On this point he writes: 
 
Representation is not essentially a relation between inner 
representing item  and  outer represented  item.  Representation  
exists  out  in  the world as much as in the head - or, to put the 
same point another way, there is no principled way of separating 
action from representation (Rowlands, 2006, p. 49). 
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We ought to think about representation as being located not just 
inside the agent’s head but also in the agent’s body and behaviour, 
representations in embodied cognition are not just internal causes 
of behaviour, they can also be seen in the agent’s behaviour. 
‘Representation is not simply what guides behavior. Rather, it 
extends into behavior. Representing is representational all the way 
out ‘(Rowlands, 2006, p. 49). In short, Rowlands argues that we 
ought to recognise the tie between representation and action to the 
extent that there are what he calls ‘deeds’: actions which are 
representational. For example, take a batsman in cricket. The eyes 
of the batsman and the other movements he makes all carry 
information about the path that the ball is taking and will take. The 
scan path of a person’s eyes as he or she is trying to determine the 
shape of an object in the foreground is: 
 
… related to the shape in such a way that it carries information 
about that shape. Specifically, to establish whether a shape of a 
given type is present, one must perform head movements of a 
certain type... The presence of such movements in the 
determining phase of the process [where  the  person establishes 
the  shape  of  the  object],  therefore, raises the probability that 
a shape of a given type is present in the foreground of the visual 
scene. Therefore, given the first concept of information [that X 
carries information about another item, Y, when the occurrence 
of X increases the probability of the occurrence of Y], the 
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movements carry information about that shape (Rowlands, 2006, 
p.213). 
 
The thought that the batsman’s actions carry information 
about the trajectory of the ball forms part of Rowlands’ claim that 
the batsman’s actions are representational. The types of actions 
that are representational, Rowlands calls deeds. He argues that 
deeds (representational actions) can meet each of the five 
criteria explained in this chapter’s opening section. 
 
 
4.2.1 Pre-intentional actions 
 
To illustrate his notion of representation in action, Rowlands 
distinguishes between intentional actions, sub-intentional actions 
and pre- intentional actions. Sub-intentional actions are non-
intentional movements such as moving the mouth while reading 
silently to oneself. Pre-intentional actions are the deeds which 
Rowlands claims are representational. For example, raising your 
hand to catch a ball, reaching out to grasp a cup of tea or throwing a 
ball of paper into the rubbish bin are all examples of a pre-
intentional act or deed. They include ‘an array of on-line, feedback- 
modulated adjustments that take place below the level of intention, 
but collectively promote the satisfaction of [an] antecedent intention’ 
(Rowlands, 2006, p. 103). 
In some detail, Rowlands gives the following example of 
representation in action, where the deeds are the saccadic eye 
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movements recorded in Yarbus’ (1967) experiment. Yarbus 
presented participants with a painting of six people, five women in a 
room and a male visitor. They are each asked to look at the picture 
with their set task in mind, which is one of the following: 
 
1)  View the picture at will 
2)  Estimate the family’s wealth 
3)  Judge the age of the people in the painting 
4)  Guess what the people had been doing prior to the arrival 
of the visitor 
5)  Remember the clothing worn 
6)  Remember the positions of the objects in the room 
7)  Estimate how long it had been since the visitor was last seen 
by the people in the painting. 
 
Yarbus demonstrated in his experiment that the eye movements 
of each participant varied according to which task they were 
assigned. But rather than the eye movements being intentional, 
Rowlands argues that the participants’ saccades are pre-intentional 
- we don’t consciously move our eyes in patterns such as the above 
when observing the painting and these deeds are representational. 
The movements of the eyes track what the participants have been 
instructed to examine. 
Like saccadic eye movements, deeds, argues Rowlands, are 
pre- intentional. They are not conscious movements of the body; 
they are unintentional actions in direct response to an external 
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stimulus and this makes them representational. For example, the 
position of the cricket fielder’s hand is a direct and pre-intentional 
response to the path that the ball is taking through the air. In 
theory it should be possible to judge from the position of the 
fielder’s hand the trajectory of the ball: the fielder’s movements are 
generally representational of the ball’s flight path, the fielder’s 
subtle bodily movements track the path of the ball. 
Of course, this is not necessarily the case: the fielder may miss 
the ball by a fraction and fail to catch it; his hands may misrepresent 
the flight path of the ball, thus deeds meet another criterion for being 
representational, they can sometimes misrepresent. 
 
In summary, Rowlands has made a remarkable contribution to 
the way we approach representation. Rather than relying upon 
internal representations alone, our actions can be representational. 
The beauty of Rowlands’ work is that representing is not just a 
feature of certain internal mental states; representations can be 
distributed beyond the neural body and into our behaviour. For 
Rowlands, certain actions (deeds) are representational, but the 
representational nature of these actions stems not from any prior 
representational states, but is inherent within them. Deeds, he 
argues, are not representational in virtue of other, logically prior 
representational states such as a belief. For example, the actions of 
hitting certain keys on the piano keyboard are related to a prior 
representational state, a belief that this key correlates with a 
particular note. The intention is then formed and that particular key 
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on the piano is hit. However, catching a ball is ‘typically a matter of 
online adjustments made through the process of trial and error acts 
independently of intention formation ... Deeds formed independently 
of intentional states ... provide far and away the best examples of 
our representational activities’ (Rowlands, 2006, p.111). 
Rowlands claims that the saccadic eye movements in the 
painting experiment discussed above meet the criteria for 
representationhood: 
 
1)  They carry specific information about people in the painting, 
2)  They track a feature in the painting, for example the type of 
clothing that each person in the painting is wearing. 
3)  The saccadic eye movements can misrepresent. For 
example, it is possible that saccadic eye movements may not 
track the feature in the painting the person claims to have 
attended to. 
4)  The eye movements can be combined into a more general 
representational structure, for example a participant can 
continue to scan a painting systematically 
5)  The saccadic eye movements are decoupleable from the 
painting (the participants could in theory remember the 
painting and their eyes could scan the imagined painting 
following the same scan paths). 
 
Rowlands’ view is particularly appealing to a theorist of animal 
cognition wishing to explain animal cognition in terms of 
222
222
222 
 
representation since it defends the thought that representational 
states can exist within behaviour. Perhaps dogs also possess 
representational internal states, possibly modal cognitive states, 
which arise from canine neural structures. My point here in 
discussing Rowlands’ view is that we shouldn’t stop at the brain in 
our investigation into animals’ use of representation; rather 
representation can, if Rowlands’ theory is right, be inherent within 
dogs’ actions too and these types of representations are the sort 
that are useful to dogs in a variety of situations. I will return to this 
point in the next chapter. 
Moreover, the notion that representation might exist in action, 
means that we are no longer faced with the controversial 
(especially with regards to non-human animals) claim that 
representations must be bound up with other prior intentional states 
such as beliefs. 
 
Furthermore, deeds are mediating states. Recall that there were 
four criteria by which an agent could be judged as using a mediating 
state. These are: 1) the agent has internal states (including goal 
states) which undergo changes; 2) The agent has internal states 
that are affected by the environment; 3) Information must be able to 
pass back and forth between the agent or system’s environment and 
the internal states; and 4), the agent ‘must have internal processes 
that act on or are influenced by the internal states and their 
changes, among other things’ (Markman and Dietrich, 2000, p.144). 
The batsman’s swinging the bat in order to hit the cricket ball would 
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satisfy criterion 1) since the deed (the internal state) undergoes a 
series of adjustments in accordance with the trajectory of the ball. It 
also satisfies criterion 2) in that the agent’s action (deed) is affected 
by the environment, namely by the ball’s flight path. According to 
Rowland, information does pass back and forth between the deed 
and the environment. The ball’s path affects the way in which the 
batsman swings the bat and in doing so, the trajectory of the bat 
represents the path of the ball. Thus criterion 3) is satisfied. That the 
deed also meets criterion 4) is not out of the question. For the 
representational deed, the swinging of the cricket bat would most 
likely affect and be affected by other states within the agent. For 
example, the batsman’s previous experience as a batter and his 
established motor programs would also affect the swing of the bat 
and conversely, the action of swinging the bat could well affect the 
batsman’s subsequent cognitive processes. On the face of it, then, 
Rowlands’ deeds meet Markman and Dietrich’s criteria for being 
representational, or mediating, states. 
 
4.2.2 Objection: Non-trivial causal spread 
 
Theories of embodied representation, such as the two I explain 
in this chapter, have the potential to show how representational 
actions are possible, but they are not without their problems. Non-
trivial causal spread is a term coined by Wheeler and Clark (1999) 
to explain an objection to representationalism. Broadly the objection 
states that if intelligent, flexible behaviour can be explained in part 
by environmental and non-neural structures and states of affairs 
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then there is no good reason to claim that neural representation use 
by the agent was the main driver for the behaviour. Thus, the non-
trivial causal spread objection is a problem for embodied cognition 
theorists because while embodied cognition emphasises non-neural 
bodily aspects it may still be vulnerable to the non- trivial causal 
spread objection due to the significant role that environmental 
factors occupy in the production of intelligent, flexible behaviour. 
Wheeler writes: 
 
If our best cognitive science picks out factors in the non-neural 
body as sites of interest then what is to prevent us from 
treating those factors as codings for intelligent actions with the 
brain and the environment relegated to the status of a normal 
ecological backdrop against which that representational function 
is performed? Similarly if our best cognitive science picks out 
factors in the environment then what is to prevent us from 
treating those factors as codings for intelligent actions with the 
brain and the non-neural body suitably relegated? (Wheeler, 
2001, p. 219). 
 
However, Wheeler argues, the non-trivial causal spread 
argument only obtains if we accept strong instructionism. Strong 
instructionism is the theory that if a representation drives a 
behaviour then it is the only driver for the flexible aspects of the 
action (Wheeler, 2001). Moreover, Andy Clark replies to the non-
trivial causal spread argument by highlighting two myths: 1) the 
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myth of the self-contained code. This is the belief that to for 
something to cause a behaviour the causal factor must act as the 
whole cause of the behaviour. This however, is not how people (or 
programs) work. All cognitive processing occurs within a setting – 
or as Clark calls it – an ‘ecological backdrop’. 2) the myth of 
explanatory symmetry. This is the mistaken belief that we cannot 
say that one causal factor guides behaviour as the actual workload 
behind causing the behaviour is shared by multiple factors. As 
Clark writes, ‘Causal equality at one level (the level of work done) 
may thus co-exist with genuine asymmetry at another level (the 
level of greatest relevant plasticity)’ (Clark, 1998, p. 95-9). In 
summary, non-trivial causal spread is not a problem for theories of 
embodied cognition because it does not matter whether behaviour 
is caused by an array of factors; embodied representations still 
have a useful part to play in their explanation. 
4.2.3 Does Rowlands’ theory meet the decoupleability 
criterion?  
Shaun Gallagher argues that it is questionable whether the 
kinds of pre-intentional actions that we are regarding as 
representational when they are interacting with environmental 
events are actions are still representations if they are decoupled: 
 
Once we do decouple a pre-intentional act [a representational 
action] from X (the cricket ball, the piano keys, the painting), I 
suggest that we are no longer talking about action in the same 
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sense. Indeed, it is difficult to see how [representational] pre-
intentional acts can be decoupled from X (the ball, the piano keys, 
the painting) or the context without becoming something entirely 
different from an element of the action   at   stake   or   an   AOR   
[action   orientated   representation] (Gallagher, 2008, p. 356). 
 
Gallagher goes  on  to  write: 
‘Off-line cognition,  imagining, remembering, or even re-enacting 
an action decoupled from its original context and absent X may 
(or may not) require representation - but this says nothing at all 
about representation in action’ (Gallagher, 2008, p. 357). 
 
Rowlands (2012) replies to this objection with reference to the 
difference between perceiving something and imagining something. 
Both are representational, yet differently so. This is because 
perceptual representation where there is nothing to represent (the 
absence of X) is no longer perception. It has now become 
imagination. This is similar, Rowlands thinks, to the argument 
Gallagher makes about deeds which are representational in the  
absence of X: they become something entirely different from an 
action oriented representation. 
 
However, Rowlands argues, 
 
If we want decoupleability to be a general constraint on 
representation, and thus a feature of all representations, then all 
we can reasonably expect from it is a way of typing tokens of 
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mental representations independently of their immediate 
environment […] The immediate environment provides neither a 
physical nor logical constraint on the occurrence of the relevant 
representation. It is in this sense that the decoupleability 
constraint, if understood as a general feature of all 
representations, collapses into the misrepresentation 
constraint. But on this way of understanding decoupleability, 
deeds are indeed decoupleable from their environment 
(Rowlands, 2012, p. 142). 
 
The main point that Rowlands is making here is that as long as the 
representational action can misrepresent, it is decouplable from the 
environment. Thus the decoupleability criterion can be met when 
the misrepresentation criterion is met. There is also an important 
distinction to note in Rowlands’ theory of representational actions. 
That is deeds are representational actions, rather than 
representations. A representational action of a ball in flight could 
occur in the absence of a ball in flight as in the case of actions 
which are misrepresenting, or re-enacting. This is contrasted with 
an action representing, where ‘representing’ is used as a success 
term. Note, for example, the difference between saying 1) ‘my arm 
movements are representational of the position of the cup I am 
about to grasp’ and 2) ‘my arm movements represent the position 
of the cup I am about to grasp’. The first phrase speaks of the arm 
movements as representational actions – representational of the 
cup’s location. The representational actions of my arm may be 
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misrepresenting (I could be wrong about where the cup is and 
knock it over instead). The second phrase implies that my arm’s 
movements successfully represent the cup (there is no room here 
for decoupleability or misrepresentation since the phrase is a 
statement of fact). The first phrase is an example of the way we 
should read Rowlands’ use of ‘representation’. On this way of 
understanding representational actions, Rowlands’ deeds do meet 
the decoupleability criterion. 
Moreover, Rowlands remarks that Haugeland’s claim (ii) that 
representations should be able to stand-in for what they represent 
in the absence of that item, can be read in different ways. One way 
does, as Gallagher remarks above, preclude actions from being 
representational. On this reading, it is implicit that what guides 
behaviour in the absence of the relevant environmental stimulus is 
not, and cannot be, a form of behaviour. 
But this is an assumption that cannot be made, especially 
given the strong arguments behind the embodied cognition 
thesis that internal mental states are not the sole guiding forces 
for behaviour. There is no reason, Rowlands remarks, that a 
form of behaviour should not guide another form of behaviour 
when the guiding behaviour and resultant behaviour belongs to 
the same individual.  He asks his reader to consider the role 
played by rhyme in triggering memories. For example, we may 
not be able to recall where in the alphabet a letter lies until we 
have gone through the alphabet rhyme for that portion in our 
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heads. So we ought not to read Haugeland’s second claim as 
precluding the individual’s own behaviour being the sort of thing 
that can stand in for an absent environmental stimulus. 
Rowlands argues that the way we should interpret Haugeland’s 
three criteria is as saying that: 
 
… (a) the representing vehicle cannot be essentially causally 
dependent  upon  what  it  represents  in  the  sense  that  the  
vehicle cannot, as a matter of physical necessity, occur in the 
absence of what it represents, or (b) what is represented cannot 
be causally dependent upon the vehicle that represents it in the 
sense that it cannot, as a matter of physical necessity, occur in 
the absence of that vehicle (Rowlands, 2006, p. 164). 
 
Therefore, representations are decoupleable if the 
representations and their represented are not physically causally 
dependent. This is attributing a much broader meaning to 
‘decoupleable’ than one first might assume when encountering the 
decoupleability criterion. What Rowlands is saying is that a deed is 
decoupleable if it is possible that the action might be performed in 
the absence of the stimulus. An analogy might be that on a short 
piece of string, one end cannot be said to represent the motion of 
the other end of the string because the two are physically causally 
connected. The two ends are influencing each other and neither is 
representing the other end’s trajectory or movement. By Rowlands’ 
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wider interpretation of what it means for a vehicle of representation 
to be decoupled from what it represents, deeds are decoupleable. 
 
There is another way of viewing decoupleability which I will 
come to in the section below as I explain Clark and Grush’s 
account of minimal representations. As we will see next, Clark and 
Grush (1999) argue for fully fledged representations which are 
‘fully’ decoupleable and ‘minimal representations’ which are only 
partially decoupleable. Minimal representations cannot fully stand 
in for absent state of affairs, like an abstract mental representation 
would; instead they are forward emulators of actions about to 
occur. 
 
In summary, representations can be embodied; found within an 
agent’s body (both neural and non-neural) and her actions. If we 
accept that an agent’s cognitive processes are distributed, then 
representations are also distributed and not confined to an agent’s 
inner neural structures. These types of representation are still 
recognisable as representations providing they meet the conditions 
for being a mediating state and the five general criteria for 
representationhood set out in the beginning of the chapter. Claiming 
that non-human animals have embodied representations does not 
rule out the possibility that they are also capable of possessing 
neural representations such as modal perceptual representations.11 
                                                             
11 To say that a representation is modal means the representation resides in the same systems as 
the perceptual states that produced them. In contrast, amodal representations are removed from 
the perceptual systems. Information from perceptual systems is converted into amodal symbols 
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For example, perhaps it is the case that some of a dog’s 
cognitive processing relies upon categorising aspects of his 
environment in accordance with how closely an item matches a 
stored prototype of a category (as in Prototype Theory). My point 
here is that representations might exist in other, non-neural forms. 
Rowlands’ theory of representation in action has shown us one way 
in which this might be the case. Let us now turn to another account 
of embodied representation which I will argue can be integrated 
with Rowlands’s account of embodied representation. 
 
4.3 The emulation theory of representation 
 
Another theory of embodied representation is the emulation 
theory, developed by Andy Clark and Rick Grush. Clark and Grush 
argue for what they call ‘minimal robust representations’ (1999, p. 
7). Their thesis is that there are emulation circuits that help an agent 
with short-term planning. In addition, emulation circuits may also 
support mental imagery and form the basis for offline cognition. In 
human beings, emulator circuits run offline ‘if, then’ scenarios about 
bodily actions and their effects on other parts of the agent’s body 
and her environment. Emulation circuits facilitate the prediction of 
what state of affairs the current actions of the agent are likely to lead 
to. They are useful because they run their predictions quickly 
enough for an agent to adjust her movements to maximise the likely 
                                                             
which are then part of an overarching system of cognition which supports higher functioning 
(Barsalou, 1999). 
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success of an action. In their words, an emulator mechanism 
provides: 
 
… a quicker kind of feedback for use by the control system. An 
emulator is just a mechanism (circuitry, software, whatever) that 
takes as input information about the starting (or current) state of 
a system (e.g., biomass, temperature, etc.) and about the 
control commands that are being issued (e.g., increase heat by 
2 degrees). The emulator then gives as output a prediction of the 
next state of the system. This prediction takes the form of a set 
of values for the future feedback that the new state of the system 
should yield. The emulator thus models the target system and 
generates a kind of mock feedback that can be used instead of 
laggardly feedback from the real system (Clark and Grush, 1999, 
p.6). 
 
The hypothesis is that emulator mechanisms are at work 
whenever a person is about to, for example, reach for a cup, catch 
a ball or jump over a puddle. In support of this hypothesis, it has 
been shown that damage to the neural emulation systems results 
in slow, shaky movements that are very likely based on real world 
feedback as opposed to the hypothetical type of feedback that 
emulator circuits give to facilitate smooth, effective actions. The 
conclusion is that the person with neural damage to emulation 
circuits is unable to simulate an action such as reaching and has to 
fall back on trial and error learning, using real actions in order to 
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successfully reach out and grasp the cup. The crucial point is that 
emulator circuits work by emulating, or representing, certain 
possible states of the agent’s body and her environment given the 
action the agent is about to perform. Clark and Grush remark that 
emulator circuits provide a ‘system of inner states and processes 
whose adaptive functional role is to stand in for specific extra-
neural (bodily) states of affairs’ (1999, p.7). Going back to the five 
general criteria for representationhood12 emulating systems meet 
the first criterion set out above, that is, they can carry information 
about things other than themselves. 
Furthermore, Clark and Grush write that emulator circuits break 
down into component parts. Each component has the job of 
representing specific states each of which correspond to the 
components of the possible (future) states of extraneural affairs. In 
light of this, representations are compositional; they break down into 
small units. Thus emulation circuits could exist as part of a 
representational framework, thereby meeting the fifth criterion. 
 
The representations produced by the components of the 
emulator systems give an account of representations that do not 
hinder real time cognitive processing and action. Instead these 
                                                             
12  1) The representation can carry information about something other than 
itself. 
2) The representation is teleological – it is directed at a particular goal. 
3) The representation can misrepresent X. 
4) The representation may be decoupled from the environmental stimulus. 
5) The representation can be combined into a more general representational 
framework 
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types of representations enhance online cognitive processing, 
thereby side stepping Brooks’ worry that representations (if the 
agent does indeed use them) would be prone to getting jammed in 
representational bottlenecks, caused by the time consuming 
process of converting sensory stimuli into amodal representations 
and producing subsequent responses. 
 
An emulation system emulates actions before they are 
performed. This enhances the likelihood that the agent’s actions will 
be successful and it also reduces the need for the agent to have to 
learn how to perform 
certain actions successfully by trial and error. Important to notice is 
that Clark and Grush think of representations within the emulation 
system as minimal representations. Fully-fledged mental 
representations may, Clark and Grush suggest, be built upon these 
minimal ‘emulator’ representations. But in some agents, minimal 
representations may be all there is. What distinguishes miminal 
representations from fully fledged representations is the degree to 
which they can be decoupled from the environmental stimulus: 
 
… motor emulation, according to Grush, marks the basic point at 
which nature, still firmly fixated upon the support of real-time, 
real-world 
action began to use the trick of representing what was not 
readily at hand. This trick, Grush suggests, marks a real 
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boundary between cognitive agency and other forms of 
adaptive success (Clark, 2008, p.152). 
 
Clark and Grush describe situations that involve a neural 
emulator. One such situation is when a person reaches for a glass 
of water. Before the actual movement takes place Clark and Grush 
hypothesise that a neural emulator circuit runs, which provides 
hypothetical feedback regarding the success or failure of particular 
arm and hand movements in relation to the task. The neural 
emulator is, Clark and Grush write, ‘working just one step ahead of 
the real-world feedback’ (Clark and Grush, 1999, p.10). 
 
The emulator represents objects and the environment as things 
engaged with in certain ways as opposed to how they are 
considered apart from their role in the organism’s 
environmental engagements. The perceived environment is the 
environment as made manifest through the organism’s 
engagements, because the emulator that supplies the perceptual 
interpretation is an emulator of the agent/environment 
interactions. The conceptual significance of this is that  it  allows  
us  to  acknowledge  the  action/behavioral  bias  of perception 
without becoming anti-representationalist about perception 
(Grush, 2004, p. 393). 
 
It is worth noting again, however, that representations 
involved in the emulator system are not fully-fledged 
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representations; they are what can be called minimal or weak 
representations, due the fact that they are not entirely 
decoupleable, as I will now explain. 
4.3.1 Do minimal representations meet the decoupleability 
criterion? 
 
As I mentioned above, Rowlands argues that motor actions 
such as catching a cricket ball are decoupleable because they can 
misrepresent, but for Clark and Grush, emulator circuits are 
representing context- dependent actions in the future: they are 
forward emulators. In this sense, emulator circuits are 
representational of the environment and an agent’s actions with it. 
Grush writes: 
 
On the emulation framework, emulators are constructed and 
maintained in order to be able to stand in for the 
body/environment. But they don’t simply represent the world, 
but more specifically they represent the world as interacted 
with by the organism. Only those aspects of the body and 
environment that are manifest in the organism’s 
engagements can be represented by the emulator, and only 
those that are salient for the organism need be (Grush 2003, 
p. 88). 
 
Representational emulation states are not examples of full-
blooded representation, precisely because they are not deployable 
in a fully offline manner, but rather are located “at the most minimal 
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end of what is surely a rich continuum of possible stand-in invoking 
strategies” ’ (Wheeler, 2005, p. 214- 215). This is what Clark and 
Grush mean when they talk about partial decoupleability. In one way 
the representational state of the emulator circuit is decoupleable 
because it is emulating future interactions with the environment, 
actions which have yet to happen. On the other hand, they are 
context-dependent and situation-specific. 
Wheeler suggests that ‘Clark and Grush’s neurally realized 
emulator may well show that some action-oriented representations 
may be minimally decouplable’ (Wheeler, 2005, p.215). In other 
words, ‘minimally decoupleable’ is a term that Wheeler adopts in his 
quote above to introduce the idea that representations fall along a 
continuum of decoupleability; some being less so than others. 
Rather than categorising, for example, saccadic eye movements as 
either decoupleable or not, it is better to suggest that some 
representational actions and states may be decoupleable, others 
definitely are, and some simply are not. 
Emulation circuits may also misrepresent. If emulation circuits 
are at work whenever we reach for a cup or jump over a puddle, it 
is possible that they are capable of misrepresenting the outcomes 
of these actions since there are times when we fail to reach the 
cup or we end up getting wet because we have misjudged the 
jump over the puddle. Of course, there may be many other 
reasons why we are sometimes not successful in actions such as 
these, but it does not seem implausible to suggest that one of the 
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many reasons could be that our emulation circuits are 
misrepresenting. Furthermore, emulation circuits are teleological. 
They have a definite goal: to represent the likely outcomes of our 
actions before we perform them for real. It seems as though 
emulation circuits meet the five general criteria above that are 
commonly agreed upon for something to count as a 
representation. In addition, the emulation system meets Markman 
and Dietrich’s four necessary and sufficient conditions for being a 
mediating state. Firstly the representational state must undergo 
changes. When the emulation circuit is activated, there are 
changes and adjustments made in response to the situation. For 
example, the emulation circuit will emulate actions differently 
depending on the situation that the agent is in. This also means 
that the representational state is affected by the environment. 
Third, information passes back and forth between the agent’s 
environment and the representational state in that the 
environment in which the emulation circuit simulates an action will 
affect how the action is emulated and how the action is emulated 
will ultimately determine how the action comes to be performed in 
that environment. Lastly, the agent’s representational state must 
act on or be influenced by other states and their changes 
(Markman and Dietrich, 2000, p.144). This again seems true 
since past experience and practice with certain actions will likely 
affect the way they are emulated and how they are emulated will 
go on to influence other cognitive processes, the most obvious of 
which is the manner in which an action is executed. 
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There are three things that make the account that Clark and 
Grush give particularly attractive: most notable is the fact that the 
representors postulated by the emulation theory of representation 
are distributed across an agent’s perceptual capacities and motor 
skills. In addition, this account of representation does not fall prey to 
the criticism that representations are unwieldy entities, likely to 
hinder cognitive processing in times where an agent’s cognitive load 
is raised. Rather, as Clark and Grush (1999) note, the emulation 
circuit would speed up cognitive performance. Moreover, it is a 
theory of representation applicable to dogs, as shall be argued in the 
next chapter. 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
The emulation theory provides an account of minimal 
representations. Minimal representations are the first step in the 
evolution of representations that could be decoupled from the 
environment, yet they are still representations in their own right. 
Minimal representations do not represent that the world is a 
particular way; rather, minimal representations represent 
affordances. They provide the agent with ‘knowledge of how to 
negotiate the environment given a particular context of activity’ 
(Wheeler, 2005, p. 198). 
 
4.4.1 What’s next? 
 
Above are two theories from within the embodied cognition 
framework which attempt to explain how an agent might use 
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representations which are not internal brain states. I have brought 
them together here to demonstrate a way forward for representation 
in embodied cognition. Although they are not designed to work 
together, the two theories of representation I have outlined above 
are compatible as two ways of representing using actions and 
emulation circuits. I have introduced them both in this chapter to 
show how we might conceive of representation in non-human 
animals like the domestic dog. This is the focus of the next chapter. 
 
The main points to take from this chapter are: little is known 
about the precise neural structures of most non-human animals, so 
I do not want to rule out the possibility that some non-human 
animals may use traditional sorts of representation such Prototype 
Theory. I singled out the Prototype Theory because researchers 
have begun to investigate whether or not certain non-human 
animals classify the world in accordance with it, for example. There 
are reports of pigeons behaving in such a way, under experimental 
conditions, as to make such a conclusion not unreasonable. But 
still, the research that tries to discover whether non-human animals 
are using mental representations such as these are looking for 
structures that are inner, and originally postulated with humans in 
mind. Such an approach may be reasonable, but it would be good 
for research to be done in an embodied representation framework 
as well. As I wrote in the beginning of this chapter, we should not 
feel limited as to what we count as representational to neural 
structures only.  
241
241
241 
 
Action-oriented accounts of representation such as the ones 
that Rowlands and Clark and Grush formulate provide plausible 
forms of representation that are not purely neural entities. They are 
compatible theories in that neither precludes the other and they 
both provide an agent with affordances and environmental states of 
affairs without entailing an account of inner, mental representations 
of the sort often attributed to humans. 
In fact it seems to me more likely that the sorts of 
representations that non-human animals use most often are the 
action-oriented and situation specific ones.  
Thus, theories of embodied representation are a good starting 
point for attributing representations to dogs and other non-human 
animals. In the next section of this thesis, I focus on the 
domesticated dog and show how embracing embodied cognition 
and theories of embodied representation enhances our study of 
cognition in dogs. 
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Chapter Five: Embodied representation use in dogs  
 
I argue in this chapter that adopting embodied cognition allows 
us to formulate a clear hypothesis about representational actions 
that dogs may use for interacting with the world. The two types of 
representational actions I will apply to dogs are those explained in 
the previous chapter: Rowlands’ ‘deeds’ and the representational 
emulation circuits of Clark and Grush. Many researchers have 
attempted to study representation in non- human animals, but the 
notions of representation used are varied and sometimes unclear. 
Here, I demonstrate that we can find useful accounts of 
representation in animals by applying Rowlands’ theory of 
representation in action and the emulation theory proposed by Clark 
and Grush. 
Because, as we saw in Chapter One, the communication that 
dogs engage in revolves around actions, objects themselves play a 
lesser role in dogs’ environments than they do in ours. What 
delineates most objects in the dog’s world is the actions around 
them, or the affordances they offer the dog: they are food sources, 
prey, play items, shelter and so on. This is a factor to take into 
account if we are to construct an account of representation in 
domesticated dogs: that the vast majority of representations which 
dogs use will relate to actions, or affordances, rather than objects 
themselves. While the majority of dogs’ representations are of 
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actions related to certain objects rather than the objects 
themselves, Miklósi writes that ‘this [the lesser role that objects 
play] is not to say that the dog’s mind operates without utilising 
representations of objects, but these are very likely different from 
our own. In addition, perceptual information will differ dramatically’ 
(Miklósi, 2008, p.156). 
 
5.1 Why investigate representations in dogs?  
 
There are many methodological guidelines we can use to 
approach the study of domesticated dog cognition and the 
interpretation of the data that experiments provide. One model is 
Morgan’s (1894) doctrine of parsimony. Morgan suggested that 
behaviour is best explained with reference to mental processes that 
stand lower on the scale of evolution and development. This is the 
stance that is usually taken by behaviourists. Behaviourists claim 
that most forms of behaviour can be described and explained in 
terms of simple associations between an environmental stimulus 
and a certain response. On this view, the canine mind is a simple 
device that is adept at making associations between environmental 
events and behaviours. Such models of behaviour have been 
labelled ‘low-level’ (Povinelli 2000) and ‘cue-based’ (Call 2001). The 
wish to avoid positing representations in domesticated dogs is, I 
believe, based upon the thought that they are inner mental states. 
However with embodied representations, there is room for 
representations used to be both low-level and cue based without the 
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need for attributions of inner mental states necessitated by theories 
of representation which come from traditional cognitive science. 
Moreover, I will argue that the attribution of embodied 
representations can explain cognitive capacities such as short-term 
planning, forming expectations and making predictions about 
possible environmental events and the actions of others. For 
example, a representation can explain how an animal can adapt to 
a novel situation and successfully interact with his environment in 
the absence of previous experience with this type of situation. 
As we saw in the opening chapter, dogs presented with a novel 
task in an experimental setting will often look longer at a human 
than a wolf will in the same setting. The wolf will apply problem 
solving tactics such as trial and error more than the dog, while the 
dog’s gaze is more frequently upon the human. It has been widely 
suggested in the literature, and outlined in the opening chapter, that 
the dog is looking to the handler for cues to problem solving (Byrne, 
2003; Topál et al., 1997; Topál et al., 2005). This behaviour can be 
explained by the dog’s representation of the human as a source of 
information. If a human’s actions are representational, as they are 
according to Rowlands, then the dog can use these actions as a 
useful information source. For example, if you watch a dog agility 
competition closely you will notice that the handler directs the dog 
around the obstacle course, which must be completed in a specific 
order and direction. The verbal cues that the handler gives the dog 
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are often minimal; what plays the largest role is the position of his or 
her body in relation to the dog and the next obstacle. 
The successful agility dog learns to use the handler’s direction 
of movement, location and speed as representational of the path 
he is to follow. In the same way, the handler’s movements 
represent the course the dog must take. In situations like these, 
Rowlands’ theory of representational action can come to life and 
we can begin to see how the dog can use representational actions 
such as these to guide his successful behaviour in his world. The 
same thing occurs when the dog is rounding up sheep, the good 
sheepdog can use the movements of the sheep as a guide to 
which way they are heading and use this information to prevent 
their heading off in the wrong direction. The sheep’s movements 
are representational actions which the dog has learned to use. 
 
Another way in which embodied representations can explain 
and predict behaviour is through the use of the emulation theory of 
representation - the dog can navigate a novel and demanding 
terrain successfully by emulating the physical actions required and 
assessing them based on their likelihood of success. Actions such 
as making a series of jumps up a steep section of bush are 
demanding, yet a healthy, fit dog will generally be able to cope 
with this task possibly through the use of a representational 
emulation system, which can guide his behaviour moment to 
moment. Without the use of representations in our toolkit to 
explain non-human animal cognition, the dog’s behaviour can be 
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explained by little other than trial and error and associationist 
theories of cognition to rely upon which if the situation is genuinely 
novel cannot explain as easily the adaptive behaviour a dog is 
capable of. 
 
In what follows I argue that embodied representations can 
enable a creature to plan, form expectations and make short term 
predictions about possible environmental events and the actions of 
others and demonstrate how this might be done. With embodied 
representations, we are not committed to the view that 
representations involve elusive intentional mental states within the 
dog’s brain. Rather, representations can be action-based, context-
specific and distributed across an agent’s body. 
 
5.2 Background to a model of representation in the 
domesticated dog 
 
The domesticated dog, as a social animal, has developed the 
cognitive capacity to predict the behaviour of a prey animal based 
on his own actions. A quite different creature, one that has not 
evolved to hunt, may not have developed this skill since that skill 
has no adaptive value for it. Susan Hurley writes: ‘animals can 
occupy islands of instrumental rationality’ (Hurley, 2003, p. 252). 
Her point is that when we are considering the issue of non-human 
animal conceptual abilities we should consider that the cognitive 
skills of the dog are likely to have developed surrounding those 
actions which they have evolved to perform in order to survive. 
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Therefore, for reasons that I will come to, we ought to also 
consider that a representation for a dog might usually consist in a 
representation of affordances, actions associated with an object, 
rather than abstract categories. Dogs know which objects are items 
they can play with, chew on, manipulate to gain release from the 
back garden and so forth. It seems that the sort of knowledge that 
dogs have about objects involves almost explicitly the types of 
actions associated with an object. So it seems likely that if dogs use 
representations, they are action based. Recall the earlier quote from 
Garbarini et al: In place of abstract representations of formal logic 
expressed in propositional format, representation proves to be 
intrinsically linked to the sphere of action and is expressible in the 
same terms that control it. Therefore representation does not 
consist in a duplicate of reality, but in the virtual activation of 
perceptual and motor processes that, when actually executed, allow 
us to recognise objects and interact with them’ (Garbarini et al., 
2004, p. 106). 
 
This quote neatly sums up the basis for embodied theories of 
representation in dogs. The types of representations dogs use will 
be ones which aid successful dealings with the dog’s environment, 
and are related to the affordances he perceives in his environment.  
Furthermore, whether something counts as a concept, or 
representation, depends on its functional role within a system 
(Clark, 1997). A functional account of representation opens the 
door to pluralism about representation, for as long as an entity fulfils 
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the functional role, it will count as a representation. Pluralism about 
mental representation is an attractive possibility; Chemero and 
Silberstein write that ‘animal behaviour and animal brains are very 
complex, and we can see no a priori reason that all aspects of them 
or any one aspect of them ought to be explained in any one way, 
whether or not explanations interlock or are complementary’ (2008, 
p.17). Thus, whilst allowing that there are some aspects of the 
brain that function on a modal level; perhaps there is other 
functioning that is amodal. In the domesticated dog’s brain there 
may not be as much integration as the human brain, but it is 
possible that there is some. This integrationmay underlie some kind 
of amodal cognitive processes; perhaps there is an amodal system 
of representation that coexists with cognition that consists of more 
modal, brain, body, environment interaction.  The focus of this 
thesis is on the latter, but an amodal theory of mental representation 
should not be discarded simply because a modular account is also 
available. 
In short, representations, I argue, arise from aspects of the 
dog’s environment. From the embodied cognition stance, 
representation, perception and the environment form a dynamic 
system. Moreover, the dog develops representations in virtue of 
the bodily actions that are associated with an object. Dogs’ 
representations will be vastly different to our own because of the 
differences in their bodies, perceptual apparatus and umwelts. 
Additionally, we should not assume that each dog’s umwelt is the 
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same. There are great physical differences between dog breeds. 
Some are very short, some are tall, some have long snouts, and 
some have short snouts. Obviously, short dogs visually experience 
the world differently from taller dogs. Similarly, a scent hound’s 
perception of the world will be even more scent orientated than a 
sight hound (Coren, 1995). So even within the dog species, there 
will be differences in perception of the environment and differences 
in the types of interactions an environment affords the dog. 
Therefore, there will be fundamental differences in what is 
represented between dogs in the same environment. 
 
Furthermore, if representations are going to aid the dog to 
survive in his world, they must also be the sort of thing that he 
can use (Anderson, 2005). Therefore, an integral project of a 
model of embodied representation for non-human animals will be 
to account for how the bearer can effectively use features of his 
representation in his dealings with the world. In short, 
representations are a valuable tool for the study of non-human 
animal cognition, especially if we are talking about biological, 
action oriented, situation-dependent representations. I will argue 
in the following that these sorts of representations are best 
characterised as representational actions, or emulations of 
actions. 
5.2.1 General Guidelines for a Theory of Representation 
 
As mentioned above, the primary function of representations in 
non- human animals is not likely to be the classification of objects as 
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having certain abstract properties. Some theorists do hold this 
conception of representation in non-human animals (Newen and 
Bartels, 2007, p. 295). But it is an echo of theories of representation 
developed predominantly for humans within traditional cognitive 
science. Contrary to representation being used primarily to 
categorise the world, it seems far more likely that, first and foremost, 
an animal represents actions, possibilities for action and likely 
consequences of actions. This capacity to represent actions, 
possibilities for actions and potential outcomes of action is more 
likely to render the non-human animal capable of interacting 
successfully with his world. That is, representations function mainly 
to facilitate adaptive and flexible responses to the environment. 
As mentioned, there will be some cases where it is unlikely that 
the domestic dog uses representations in order to interact 
adaptively with his environment, there will also be some cases 
where the issue is unclear and some cases where representations 
are probably behind successful adaptive behaviour. Whether or not 
representations are needed for successful behaviour will largely 
depend on the situation. For example, in many situations, the 
environment is its own model such as in a chase situation, when the 
animal remains visible the dog may not need to use representations 
for, wherever it is possible, the dog will use environmental 
resources to lighten her cognitive load. This makes for faster online 
cognitive processing which means faster response times to the 
stimuli. 
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The situations in which representations are needed are 
generally those times when relevant stimuli are perceptually 
absent, or there is a need to simulate actions before performing 
them to enhance the dog’s chance of success in that situation. 
The environment plays a large part in the cognitive processing of 
domestic dogs and other non-human animals. But it is only those 
features of the environment relevant to a non-human animal which 
have, from the animal’s point of view, impacted on the agent in 
previous situations that feature on cognitive processing. Therefore, 
if a non-human animal does possess some mechanism by which a 
representation is constructed, potential candidates for 
representation will be those features of the environment that are 
relevant to the agent and only those features of the environment: 
‘what this suggests is that what non-human animals actively 
represent is, primarily or exclusively, affordances’ (Millikan, 2006, 
p.121). In short, non-human animals, unlike humans do not go 
around collecting what Millikan calls ‘dead facts’, facts about 
features of the environment divorced from actions that the agent 
can associate with those features. This is because the collection of 
dead facts of this nature does not have immediate relevance to the 
agent’s success in their environment. Collecting dead facts requires 
a skill which Millikan rightly remarks non- human animals probably 
don’t have the capacity for propositional thought. Millikan is surely 
right. Therefore, our theory of representation ought to reflect this. 
Furthermore: 
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Pure goals would not be represented torn apart from the 
perception of affordances directing the animal toward those 
goals, or at the very least, perception of what will support 
searching behaviors, designed to raise the probability of 
encounters with more rewarding affordances. Thus the hungry 
animal perceives aspects of its environment as for traversing, or 
for sniffing, or for searching with its eyes, these behaviours being 
designed to bring it into contact with more direct food-tracking 
affordances, and so forth (Millikan, 2006, p. 121). 
 
Simply, non-human animals learn to interact successfully with 
the environment by trying things out. In order to act upon the 
environment a non-human animal must be able to recognise a 
feature of their environment as something with a particular type of 
affordance. For example, our dogs while out tramping have learnt 
to jump or scramble up things such as large rocks or steep banks. 
However, steep banks and large rocks come in all shapes and 
sizes and there are times when we encounter a sharp novel 
climb.In this situation the dogs may represent the affordances the 
terrain presents them. The emulation circuit may then emulate 
some actions to find the action with the best outcome. Finally the 
action which occurs represents the gradient of the terrain. 
Because perception and motor skills are intrinsically linked, the 
representation of the likely consequences of an action will be 
manifest in the activation of certain motor pathways that become 
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activated when an affordance is perceived. A possible scenario is 
this. Aspects of the environment that are significant to the non-
human animal cause the animal to register on some level when an 
affordance is available: the non-human animal becomes ‘aware’ of 
potentialities for action.13 Relevant motor programmes are 
subsequently activated or simulated and the action appropriate to 
the situation in which the animal agent finds himself is then either 
carried out or simulated. If it is simulated, the agent has a chance 
to ‘assess’ the consequences of his action before carrying it out. 
Minimal representations come into play by representing the 
affordances an environment offers. In addition, representational 
actions from the dog will represent affordances because they are 
encoded into the action. Recall the example of the agility dog 
above. The good agility dog can use the human handler’s bodily 
movements as representational of the course he is to take from 
obstacle to obstacle. In addition, his position as he sails over a 
jump in midair will represent the direction his handler has shown 
that he is to go upon landing. Representational actions are readily 
used by the dog as an information source and his own actions 
represent aspects of his environment also, which can be used in 
turn by others. 
 
                                                             
13 18 I have put ‘aware’ in inverted commas because I do not wish to assume that 
affordances are known on a personal level. They may register at the sub-personal level, 
however. 
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5.2.2 The function of a dog’s representation 
 
In the previous section of this chapter I have introduced the 
notion that representational actions and emulation circuits have a 
function - that is to represent. This is clear when we consider 
forward emulator circuits of the sort Clark and Grush speak of. For 
Rowlands, the functional role of representational actions receives 
little attention. However, in cases where a dog’s actions are used by 
the individual dog itself and other dogs or humans in a situation to 
stand in for, or represent a state of affairs, the actions are 
representational. Ruth Millikan (1993) writes that we must focus on a 
representation’s consumption, or how the representation is used by 
an agent, to decide whether it is indeed a representation. 
This is in accordance with Haugeland’s (1995) third claim 
(mentioned in the previous chapter) because something such as 
gastric juices or saliva may signal the presence of food but that is 
not their function. Saliva is mainly used by a creature to assist in the 
digestion of food. That saliva occurs does not make it a 
representation of incoming food because saliva is not part of a 
system of representations; it is part of the digestive system. The 
function of saliva, therefore, is not to represent food but to assist in 
the chemical breakdown of it. And, according to Millikan, what 
determines the function of a representation is how it is used by the 
animal agent. 
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The function of a representation, Millikan explains, has been 
selected for and preserved over time. Recall that for Millikan, a 
representational system can be divided into two parts: producer 
and consumer: the part of the system which consumes 
representations must ‘understand’ the representations proffered to 
it. This makes sense. For, if a representational action is to be 
useful to a dog he must be able to use it as a representation. When 
a dog is hunting down prey, his movements can represent the path 
that the prey animal is likely to take. Moreover, other pack mates 
can use this information, the representational action of the dog, to 
intercept the prey at another point. 
 
5.2.3 Embodied representations are situation specific 
 
In non-human animals especially cognition is often task and 
situation- specific. Representations, therefore, are connected to 
specific situations. As an analogy, consider the cry of the paradise 
duck. The paradise duck has a loud call which it emits upon 
noticing a potential threat. This call functions as a warning to other 
paradise ducks within earshot; it represents danger. In order to 
function as a representation of danger, the call is located in time 
and a place: the call represents danger right now, in this place. 
Representations in other non-human animals likely work in the 
same way. That is, they are tied to a time and a place just as the 
paradise duck’s call is. Because of this, the representation in the 
non-human animal is not the sort of thing that can be stored 
(Millikan, 1993). A representational action, once performed 
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dissipates, as does an emulation circuit activation. This section has 
discussed the likely features of a representation in the non-human 
animal. To summarise, here are two main features of a 
representation in a non-human animal such as the domesticated 
dog. 
1)  Representation in dogs is action-based and situation-specific. 
Representational actions can represent affordances to 
other dogs and can be used as an information source by 
dogs to enable successful cooperative behaviour. 
2)  Emulation circuits emulate responses to a situation in the 
environment; that is they represent to the dog the 
affordances provided by the environment and can enable 
him to produce the most successful behaviour in that 
situation. 
 
5.3 Scenarios demonstrating dogs’ use of embodied 
representations 
 
In what follows, I give a series of scenarios in which dogs 
and other non-human animals might use representational actions 
(deeds), or the emulation circuitry described by Clark and Grush. 
 
5.3.1 Scenario one 
 
It is dusk in a wooded area. The hunting dog has caught a 
scent of his prey and movement of it in the distance has been 
visually perceived. The dog begins his chase and the rabbit starts 
to flee. The dog’s visual acuity is good in this light and the moving 
target in the 300 metre distance that separates them is visible to 
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him when nothing blocks his line of sight. Right now the dog’s 
cognitive load is heavy. He is exerting himself to navigate the forest 
and his senses are fixed upon his prey. The primary sense in play 
is olfaction. Every move the rabbit makes can be tracked by the 
scent cues it leaves. However, there are times when trees obscure 
the position of the rabbit and although scent cues are readily 
available the most effective way to catch this target is to gear his 
movements to the cornering and catching of this rabbit. A simple 
straightforward chase based on scent and sight will be enough to 
follow the rabbit but perhaps not enough to catch it. The dog must 
still anticipate and act in relation to the prey’s behaviour and his 
success lies in the ability to coordinate behaviour by representing 
the effect of his own actions on the prey’s behaviour. In this 
scenario emulation circuits are triggered. His own actions are 
simulated in relation to the movement of the rabbit and his actions 
become representational of the affordances offered to him in that 
situation. The result is adaptive, flexible hunting behaviour in the 
domesticated dog. 
 
5.3.2 Scenario two 
 
A Collie has just jumped off the quad bike and been instructed to 
move out and round up a flock of sheep.  Even if he is not 
conscious of it, there must be a connection for the dog between his 
actions and what the flock of sheep will do. The dog acts on the 
basis of what the likely effects of his actions will be. This is integral 
to the Collie’s success in herding sheep. The flock’s behaviour is 
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often unpredictable. That is, what the flock of sheep will do in the 
current situation will depend on many factors such as the contours 
of the land, what type of flock they are, their previous experiences 
and so on. Therefore, the flock’s behaviour is not always totally 
predictable. This element of uncertainty in the sheep’s behaviour 
requires the sheepdog to be flexible in his actions. He must be able 
to adjust his actions on the spur of the moment in accordance to 
whatever the sheep do. Without this ability there would be little 
flexibility in his behaviour and his efforts would be in vain.  
Representations of relationships between events in the non-human 
animal’s world can lead an animal agent to be flexible in her 
responses to stimuli. That is, representations of the connection 
between an agent’s actions and their likely effects are at the bottom 
of flexible behaviour (Forkman, 2000). Moreover, the sheepdog has 
a representational system which can provide real time emulation of 
what is happening so as to facilitate a rapid real time response. 
The Collie uses information provided by emulation circuits to 
make fast decisions about which action will cause the desired 
consequence and when the dog is using representations of his 
actions in this way he can change his responses to the flock in a 
flexible way. It is now possible for the dog to make functional 
decisions under novel circumstances. 
 
5.3.3 Scenario three 
 
Representations are needed for anticipatory behaviour: 
‘anticipatory behaviour is behaviour that is influenced by 
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expectations about the future, such as future states of the 
environment, future actions or merely anticipations about the way 
things work in a given situation’ (Reznikova, 2007, p. 93). And, as 
Andy Clark (1997) argues, anticipatory behaviour cannot be 
adequately explained solely in terms of current interactions 
between the agent and their environment. Situations that require a 
degree of future planning that goes beyond actions for immediate 
consequences are, to use Clark’s words, ‘representation hungry’ 
situations: ‘in this case behaviour consists of regular sequences 
that are not guided from moment to moment by the ongoing 
organism-environment couplings (Keijzer, 2002, p. 280). Thus, 
some form of representation of action remains necessary. For 
example, when a dog is herding sheep into a small yard, his actions 
must all be directed at the ultimate future goal (getting the sheep 
into the yard) even though immediate actions do not satisfy that 
goal. He is able to take steps to achieve the future goal and for this 
behaviour, representations are needed for this ability. This is 
possible using minimal representations within an emulation circuit. 
The emulation circuits represent the actions available to an agent 
before they are performed assisting in the success of the action. 
 
5.3.4 Scenario four 
 
You are in a park throwing sticks for your Terrier who loves to 
fetch sticks. The stick accidentally goes over the fence; a fence 
which the dog cannot climb through. The Terrier must act upon two 
things: recognition that he cannot get through the fence and 
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recognition of a possible alternative route to the stick. Moreover the 
Terrier must be able to find the stick when he has found an access 
route. This is a complex task, but highly motivated dogs can 
accomplish it with little difficulty. The dog may first of all try to get 
through the fence, during the attempt, emulation circuits are firing 
as possible methods are simulated. The attempt at getting through 
the fence is quickly abandoned and an alternative action which 
involves running in the opposite direction of the target stick toward 
a gate is emulated and then performed. The stick can now be found 
via scent cues and returned to the human by the same route. In this 
scenario the ability to simulate the likely success (or failure) of 
getting through the fence, and then obtaining the stick by following 
another route is efficient. Trial and error alone would have required 
much greater effort and more time. If this situation was a hunt for a 
meal, rather than a game of fetch, use of trial and error alone would 
not be as effective as the use of a forward emulation circuit. The 
dog is at an advantage if he can represent affordances that an 
environment offers and the effects of these possible actions without 
having to try out many possible actions in every situation. 
 
5.3.5 Scenario five 
 
In an experiment described in the first chapter, Philip, a four 
year old Tervueren was trained to use different human 
demonstrated actions to guide his behaviour. First of all, the 
experimenters trained Philip to repeat a range of human actions to 
command. When he could do this reliably the humans 
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demonstrated a novel action which involved moving an object from 
one place to another. On the same command as before, Philip 
copied the new action more frequently than would be expected by 
chance. The conclusion of the authors of this study (Topál et al., 
2006b) was that Philip ‘could have recognized the action sequence, 
on the basis of observation alone, in terms of the initial state, the 
means and the goal. This suggests that dogs might acquire abilities 
by observation that enhances their success in complex socio-
behavioural situations’ (Topál et al., 2006b, p.355). Emulation may 
have enabled Philip to learn by imitation. Lots of a dog’s early 
learning is achieved via imitation and emulation circuits seem to 
have the potential to expedite this type of learning; by simulating 
another dog’s actions a new action can be learned and then tried 
out. Phillip may also be using the demonstrator’s route as 
representational of the correct response. 
 
5.3.6 Scenario six 
 
A police dog has been deployed by his handler to track an 
escaped convict. It is 3 am, raining and the convict has had a 
head start. The handler casts her dog out (gives him a long free 
line to roam around on) to pick up the scent trail. Once the dog 
has detected the scent, he then indicates to his handler and 
begins tracking. The handler follows behind and uses the dog’s 
movements as representational of the route the convict has 
followed. The dog’s actions represent, or stand in for, the route of 
the convict which is imperceptible to the police dog’s handler. 
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5.4 Dogs’ use of embodied representations 
 
In this chapter to the present point, I have sketched some ways 
in which embodied representations might be used to explain the 
behaviour of non-human animals such as dogs. The embodied 
representations to explain the dogs’ behaviour may be the 
representational outputs of the emulation circuits and 
representational actions such as those described by Rowlands.  I 
hope to have shown how these theories might come to life in our 
explanation of canine behaviour and how they might be used to 
facilitate flexible, goal-directed behaviour, enable anticipatory 
behaviour and reduce the need for trial and error learning. 
The overriding influence of embodied cognition on this research 
is the idea that cognitive capacities, such as the ability to represent 
affordances, are not confined to an agent’s brain. Instead, 
representations may be found within action and behaviour. In order 
to apply the emulation theory of representation with certainty to 
dogs and other non-human agents, we would first need to ascertain 
whether they have the same neural emulators that studies have 
suggested humans have. But, given preliminary evidence for 
emulation circuits in cats (Clark and Chalmers, 2007) it is not 
unrealistic to suppose they are also at work in dogs and other 
animals. This might be a fruitful avenue of neurobiological research. 
The work that remains of this chapter and the one which 
follows is to clarify how embodied representations might be used 
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by dogs in certain types of cognitive skills and tasks. I begin by 
describing how the use of embodied representations might be 
instrumental in the dogs’ ability to learn by imitation. From here, I 
move to the possible link between anticipatory behaviour and 
embodied representations. Finally, I suggest that embodied 
representations could be at work in the dog’s ability to make 
means-ends connections and use social cues. 
 
5.4.1 Learning by imitation 
 
Emulation circuits may facilitate learning by imitation by 
simulating actions observed being performed by others. When a 
pup is young much learning takes place through the observation of 
his litter mates and mother. By observing actions of others in 
situations of play fighting, navigating the environment and 
responses to certain stimuli he is learning the affordances that 
different environments and stimuli provide; these affordances may 
be represented by the emulation circuits as minimal 
representations. In addition, actions performed by pack mates can 
serve as representational actions for dogs observing their behaviour 
and function as a guide to current and future responding. 
 
5.4.2 Anticipatory behaviour and emulation circuits 
 
Emulation circuits simulate actions open to a dog in a particular 
context. On this basis, the dog is able (probably on a sub-personal 
level) to predict the consequences of his actions. For example, say 
a dog has the task of leaping to catch a ball. Clark and Grush 
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hypothesise that the emulation circuits simulate the action before it 
is done, thereby fine tuning it and facilitating, say, a successful ball 
catch. Furthermore, let us go back to the Collie working hard to 
round up the sheep. Every action he makes would be simulated 
and perfected before it is performed. The action and its outcome 
are subconsciously pre-run by the emulation circuits simulating, or 
representing the action before it occurs. Thus, more successful 
actions are rendered more likely.  In short, it is possible that 
emulation circuits facilitate smooth, finely tuned motor actions in 
the domesticated dog, such as leaping to catch a ball or navigating 
difficult terrain. They do so by representing the actions invited by 
affordances that the environment presents. In this way, emulation 
circuits play a part in controlling behaviour such as sheep herding, 
the pursuit of prey animals and game playing with pack mates and 
human beings. Being able to represent (even temporarily) the 
effect of one’s actions upon the immediate environment is a great 
advantage to an agent and one which leads to the dog being 
capable of anticipating the effect of his own actions on his 
environment. This type of representation, therefore, is clearly 
something that a dog could, and possibly does, use in anticipatory 
behaviour. 
 
5.4.3 Means-ends connections   
 
Similarly, an understanding of the connection between one’s 
action and the environment is also facilitated by the minimal 
representations provided by emulation circuits. If the dog can 
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emulate the effects of his actions upon the world, via emulation 
circuits, then emulation circuits could plausibly be the basis for 
means-end understanding in the domestic dog. As above, this is 
because the dog has a means by which his actions and their effects 
can be represented to him. Note that I do not believe it is a 
requirement that such knowledge is explicit to the dog and this is an 
intuition shared by Clark and Toribio: ‘in a fairly intuitive sense, it 
seemed to say of a trained up network, that it could embody 
knowledge about a domain without explicitly representing the 
knowledge’ (1994, p.403). Minimal, action-oriented representations 
also serve the function of avoiding excessive and potentially costly 
trial and error learning. If emulation circuits are triggered when an 
affordance, similar to a previously encountered one, is presented by 
the environment to the dog, then rather than having to learn what to 
do in this situation all over again, the emulation circuits could run, 
triggering the same actions that were successful before.14 
As we saw above, as a hunter, the dog must still anticipate the 
movements of his prey even at times when he might not be able to 
see his prey. In these situations, the dog’s success is due to the 
ability to coordinate his behaviour with the movements of a creature 
he cannot always see. The dog relies on representing the effect of 
his own actions on the prey’s behaviour. The emulation theory may 
                                                             
14This idea also links with automaticity and proceduralisation of behaviour; new tasks are hard/slow 
but once practised they become automatic and require no conscious attention or thought (such as 
driving a car or riding a bike). It also links to schema theory – we build up schema about what we 
expect to happen given certain circumstances and our response becomes quite automated unless 
something unexpected happens  
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explain how this is achievable. If the emulation circuits can simulate 
the dog’s movements and fine tune his success with dealing with the 
environment then it is possible that this can occur even if the object 
of prey goes out of sight; enabling the dog to still successfully 
predict its movements. Thus the dog is able to act successfully in 
these situations by having something other than the signal directly 
received from the environment stand in and guide behaviour in its 
stead. The minimal representations provided by the emulation 
circuits will represent the dog’s own actions and their effect on his 
prey and facilitates adaptive, flexible hunting behaviour in the 
domesticated dog. 
It is quite possible that different types of representation are 
involved in different aspects of dog cognition. For example, it may 
be the case that training and co-evolution with humans has 
developed the capacity for inner, mental representations as well 
representational actions. 
5.4.4 Representational actions as social cues 
 
Representational actions, as put forward by Rowlands, have 
many possible uses also. One would be the representing of the 
dog’s trajectory to another dog. Recall, for example, that the 
cricketer’s bodily movements represent the trajectory of the ball as 
he goes to catch it. In the same way, the dog’s bodily movements 
can represent the route of a prey animal as he is stalking it. The 
dog’s representational actions can, then, be used by others in his 
pack to help coordinate pack-hunting behaviours. 
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In addition, the dog can use a human’s bodily movements as 
representational of important aspects of the environment. Recall 
from the opening chapter that often dogs display the tendency to 
off-load cognitive work on to his environment. One way in which he 
does this is by using human cues as an aid to problem solving. 
Recall the experiment mentioned in the opening chapter which 
involved trained explosive detection dogs and their handlers (Lit et 
al., 2011, see page 73). A high number of false alerts were seen by 
the dogs when the handlers held incorrect beliefs about the 
locations of target items. The experimenters concluded that dogs 
are highly sensitive to human social cues, sometimes to the extent 
that they will use human cues over and above other environmental 
cues. The handler’s cues were given unintentionally via body 
language. With Rowlands’ theory of representational actions in our 
toolkit, this explanation might be refined by saying that the handler’s 
subtle bodily cues were representational of the (false) target 
location. That is, the dog was using these representational actions 
from his handler in an effort to solve the task of detecting explosives 
in the church. 
 
5.4.5 Embodied representations have explanatory value 
 
The take-home message of this chapter is that minimal 
representations and representational actions can help explain dog 
behaviour and certain cognitive skills. Minimal representations 
provided by the emulation circuits could underlie anticipatory 
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behaviours such as low-level planning and assist the dog in learning 
by imitation. In addition, they could enable the domestic dog to avoid 
excessive trial and error learning, by emulating actions before they 
are performed. Furthermore, they would enhance the dog’s cognitive 
processing. Representational actions can facilitate social behaviours 
such as the use of a dog’s bodily movement by another dog to 
coordinate pack hunting; or the use of human actions by the dog as 
representational of a pertinent aspect of the environment. 
These types of representations are embodied representations: 
They are body and action based, situated and occur in real time in 
response to particular situations. Minimal representations and 
representational actions can provide the dog with flexible and 
adaptive behaviour and are entities that are at the very least 
something that he could use to maximise his chance of being 
successful in his world. 
 
5.4.6 Representations in the non-human animal represent 
actions 
 
Emulation circuits simulate and represent actions. As we saw 
above, emulator circuits run offline ‘if, then’ scenarios about bodily 
actions and their effects on other parts of the agent’s body and her 
environment. Emulation circuits facilitate the prediction of what 
state of affairs the current actions of the agent are likely to lead to. 
They do this by representing the agent’s action and are useful 
because they run their predictions quickly enough for an agent to 
adjust her movements to maximise the likely success of an action. 
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This makes the representation useful in novel situations where fast 
and effective responding is the key to success. Moreover, 
representational actions can be used by other agents as a guide to 
worldly states of affairs. Actions and their likely effects may be 
represented by their being simulated in emulation circuits. In 
addition, representational actions can be used by agents to guide 
responding. Representation in action happens on a sub-personal 
level, but the agent is still able to use these representations to 
guide her actions and enhance her chances of a successful 
interaction with her environment. 
 
5.4.7 Representations are fixed in time and space 
 
Emulation circuits are triggered when an affordance is 
presented to the dog as he moves about his environment. As a 
result, the minimal representations are highly context bound and 
situated in time. Once the action is complete, the circuits stop 
firing and the dog moves on to another situation where the same 
will happen all over again, most likely with different 
representations of different actions. Representational actions are 
also context-specific; although they can misrepresent, many of 
the actions by the agent are representational of a current 
situation. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Embodied representations such as minimal representations can 
provide useful ways of thinking about and explaining dog cognition. 
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The embodied cognition paradigm has opened up a new way of 
thinking about representations in humans and I have begun to show 
throughout this chapter how a theory of embodied representation 
can provide a promising theoretical perspective into the cognition of 
animals other than us. Minimal representations ought to be studied 
further, for it seems plausible that they are involved in cognitive 
processing in a variety of ways. The following chapter aims to 
further refine the conclusions drawn from the empirical studies on 
dog cognition through the application of embodied representations 
and principles from embodied cognition. 
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Chapter Six: Studying dogs using embodied cognition and 
embodied representations 
 
This thesis began with a review of empirical literature 
generated by experimental psychologists and scientists on dogs 
and their perceptual and cognitive skills. From this beginning, the 
second chapter introduced the recent embodied cognition 
framework and, using dogs as a case study, I hypothesised that 
this philosophical approach might profitably be applied to our 
explanations and understanding of non- human animal cognition 
and behaviour. In particular, in Chapter Three, I outlined seven 
strands of the embodied cognition framework to guide our thinking 
about canine cognition: 
1.  Dog cognition is situated 
2.  Dog cognition is time pressured 
3.  Dogs off-load cognitive work onto the environment 
4.  The dog perceives the environment as opportunities to act 
5.  Dog cognition is for action 
6.  Dog cognition has evolved 
7.  Dog cognition is body-based. 
 
From an outline of embodied cognition and the formulation of 
guiding principles to a study of dog behaviour and cognition, the 
fourth chapter introduced the idea of embodied representation. 
Embodied representations are non-neural, situated 
representational systems which reside in sensori-motor networks 
and actions. In the explication of embodied representations, I 
focussed on the two most significant theories of embodied 
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representation: the emulation theory, from Andy Clark and Rick 
Grush, and Mark Rowlands’ theory of representation in action. The 
fifth chapter sketched an outline of how embodied representations 
can be used in our understanding and explanation of dog 
behaviour and cognition. 
 
6.1 Applying embodied representations to the findings of 
Chapter One 
 
Here, the discussion returns to Chapter One, where we began, to 
take another look at the experiments conducted upon dog cognition. 
The aim of this chapter is to consider the empirical data of the 
opening chapter in the light of the theories of embodied 
representation and the overarching stipulations of the embodied 
cognition paradigm. The following discussion groups together 
cognitive capacities and behaviours that can be seen in a new light 
from the embodied cognition viewpoint and follows the same basic 
structure as Chapter One. 
6.1.1 Communication 
 
Embodied cognition teaches us that dog cognition is for action. 
It follows, therefore, that dog communication is also for action. 
Thus, most communication between dogs, and dogs and humans 
revolves around actions. Recall Rico, the Border Collie who could 
fetch 200 toys in response to a verbal command (Kaminski et al., 
2004). Then there was Chaser. Pilley and Reid (2012) spent three 
years training Chaser who, at the end of her training, could fetch 
1000 toys on command. But there was doubt over whether Chaser 
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really understood that the noun her trainers used to identify a toy 
with was a name for the toy. In other words, the worry was whether 
the dog understood that the word stood for a referent. To test this, 
recall that the experimenters trained Chaser to respond to the 
commands ‘nose’ (nudge at an item with her nose), ‘paw’ (pat at an 
item with a front paw) and ‘fetch’ (go collect an item and bring it to a 
human). These commands were then paired with words like ‘ball’ 
which Chaser already responded correctly to. The dog ended up 
performing well when commanded to ‘paw ball’, she would 
approach the ball, for example, and begin to paw at it. To this the 
experimenters conclude ‘Thus, in effect, Chaser treated phrases 
like “fetch sock” as though the “sock” was a sock and not “fetch 
sock” - indicting that her nouns referred to objects’ (Pilley and Reid, 
2012, p.190). 
In contrast to their conclusion, however, the embodied cognition 
theorist might suggest that the words ‘fetch sock’ still refer to a 
specific action, inseparable from the toy itself. When we consider 
the action- orientated nature of cognition, especially non-human 
animal cognition, it becomes probable that, even when paired with a 
verb to which the dog will respond correctly, the command ‘fetch 
ball’ still refers to an action associated with the object (the ball). 
Therefore ‘ball’ to a dog means something like ‘do something with 
the ball’. So ‘fetch’ is a modifier of that action, more precisely it is a 
‘fetchy’ kind of doing rather than a nosey kind or a ‘pawy’ kind. 
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Recall Gibson’s (1979) thesis that laid the groundwork for 
embodied cognition. The world around an agent, such as a dog, is 
not perceived as a collection of objects, instead the dog perceives 
opportunities for action, or affordances. When a human gives a 
command, this is another affordance. In the case of the command 
‘fetch sock’ it is an opportunity to act upon a specific item in the 
world. So we should bear in mind that as dogs are action-orientated 
creatures, verbal cues more likely refer to affordances, opportunities 
for action in a specific situation, than to individual objects. 
Furthermore, we can aid dogs’ understanding of our verbal and 
bodily cues by ensuring that they are clearly representational of the 
actions we are requesting. For example, we can use representation 
in action to indicate to a dog a ‘sit’ command by lowering the hands 
and arms with the accompanying verbal cue. Similarly, a cue for 
forward movement may be accompanied by a gesture 
representational of the request. In this case, it maybe the swift 
forward swinging of an arm accompanied by a verbal cue. 
6.1.2 Embodied representations and dogs’ use of human 
pointing gestures 
 
Outlined in the opening chapter were the findings that dogs 
demonstrate a significant ability to understand human pointing 
gestures. A mixture of co-evolution with humans and the individual 
dog’s experience and socialisation determines the skill with which 
dogs can do this. Moreover, the breed and the age of the dog 
influences how well the dog will use a human pointing gesture as an 
aid to problem solving (Passalacquaa et al., 2009; Doréy, Udell and 
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Wynne, 2010). As we also saw in Chapter One, there are other 
factors related to the experimental setting which also affect dogs’ 
ability to use human pointing gestures as an aid to problem solving. 
These include the experimental setting and the proximity and 
familiarity of the handler. Nevertheless, dogs in general display a 
remarkable ability to use human pointing cues. The ability to use 
pointing cues can be seen as the dog using a human’s 
representational actions as information about his environment. The 
human’s pointing gesture is a representational action. For example, 
it may represent the trajectory of a stick just thrown and the dog’s 
ability to use this representational action as a clue regarding where 
he should begin his search enhances his likelihood of success in 
finding it. Interestingly, dogs also understand other dogs’ ‘pointing’ 
gestures. In fact, English Pointers are bred to do just that. As a 
hunting dog, Pointers will indicate the direction of a rabbit or hare, 
with a raised front paw and an angling of the body in the direction of 
the prey (American Kennel Club, 2013). Other dogs are able to 
interpret this action as representational of the direction of the prey 
and the pointer can be used in conjunction with a greyhound in the 
successful tracking and catching of prey. 
 
6.1.3 Dogs’ sensitivity to human cues 
 
As we have seen, dogs have evolved to use humans’ cues for 
problem solving. This skill appears to be more highly developed in 
dogs than in wolves although data on this is somewhat mixed. Dog 
cognition is the interweaving of environmental affordances, social 
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cues, individual histories and evolutionarily acquired traits. 
Therefore, I have suggested that when a dog looks to a human for 
cues for responding this is not to be seen as a way of avoiding 
problem solving; it is a problem solving strategy which the dog is 
disposed to acquire. The dog is using the human for cues by which 
he can complete the task and is off loading cognitive work on to his 
environment as he does so. In many situations the dog will do this 
quite naturally and this skill can threaten the validity of experiments 
which are not designed to control for the effect of handler cues on 
the dog’s performance. As mentioned above, very subtle handler 
cues can be detected by the dog, bearing in mind that dogs’ 
superior sense of smell can detect hormonal changes within a 
human (Kaldenbach, 1998) therefore these must be carefully 
controlled for. 
 
6.1.4 Reasoning by deductive inference 
 
A point that I have already made, but is worth reiterating, is that 
we should ensure that our experiments give the dogs tasks that 
have ethological relevance. This is especially the case when 
thinking about cognitive skills such as the ability to reason by 
deductive inference. Several studies have been conducted in the 
last ten years on dogs’ ability to reason by inference (Erdőhegyi et 
al. 2007; Aust et al., 2008). Aust et al.’s (2008) conclusion was that 
dogs could make deductive inferences of the kind “If ~P, Q; ~P; 
therefore Q” in a setting where human cues were controlled for.The 
evidence for reasoning by exclusion in dogs was mixed in other 
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studies, but one thing was highlighted in all of them: the strong 
tendency for dogs to use human cues over and above other 
problem solving strategies. 
From the embodied cognition perspective this thesis adopts, 
dogs’ cognitive skills are likely task specific, so when testing their 
capacity to perform inferences we ought not to give them an 
abstract problem that involves inferential reasoning in the lab 
divorced from a real world task that the dog might face.  It may often 
be the case that dogs can learn to reason by deduction in certain 
experimental settings, yet this skill may not be seen in other 
contexts. An interesting study would be to examine whether 
reasoning by deduction is evident in real-world lives of dogs. 
6.1.5 Forming expectations about the near future 
 
Postulation of the emulation theory of representation and 
representational actions may assist the dog in forming expectations 
about the near future. Forming expectations about the near future is 
called ‘anticipatory planning’: ‘Anticipatory behaviour is behaviour 
that is influenced by expectations about the future, such as future 
states of the environment, future actions or merely anticipations 
about the way things work in a given situation’ (Reznikova, 2007, p. 
93). Classical and operant conditioning can explain how an agent 
can come to anticipate future events in situations he has 
encountered in the past. For example, most dogs can quickly learn 
that sitting down when hearing the verbal command ‘Sit!’ will result 
in a food reward. In fact, it is often the case that anticipation of 
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future consequences is the driving force for most dog behaviour. 
However, there will be times in a dog’s life where he encounters a 
novel situation. In these cases being able to simulate certain 
actions and their outcomes in the face of a new situation is 
advantageous to him. Novel situations are presented to the dog 
with more frequency than might be expected. For example, an 
agility dog is at a competition and her task is to negotiate the 
obstacles on the course in a specific order and direction. The dog 
does not have the opportunity to practice the course before the 
competition begins, although her handler does. Therefore, when 
the dog enters the ring, her situation is novel. Using bodily 
movements, her handler uses representational actions to guide the 
dog around the course in the right order. The dog has been trained 
to follow these representational actions and much of the success of 
the handler and dog team depends on how clearly the person can 
represent the desired direction to the dog and the efficiency with 
which the dog will respond. The efficiency of the dogs’ responding 
may lie in her use of emulation circuits. These would be deployed to 
simulate on the spot responses to her handler’s cues quickly 
regarding the best movement to perform over the obstacle which will 
place her in the best position to tackle the next obstacle. The dog 
and human are under time pressure and the more quickly the dog 
can produce the most effective response to her handler’s cues, the 
better. The best way to execute the jump and land facing a certain 
way will be emulated and performed.  
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In this way, representational actions from the handler and the 
representational emulation circuits within the dog can work in 
tandem to produce fast, effective responses to the task at hand. 
In the example outlined above the theory of embodied 
representation and representational actions can work together to 
anticipate future events in novel situations. 
 
6.1.6 Embodied representations, off-loading cognitive work on 
to the environment, and means-ends connections 
 
We saw in the beginning that Osthaus, Lea and Slater (2005) 
tested whether or not dogs were capable of making the connection 
between means and ends. They conducted four experiments which 
tested whether dogs would learn that pulling on a piece of string 
dragged a piece of food previously out of reach into a position 
where they could consume it. They set up a low, flat box with a 
transparent top so the dog could both see and smell that there was 
a reward in the box but out of reach. Attached to the reward was a 
long piece of string that lay on the floor and poked out through the 
side of the box nearest to the dog. 
Osthaus and her colleagues found that the dogs applied one 
of two problem-solving strategies: either they would paw close to 
the food regardless of whether the string was at the site they 
were pawing; or if the string was in the site that was closest to 
the food, the dogs would still paw close to the food and paw at 
the string as well. If the latter of these strategies proved 
successful, its performance was rapidly perfected; eventually, 
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the string was reliably pulled and the food reward obtained. 
Thus, Osthaus et al.’s study showed that dogs were able to 
learn to obtain the food by pulling at the string. However, they 
concluded, rather than doing so by learning the connection 
between pulling the string and getting the food, they did so 
through associative learning, ‘in Piagetian terms, the dogs 
displayed sensori-motor intelligence at stage III (circular 
reactions), but not at stage IV (means-end understanding)’ 
(Osthaus et al., 2005, p. 45). In short, it was concluded that 
dogs did not develop a means-ends understanding in relation to 
the task. 
In light of their conclusion, the researchers suggest that perhaps 
dogs have lost some of their ability to solve problems. They 
suggested that dogs fail to learn means-ends connections because 
in their cooperation with humans, it is always the human that carries 
out problem solving tasks. But, the problem solving ability of dogs 
may be seen in a different light. Recall that Pepperberg (2004) 
found that two language trained parrots also demonstrated no 
means-end understanding when confronted with the same task. The 
parrots simply asked their human trainers to give them the treat. In 
contrast, the parrots with no language training solved the problem 
easily. It could be that dogs’ ability to solve problems is not 
diminished, just redirected: In Osthaus et al.’s study they were 
employing a problem solving strategy that involved humans. 
Osthaus et al. are aware of this experiment but conclude that ‘it 
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appears that the availability of human-aided solutions to problems 
can sometimes inhibit the expression of animals’ cognitive 
capacities’ (Osthaus et al., 2005, p.46). 
Looking at Osthaus et al.’s data through the lens of embodied 
cognition, however, could lead to an entirely different conclusion. 
The parrots’ performance in Pepperberg’s study might not reflect an 
inhibition of problem solving capacities since it could also be the 
case that the language trained parrots are simply displaying a 
different method of problem solving. That is, they are problem 
solving by off-loading their cognitive load on to an aspect of their 
environment (the human experimenter). In the same way that we 
would use a calculator to solve a hard sum, the language trained 
parrots refer to their human trainer or owner for the solution. This is 
still problem solving, just as our solving the sum by using a 
calculator is still problem solving. Dogs also problem solve in this 
way in certain situations. That they do so does not mean that dog’s 
problem solving abilities are inferior as a result of their association 
with humans. Rather, when confronted with a problem solving task, 
the dogs have learnt through evolution and individual learning to 
off-load the cognitive work onto humans. 
Dogs off-load cognitive work on to their environment through the 
use of human cues. Dogs are able to comprehend human cues 
toward the best action in a context, thus they use this skill to interact 
with their environment efficiently. One way in which dogs can 
comprehend human cues is through the use of the human cue as a 
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representational action. Human cues, even those unintentionally 
given, can represent for the dog a target’s location. Recall for 
example Lit et al.’s study involving the explosive detection dogs and 
their handlers (2011). In this study the dogs used unintentionally 
given handler cues to signal the location of target scents. The 
handler’s actions provided the dog with information regarding the 
target scent’s location, which he acted upon to the extent that he 
disregarded alternative perceptual cues. In short, the handler’s 
actions are used by the dog to represent the target’s location. These 
are representational actions at work. Moreover, a cognitive skill such 
as understanding means-ends connections is highly likely to be 
action-based and situated, as the embodied cognition paradigm 
suggests. Therefore, it may be difficult to elicit evidence of such an 
understanding removed from the context in which it would be 
needed. Emulation circuits may be triggered in a situation requiring 
a means-end understanding. For example, the Border Collie who is 
mustering sheep into an enclosed yard operates with an 
understanding (at least at the sub-personal level) of the effect her 
actions will have upon the sheep. This means-end connection may 
be provided by representational emulation circuits which simulate 
her actions before she performs them to enable the most effective 
means to achieve her goal in the given situation. 
Removed from the context of rounding sheep, and the 
subsequent trigger of representational emulation circuits, it may 
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be difficult to gain evidence that the same Collie understands a 
means-end connection.  
6.1.7 Studies to test object permanence in dogs 
 
Recent data on the perceptual abilities of the domesticated dog, 
especially their sense of smell, shows that the degree to which dogs 
may be able to use olfactory environmental cues as an aid to 
problem solving should not be underestimated. Experimental data 
on object permanence in dogs may be due to the confounding 
variable of dogs using olfactory cues to solve invisible and visible 
displacement tasks. The effect of scent cues on dogs’ responses in 
experiments cannot be overestimated and is very hard to control for. 
However, if dogs were simply relying on olfaction in these 
instances then surely there would be no learning curve. The dogs 
would presumably be able to smell their way to the target item right 
from the outset. This does not appear to be the case, since younger 
pups (who are born with a keen sense of smell) do not seem able to 
solve invisible displacement tasks that older pups have sometimes 
been shown to succeed at. Therefore, it may be that dogs do learn 
object displacement. 
If we take the embodied cognition approach to these tests, 
however, it seems clear that object permanence is a skill which, if 
possessed, is context-specific and action based. Moreover, the 
embodied cognition framework has teaches us to hesitate to 
consider object permanence in animals as an internal 
representation of an external state of affairs. 
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Instead, we should consider the types of situations in which a 
dog might need to locate a target which is perceptually absent. In 
hunting situations, for example, this would rarely happen. Even 
when a prey animal goes out of sight permanently there remains 
the trail of scent cues which are left behind to follow. Should there 
be no scent cues to follow for some reason, a search for scent cues 
will probably commence, but ultimately the hunt would be over. In 
most situations the dog finds himself in, it seems that the total 
absence of perceptual cues for a target item would result in search 
behaviours for scent cues, reference to a human handler (if 
present) for social cues and eventually the abandonment of the 
task. It does not seem adaptive for the dog to persist for long with 
search behaviours for a target which he can no longer perceive or 
track. 
 
Collier and Baker (2004) suggested that the use of scent cues 
means that dogs cannot solve invisible displacement tasks. But 
there is reason to question this assumption. From the embodied 
cognition perspective, using the environment as an aid to problem 
solving is still problem solving. Even if dogs are using olfactory cues 
to find the target item, then they may still be demonstrating an 
understanding that the object (although it moved out of sight to an 
unknown location) is still in existence, they know this because they 
can smell it! A reliance on scent cues to solve invisible displacement 
tasks is still solving the task when we allow bodily movements and 
manipulation of the environment into our account of problem solving. 
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We only draw the opposite conclusion if solving an invisible 
displacement task is restricted to brain-bound cognitive activity; an 
assumption which adherents of the embodied cognition hypothesis 
consider to be false. Moreover, dogs are extraordinarily perceptive 
of human social cues and we should determine, therefore, whether 
they might be responding to unintentionally given social cues rather 
than an understanding of object displacement. Social cues can even 
be as slight as the detection of adrenaline from an experimenter if 
the dog begins to respond correctly, or the perception of actions on 
the part of the experimenter which may represent the location of the 
target item. 
In short, our human understanding of object permanence simply 
may not be relevant for the dog and different criteria may apply to 
dogs when we are defining the behaviours we wish to see which 
demonstrate an understanding of object permanence. Dogs’ 
cognitive skills are situation- specific thus an understanding of 
object permanence, if it is exists, may only be manifest in the right 
situation. Additionally, embodied cognition redefines what it means 
to problem solve. Problem solving in this approach includes the use 
of social and environmental cues, thus the use of scent and/or 
human cues to solve invisible displacement tasks still counts as 
problem solving. 
The critic might object that in this case they are not solving the 
invisible displacement task that was intended by Piaget to 
demonstrate the requisite cognitive skill. My reply would be that such 
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a definition of what it means to solve an invisible displacement task 
is human-based. This is highlighted by the human-based implication 
that because the target item is no longer visible, it is imperceptible: 
an assumption which may hold for human beings, but certainly not 
for dogs. 
It may even be, therefore, that studying object permanence, 
while relevant to humans, is not appropriate for dogs given the 
above considerations and much more research is needed on how 
to fully control for confounding olfactory cues in present 
experimental designs for object permanence in dogs.  
 
6.1.8 Counting 
 
Dogs’ use of olfaction may be the predominant sense; however, 
gaze duration is often used as an experimental measure. In West 
and Young’s (2002) experiment on counting, gaze duration was a 
measure of expectancy in dogs. Gaze duration is a common 
measure of expectancy in human infants; the idea is that if an 
outcome violates what the subject is expecting in the trial, gaze 
duration will be longer than when the outcome is in accord with what 
is expected. In West and Young’s experiment the dogs were shown 
a different number of biscuits behind a screen than they saw placed 
there before the screen went up. Their gaze duration in these trials 
was longer than in the control trials when the number of biscuits 
revealed behind the screen matched the number they saw placed 
there. This experiment is problematic because it did not control for 
olfactory cues. It also is hard to prove that vision is the predominant 
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sense in use during the trial; it may be that a kind of ‘sniff duration’ 
measure is a more appropriate measure in this context for dogs. 
This is especially the case when we consider that vision for dogs 
plays a secondary role in perception, especially when they perceive 
attractive smelling stationary objects in brightly lit situations. 
Embodied cognition emphasises the role of an agent’s perceptual 
apparatus in her cognitive processing. So it is best that experiments 
into dog cognition are devised especially for dogs, rather than using 
those designed for humans given the vast differences in our 
perceptual apparatus. Recall Bonanni et al.’s (2011) conclusion that 
it is possible that dogs are capable of some assessment of number, 
but their assessment is based on something quite different from 
being able to count, in the human sense. For example, the authors 
note that it is possible that the dogs in their study were basing their 
assessments of group size not on the number of individuals in the 
opposing group, but on another variable which is a reliable indicator 
of the size of the opposing pack.  A variable of this kind might be, 
they write, ‘the total surface area occupied by pack members’ 
(Bonanni et al., 2011, p. 113). 
An alternative conclusion, from the embodied cognition 
paradigm is that the total surface area occupied by a group led 
not to an assessment of number, but a different set of affordances 
provided by that situation. The emulation circuits would simulate 
very different actions upon perceiving the affordances provided by 
a large agonistic group as opposed to a smaller one. There may 
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be no assessment of number at all, just a different perception of 
affordances. Bonanni et al. (2011) looked for the dogs’ ability to 
count in a natural setting, one which may be encountered by dogs 
outside of laboratory settings, and this is great. Yet it should be 
remembered that from an embodied cognition perspective, 
cognition is for action, and the assessment of number is no 
different. Therefore, an ability to count may well translate, with 
regards to dogs, to a different set of actions open to the dog in a 
setting where there are lots of dogs as opposed to where there 
are few. Note that the dog need not be able to understand the 
difference between ‘lots’ and ‘few’ rather he just needs to perceive 
the affordances provided in the different circumstances. 
6.2 Summary 
 
Embodied cognition can guide and inform our study of dog 
cognition. I have endeavoured to show how the conclusions and 
explanations employed in the experimental studies into dog cognition 
might be enhanced by adopting embodied cognition as a theoretical 
background for our study into dog cognition, and this can provide a 
model for studies of cognition in other non-human animals. Embodied 
representations provide a clear and applicable way of understanding 
some of the mechanisms behind flexible behaviour in novel 
situations. Embodied representations also may underlie basic 
behavioural processes in times where fast and efficient responding is 
necessary.  
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Domesticated dogs have co-evolved with human beings. 
Therefore, a large part of their cognitive skill-set has evolved within 
the context of their role in human societies. This can explain the 
differences in cognitive skills across breeds. This is not to say that 
some breeds are necessarily ‘smarter’ than other breeds, just that 
different breeds will have evolved different cognitive skills according 
to their role in human society. For example, dogs which have more 
independent roles such as hunting dogs or retrievers have perhaps 
evolved more independent problem solving capacities than the dog 
selectively bred to be a house pet, such as the Cavalier King Charles. 
Therefore, when looking into the cognitive skills dogs possess in an 
experimental setting, it would be a good idea to examine each breed 
of dog separately as it is likely that different breeds will display 
different  cognitive skills. After having done so, we could see whether 
conclusions which apply to a particular breed of dog also apply to 
dogs in general. 
6.3 Training implications of embodied cognition 
 
The final section of this chapter suggests that an embodied 
cognition framework could be useful in our approach to training dogs 
and can help overcome some common training problems. 
 
6.3.1 Training by imitation 
 
Much training relies on the use of verbal commands paired with 
hand signals. Given the notion that cognition is body-based and our 
actions can be representational, we ought to ensure that our bodily 
commands represent the action required of the dog. It is natural to 
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pair a hand signal to a verbal command when training a dog. For 
example the verbal command ‘sit’ is often paired with a hand signal. 
Taking into account that cognitive processing occurs not only in the 
brain, but also the body, the most effective hand signal we could 
give is one which mirrors the required action. So accompanying the 
verbal command ‘Sit!’ might be a horizontal hand which moves 
down toward the floor. This is a way of representing with our own 
bodies the action that is being asked of the dog. 
Moreover, more emphasis could be placed on modelling 
behaviours displayed by other dogs. Recent research has shown 
that dogs possess a great capacity for imitating behaviour of pack 
mates and even humans. Dogs that have had the opportunity to 
watch another dog or a human solving a detour task are more 
successful than those who have not had a demonstrator (Pongrácz 
et al., 2001). A detour task might be, for example, a task which 
requires the dog to move away from the desired location in order to 
reach it such as when the route to the food bowl on the other side of 
a fence involves going through a gateway in the opposite direction to 
the bowl. Moreover, research outlined in the opening chapter 
suggests that dogs are able to use a human action as a cue for 
showing functionally similar behaviour (Kubinyi et al., 2003; Topál, et 
al., 2006a). As I mentioned above, dogs are able to perceive others’ 
actions as representational of environmental states of affairs. When 
watching the actions of another dog in a detour task, for example, 
the dogs’ actions represent the route to the food bowl and on a sub-
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personal level the dog can react to this and can repeat the 
movements with success. Moreover, emulation circuits may be 
triggered when watching the actions of another dog or human, which 
enable the dog to simulate more effectively actions which are likely 
to lead to success. Bearing this in mind, we can approach training in 
a new light by providing opportunities for dogs to learn from other 
dogs and human demonstrators. 
 
6.3.2 The slippery floor problem 
 
One example of an area of dog training that has proven 
problematic is police dogs working on a slippery floor. When the 
canine division of the police force is required to search a room for, 
say, drugs and suspects the police dog enters the room first. The 
canine division arrives at the room and ‘stacks the door’: the officers 
line up either side of the door frame out of sight and in relative 
safety from anyone within the room. The dog’s task is to do a circuit 
of the room and signal the presence of illegal substances if she can 
detect them before the police officers enter the room. This is safer 
for both the police and for the suspect (the dog will render less harm 
than an armed police officer might). If the room has a linoleum 
surface on the floor which does not provide much traction, the dog 
must be confident to work as well as he would normally on a floor 
where he has better grip. However, too often pups that arrive for 
police force training have excellent retrieval drives, are confident, 
but they hesitate when asked to work on a slippery floor. This is a 
major problem for the dog sections of police forces and arises 
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between four and eight months of age (Kennedy, L, 2008). There 
are possible explanations for why slippery floors pose such a test 
for trainee police dogs. It could be handler-related. The handler may 
try and reassure the dog when he first becomes scared of slippery 
surfaces, thus reinforcing timid behaviour on slippery floors. 
However, despite attempts at minimising unwanted handler cues, it 
still remains a big problem. Since learning by imitation is a 
successful way to teach dogs new skills, it appears that focus 
should be placed on allowing the dog to watch an older, more 
experienced dog working on slippery floors. The subtle movements 
which enable the older dog to work effectively even when the floor is 
slippery may then be emulated by the young dog’s emulation 
circuits and will hopefully lead to a faster, more successful outcome 
in which the pup becomes confident on slippery surfaces. This is 
one example of how adopting an embodied cognition approach to 
non- human animal cognition is valuable with regards to dog 
training. From the embodied cognition framework, comes a greater 
emphasis on cognition which is action-based, body-based and 
situated. This naturally leads to learning by imitation playing a 
greater role in dog training. Allowing the dog to watch another dog 
(or human) demonstrator’s actions may facilitate the deployment of 
emulation circuits within the dog to enable effective simulation of 
successful actions in that situation. Moreover, the dog’s use of 
another’s representational actions will speed the process of learning 
the correct response in a situation. 
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6.3.3 Cognition is situated: training and learning are situation 
specific 
 
When we are training our dogs, the embodied cognition 
paradigm suggests that we should not expect them to be able to 
carry skills over from one situation to another. It may be the case 
that a dog is quite accomplished at performing a certain action in 
one context, but may have to be re-trained in that same action in a 
different context. Dog trainers often recognise this, but the reasons 
behind it are left unclear. The reasons behind this issue are 
provided by embodied cognition when we accept that cognitive 
processing is not simply a neural affair, rather cognition employs 
the agent’s body as well in a dynamic interplay with the 
environment. As we have seen, the dog perceives and represents 
affordances in his environment, these affordances are unique to his 
species and I have hypothesised that he represents them through 
representation emulation circuits which allow him to choose the 
most successful action for that situation. Given this consideration, 
the cognitive processing that occurs in this context plus the actions 
he will perform in a situation will be situation-specific. Many of the 
dogs’ skills are situation specific so we will need to recognise that 
our dogs have to be trained in the contexts in which those skills will 
be required. In my experience raising our dogs, we have often 
found that they needed to be taught the same skill in different 
settings. For example, our dogs needed to be re- housetrained 
when we moved house, and then house trained again in our friends’ 
houses. The same happened when training them to come back to 
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call. They mastered the task in the setting of our back garden, but 
needed re-training in coming back to call at our local park and other 
busier places. There may be some generalisability of skills if the 
situations are significantly similar, for instance training them at the 
park where there are other dogs, people and more distractions in 
general may be enough for them to perform the same tasks at, say, 
the beach. This is because the situations are similar enough. My 
point is the reason why tasks have to be re-trained in different 
settings lies in the fact that dogs and other non- human animals’ 
cognitive skills are situation specific. It does not mean the dog is 
misbehaving or did not fully learn the lesson in a previous context. 
A dog’s failure in some task is often attributed to these reasons 
when he is asked to perform the task in a setting other than that in 
which he’s been initially trained.  And this impacts on the welfare of 
the dog too. If we understand why the dog may seem unable to 
perform a new task in new settings, because learning is context 
specific, we are more likely to act with patience and do further 
training rather than punish. 
 
6.3.4 Cognition has evolved, is situated, action-based and 
body-based 
 
Tasks such as learning to pull on a string to achieve a goal bear 
little relation to the problems that dogs face in their natural 
environments. If we keep in mind that dogs’ cognitive capacities 
are context and action specific, and have evolved over time to aid 
the dog in his natural environment, then we ought to realise that a 
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means-end understanding is also context and action specific.  As I 
mentioned earlier on, in a dog’s natural environment (say the 
sheep farm of a working Border Collie) a means-end 
understanding may be present as he carries out his tasks. The 
means-end connections may be assisted by the dog’s use of the 
sheep’s representational actions and his own emulation circuits. 
However, a means-end understanding may not be elicited in an 
experimental setting featuring a string-pulling task because 
learning, as an embodied cognitive skill, is action-orientated. To 
use the example of a farm dog mustering sheep, a means-end 
connection may be manifest with the particular movements 
involved in mustering sheep, and context dependent (inseparable 
from the mustering situations). In short, because a dog does not 
show an ability or skill in one setting does not mean that he cannot 
demonstrate that ability in another setting. Moreover, because 
tasks can be action specific, a command such as ‘stop’ may have 
to be trained going from a walk to a halt, a slow run to a halt and so 
on. This is because cognition is interlinked with actions so that they 
cannot be separated and the same action (such as stop) from a 
different bodily position may be to the dog like a whole new action. 
A dog trainer spoke with me on this issue (Kira, A, 2013). When 
clicker training dogs to stop, often an alternative cue will be needed 
for ‘slow down’ which it is best to teach the dog first before the cue 
to stop is introduced. This is because the cues are action-
orientated and the cue for ‘stop’ will continue to mean ‘stop’ 
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regardless of the pace the dog is travelling at due to the situated 
nature of cognition.  
6.4 Summary 
 
There are many ways in which embodied cognition can 
influence and inform our training and study of cognition in 
domesticated dogs. I have focused here upon dog cognition as a 
case study but the guiding principles of embodied cognition apply 
equally well to the study of all non- human animal cognition. 
Recognition of the foundational assertions of embodied cognition 
provide a sensible approach to ensuring that the conclusions to 
empirical studies on dog cognition are reliable and that our 
experimental designs will yield reliable and useful data. Moreover, 
the adoption of embodied cognition can lead us to formulate 
theories of embodied representation, such as the emulation theory 
and representation in action. These theories of embodied 
representation are special because they are models of 
representation in animals powerful enough to provide explanations 
behind certain skills and behaviours that dogs exhibit. Embodied 
representations can also be hypothesised and tested for without 
the worry of positing elusive inner mental states to non-human 
animals. In the next, and final, chapter I argue for one further 
advantage in adopting embodied cognition. This is that it can 
enhance our understanding of what it means for dogs to perform 
actions which are rational. 
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Chapter Seven: Embodied cognition and dog rationality 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Using the domesticated dog as a case study, this chapter 
argues that our conception of rationality in non-human animals 
should not depend on the attribution of inner mental states such as 
propositional attitudes.15  Instead, I defend the notion that a dog’s 
actions are rational when they enable her to successfully respond 
to the environment she is in. In short, my theory of rationality is 
action-based and situation specific and I argue that embodied 
representations facilitate rational responding at times when 
relevant environmental information is absent, hard to come by or in 
a novel situation. Flexible behavioural responses in these latter 
situations can be generated by the use of representational actions 
and the deployment of representation emulation circuits. 
 
7.2 What makes behaviour rational? 
 
In the study of non-human animal cognition, this question 
often arises: ‘what makes a non-human animal’s behaviour 
rational?’ For strict behaviourists, the non-human animal responds 
to a stimulus with conditioned responses. For those who wish to 
explain non-human animal cognition in terms of inner mental states 
such as propositional attitudes, a non-human animal is said to 
                                                             
An earlier version of this chapter is entitled ‘Rationality in Domesticated Dogs and Other 
Non-Human Animals’, published (2010) in Teorema, 29(2), 135-145. 
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decide on a course of action based on a rational assessment of the 
beliefs and desires held at the time. The behaviour that this leads 
to is, on this view, rational behaviour. To meet this criterion a non-
human animal must be capable of an assessment of, say, his or 
her beliefs about a situation and must also be capable of acting 
upon them. Aside from the fact that it is unlikely that many non- 
human animals are capable of holding human-like propositional 
attitudes, I argue that this notion of rationality is too restrictive to 
adequately characterise rationality in the non-human animal. 
 
In short, this final chapter advocates giving cognitive 
explanations for behaviour but rejects wholesale the notion that our 
explanation of rationality should solely rely on internal mental states 
like beliefs and desires. Such reliance on internal mental states like 
beliefs are seen in internalist accounts of rationality. From an 
embodied cognition perspective we can answer the question ‘what 
makes a non-human animal’s behaviour rational?’ without having to 
attribute propositional attitudes to the non- human animal. The 
embodied cognition perspective I have adopted emphasises the 
idea that the non-human animal is acted upon by the environment 
and in turn acts upon the environment in continuous feedback loops. 
Beliefs and desires are not ‘inner’ causes of behaviour. Rather, the 
environment, brain and non-neural body are one system, each 
affecting the other to produce adaptive behaviour.I address two 
questions in the following order. 
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1) Given our embodied cognition approach, under what 
conditions are a dog’s actions rational (under what 
conditions can we say it makes sense to perform the 
actions he does)? 
2) What processes enable a dog to fix upon rational 
courses of action (actions that make sense for him in a 
given set of circumstances)? 
 
I will argue that the answers to the questions are as follows: 
 
 
1)  A dog’s actions are rational (it makes sense to perform 
them in a particular circumstance) when they enable him 
to successfully adapt to the environment even at times 
when relevant environmental information is absent, hard to 
come by or novel. 
2)  A dog fixes upon a rational course of action by 
employing processes that include the use of 
heuristics and embodied representations. 
 
As my answer to question 2) illustrates, my theory of rationality 
in the non-human animal is partly reliabilist. That is, an animal’s 
actions are rational if they are based on a reliable source of 
information First this chapter argues that the non-human animal, 
such as the domesticated dog, fixes upon a rational course of 
action by using processes and methods that reliably lead to 
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successful outcomes unless the situation is novel, in which case 
the rational course of action is one which is adaptive. Second, this 
account implies externalism about cognitive processes and 
naturally falls out of the embodied cognition approach in that the 
environment and an agent’s perception and interaction with the 
environment plays a significant role in cognitive processing. An 
agent ‘decides upon’ rational actions by using processes that have 
in the past worked reliably such as an emulation circuit to emulate 
the outcomes of potential actions. The second claim, that 
reliabilism about rationality ties us to externalism about rationality 
is the claim that the agent (human or non-human) need not be 
aware of the processes that lead to the rational action. So, for 
example, a Border Collie need not be aware of how he comes to 
fix on the best action when faced with a flock of sheep to round up; 
they must simply be reliable processes that have worked for him in 
similar past situations. Reliabilism about rationality stands in stark 
contrast to internalist theories of rationality. Internalist accounts of 
rationality are often used to assess whether a human’s decision is 
rational or irrational. The assessment of the decision is made on 
the basis of its relation to her beliefs, desires, and other such 
mental states (Langham, 2008).  In the following, I will show how 
the account of rationality that I advocate can be formulated and 
how attributing rationality to non-human animals need not depend 
on the attribution of propositional attitudes. 
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7.3 Kacelnik’s account of rationality 
 
Zoologist Alex Kacelnik discusses the notion of rationality that 
depends on the attribution of propositional attitudes. This 
conception of rationality, he calls PP-rationality. PP-rationality 
requires beliefs or actions to be adopted based on internal 
reasoning processes. It is a very human- centred way to conceive of 
rationality, with a focus on ‘process, not on outcome’ (Kacelnik, 
2006, p.89).  A belief or action is rational depending on the internal 
reasoning processes behind it. This is a commonly held view of 
rationality and it depends upon the agent being the bearer of 
propositional attitudes with conceptual content. Representations 
within this view are the types of things that can constitute 
propositional attitudes. They are abstracted from the situation (in 
most cases) and can be combined and recombined to form different 
conceptual contents such as thoughts or beliefs. This view of 
rationality is internalist in the sense that the focus is on internal 
processes within the agent’s head. Whether or not an action or 
belief is rational depends upon facts that are ‘internal’ to the agent: 
the internal mental states that the agent has at a particular time 
determine what course of action is rational for him at that time. On 
this view, our assessment of a subject’s rationality depends upon 
which propositional attitudes they based their action on. Which 
propositional attitudes a subject has based their action upon is a 
difficult thing to determine with any animal, human or non-human 
that lacks reasonable language skills with which to express inner 
thoughts and beliefs. Furthermore, even with a reasonable set of 
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language skills, we may not be aware of attitudes such as beliefs 
and desires that justify our actions. To illustrate Kacelnik gives this 
example: a chess master is aware of only a fraction of the possible 
moves available to her at any given point, she does not go through 
a process of assessing all her relevant beliefs and desires when 
fixing on the best move for her to make. Consider also driving; many 
of our actions behind the wheel are not caused by a process 
whereby we assess all our beliefs about the situation (although 
some beliefs that we are not aware of may influence our decisions 
to an extent). Rather, the actions we perform to enable us to drive a 
car successfully, and the move that chess master makes to her 
advantage are more likely caused by the use of mental heuristics 
not an internal assessment of particular propositional attitudes 
about the current situation.  
7.4 Heuristics 
 
Heuristics are strategies for making decisions and solving 
problems. They allow for fast, efficient, online decision making and 
are behind much of what we consider to be rational behaviour. 
Herbert Simon’s (1957) research was highly suggestive of the 
conclusion that humans in general actually have a very limited 
capacity to weigh up possible courses of action and process 
information in the face of many possible alternatives. Instead, he 
remarked that humans ‘use simple strategies in decision making 
that focus on only a few facets of available options’ (Herbert, 1957 
as cited in Weiten, 2001, p.327). Therefore, it seems much more 
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likely that rather than examining all their beliefs about the next 
possible move, the chess master and the driver use heuristics to 
decide on the best course of action. The heuristics used to come to 
the decision will be ones that have proved reliable in the past in 
relevantly similar situations. Embodied cognition furnishes the non-
human animal such as the dog with two types of heuristics: 
emulation circuits and representational actions. 
 
7.5 Embodied representational and rationality in dogs 
 
As Clark (2008) and Grush (2004) argue, emulation circuits fire 
to allow the dog to simulate opportunities for action presented to him 
in any given situation. These are fast and effective ways to enable 
the dog to respond adaptively even in situations which are novel or 
challenging. Thus emulation circuits can enable the dog to respond 
rationally to the situation he faces. Moreover, dogs can use the 
representational actions of others as an information source 
regarding the best way to respond. A large part of learning by 
imitation, I have argued in the previous chapter, is the ability to 
understand that another’s actions are representational of a possible 
course of action. The dog that has watched another dog 
successfully navigate his way to a desired consequence is more 
likely to repeat the demonstrator’s actions to receive the same 
reward. The dog’s rational behaviour in this example is underpinned 
by the use of representational actions. 
Thus, PP-rationality alone doesn’t seem to furnish us with the 
best account of the rational processes behind an agent’s course of 
306
306
306 
 
action when interacting with the environment. But can we claim that 
using heuristics such as the use of representational actions and the 
emulation circuit is a rational process? In fact, we can. The actions 
which are produced by heuristics count as rational processes since 
their use reliably facilitates the agent’s success and/or survival in the 
right situations. 
 
This point applies to rationality in non-human animals as well as 
humans. If reasoning by the evaluation of propositional attitudes is 
‘too restrictive as a conception of process rationality in the human 
case, then it shouldn’t be required for process rationality in animals 
either’ (Hurley, 2006, p.13).  At the heart of Hurley’s remark is the 
idea that rational processes are those cognitive processes which 
reliably result in behaviour that contributes to an agent’s success in 
his or her environment. This conception of rationality is better suited 
to explanations of human and non- human rationality. What 
Kacelnik terms PP-rationality (the formulation of rational processes 
that traditional cognitive science tends to leave us with) is too 
restrictive to be applicable to human beings let alone non-human 
animals, so we are better off adopting an embodied view of rational 
processes. 
 
Of course, by adopting a more liberal embodied account of 
rational processes I am not suggesting that there is no place 
whatsoever for an internalist account of rationality, akin to 
Kacelnik’s PP-rationality. With human beings, we can incorporate 
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both in some situations. Clearly, there may be times when an 
agent is both acting upon processes that have been successfully 
applied to a similar situation in the past, and upon assessments of 
her beliefs about the situation at hand. My argument is that we 
ought not to restrict our notion of rationality to an internalist, 
propositional attitude based account of rationality for it is too 
restrictive when discussing rationality in humans and non-humans. 
 
On a terminological note, sometimes the focus in discussions of 
rationality is on what makes an agent’s behaviour rational. At other 
times, the focus is on what makes the processes behind behaviour 
rational (See, for example, Dennett, 1981). In the former dialogues 
rationality can be classed as behavioural rationality. In the latter, 
rationality can be classed as process rationality.  Hurley above 
couches her remarks about rationality in terms of process 
rationality. 
An example of behavioural rationality is often adopted by 
economists. On this approach an agent engages in rational 
behaviour when he or she behaves in such a way that her actions 
lead to the accomplishment of a desired goal. That is, an action is 
rational whenever it is characterised by patterns of behaviour that 
result in those outcomes most beneficial to the agent. This is 
classical behavioural rationality. Game Theory is based on this 
conception: rationality as behaviour patterns which maximise utility 
for the agent. The focus in classical behavioural rationality is on 
the outcomes of behaviour rather than the processes behind them 
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In his chapter in Rational Animals, Kacelnik discusses this version 
of behavioural rationality under the heading E-rationality. E-
rationality claims that patterns of actions are rational when they 
maximise the expected utility for the agent. 
An alternative example of behavioural rationality is Kacelnik’s 
notion of B-rationality. B-rational behaviour maximises fitness 
‘across a set of evolutionarily relevant circumstances’ (Hurley, 2006, 
p.22). The focus in B- rationality, as with E-rationality, is on the 
outcome of behaviour rather than the processes behind behaviour. 
What makes an agent’s behaviour rational is, for Kacelnik, 
determined by the outcomes of the behaviour (whether the 
behaviour maximises fitness) not the processes that guide it. 
Recall that process rationality is concerned not so much with 
outcomes of behaviour but with how an agent comes to select the 
method by which she will achieve her goal. Rational processes 
must be reliable in order to count as rational. That is, they must lead 
to the right results reliably. It cannot be mere coincidence that the 
method used to achieve a goal worked. Therefore, any theory of 
rationality that couches rationality in terms of process rationality 
must also be reliabilist. In the literature surrounding process 
rationality, there are two types of process rationality: theoretical and 
practical (process) rationality. In practical process rationality, 
rational processes reliably lead to the agent choosing an action 
which will achieve his or her goals. Theoretical process rationality 
stipulates that the rational process reliably leads to true beliefs. In 
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summary, rational processes are those which reliably lead to the 
selection of an action which will achieve the agent’s ends. The 
behaviours that the processes lead to are rational precisely 
because they stem from a rational process. 
 
To recap, the previous discussion highlights a distinction 
between rational behaviour and rational processes. Rational 
processes are those processes that reliably lead to rational 
behaviour. A rational process is a process that has reliably worked 
in the past to produce actions which maximise an agent’s adaptive 
fitness. A rational action is one which enables the agent to 
successfully adapt to the environment at times even when relevant 
environmental information is hard to come by or costly. Thus, 
there is a distinction between behavioural rationality (rational 
actions) and process rationality (rational processes). When 
Kacelnik discusses PP-rationality, he is talking about a type of 
process rationality: that is, he is discussing traditional cognitive 
science’s answer to ‘how does an agent come to perform rational 
actions?’ When Hurley talks about heuristics, she is also talking 
about process rationality: how the agent comes to, or fixes on 
rational actions. 
As mentioned above, I will not argue either for adopting a 
process rationality approach, or a behavioural rationality approach. 
This is because the two are not mutually exclusive. Both behavioural 
and process rationality can work together for a formulation of 
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rationality in the human and non-human animal. In the following, I 
explain why this is the case. 
In Kacelnik’s account of B-rationality, there is the thought that 
it is evolution which furnishes the agent with a repertoire of 
rational behaviours, behaviours that maximise fitness for the 
animal agent. This, however, is problematic because evolution 
can only do so much for an animal agent faced with 
environmental and social challenges. For example, evolution has 
provided the dog with a fixed set of epistemic capacities, but over 
the course of the dog’s life, there will be novel tasks or situations 
that require him to flexibly adapt: circumstances that evolution 
has not kitted him out for. The degree to which a dog must 
possess cognitive plasticity (be adaptive and flexible in his 
behaviour) depends on the varieties of challenges that he is likely 
to encounter in his environment. 
 
On this point, Kim Sterelny writes ‘animal agents would be 
rational [by Kacelnik’s B-rationality theory] to the extent that their 
capacity to choose the optimal action in their situation was not 
subverted by constraints on their capacity to access and use the 
information. So understood, rationality would be an aspect of 
optimal design’ (Sterelny, 2006, p.302). And I agree, because 
Kacelnik’s conception of rationality does not take into account the 
times when an animal must adapt to circumstances on the fly; his 
theory of B-rationality is limited and only applicable to those 
encounters with the environment which his ancestors have 
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encountered frequently and where relevant information is not hidden 
from the animal. Thus, there will be times when behaviours which 
have in the past been successful, will not be applicable to the 
situation at hand. In these cases, the rational course of action is one 
which is adaptive in this novel situation and can be facilitated by the 
use of embodied representations. 
 
7.6 Summary 
 
In summary, rationality, I argue, ought to be grounded not just 
in processes that have in the past been successful for a non-
human animal, but also within the plasticity of an agent’s cognitive 
processes that enable him to successfully adapt to the 
environment even at times when crucial information is difficult to 
obtain and an agent must, if he is to be successful, think on his 
feet. In other words, we ought to partly tie our conception of 
rationality to the idea that rationality is grounded in the flexibility of 
an agent’s cognitive processes that enable him to successfully 
adapt to the environment even at times when relevant 
environmental information is hard to come by or costly. Rational 
behaviour can result from these flexible cognitive processes when 
it maximises his adaptive fitness. Embodied representations, as I 
have argued already in this thesis, can underpin flexible cognitive 
processing. They can enable a non-human animal such as a dog 
to respond quickly and effectively to his environment. In short, 
embodied representations assist the formulation of rational 
behaviour in dogs and other non-human animals. 
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Rationality for the non-human animal is behaviour which 
maximises the non-human animal agent’s chances of success in his 
or her environment. This behaviour can be the result of flexible 
cognitive processes or the result of reliable processes which have in 
the past been successful. For those, like me, who adopt embodied 
cognition, the environment plays an active role in shaping an agent’s 
cognitive processes. On Hurley and Kacelnik’s account, cognitive 
processes that reliably lead to fitness maximising behaviour are 
rational processes and are predetermined by evolution. But as 
argued in the previous section, this conception of rational processes 
is as limited as if we were to accept only the internalist version (I.e. 
Kacelnik’s PP-rationality). 
 
The environment, the non-neural body and the brain all 
interact to produce reliable cognitive processes that inform 
rational action. Constantly, relevant aspects of the 
environment affect the agent’s behaviour and brain and vice 
versa in a continuous feedback loop. Because of these 
interactions with the environment, there is also a great degree 
of plasticity in an agent’s cognitive processes. Once we 
recognise the large part that the environment plays in shaping 
an agent’s cognitive processes we can recognise that there is 
some degree of cognitive flexibility available to every agent 
interacting in the world. It is this cognitive flexibility that 
facilitates successful (fitness maximising) behaviour even in 
novel and/or hostile environments for which evolution cannot 
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have kitted out the agent. Thus rational behaviour in novel 
situations can arise from these flexible cognitive processes. 
This thought is at the heart of embodied cognition theorist 
John Haugeland’s remark: 
 
A sophisticated system (organism) designed (evolved) to 
maximise some end (such as survival) must in general adjust its 
behaviour to specific features, structures, or configurations of its 
environment in ways that could not have been fully prearranged 
in its design (Haugeland as cited in Clark, 2008, p.150). 
 
Thus, taking an embodied approach to the study of non-human 
animal cognition allows us to see more clearly how rationality might 
be more liberally characterised to include the notions that rational 
behaviours result from reliable processes and that rationality can 
also be grounded in the flexibility of an agent’s cognitive processes 
which enable him to successfully adapt to the environment even at 
times when relevant environmental information is hard to come by 
or costly. Such reliable processes include the mechanisms which 
involve embodied representations such as we have seen in Clark 
and Grush’s emulation theory of representation and in Rowlands’ 
representational actions. 
 
I began this chapter with two questions: 
 
1)  Given our embodied cognition approach, under what 
conditions are the dog’s actions rational? 
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2)  And how does the dog fix upon rational course of action? 
 
I then stated that I would answer them this way: 
 
1)  A dog’s actions are rational (it makes sense to perform 
them in a particular circumstance) when they enable him 
to successfully adapt to the environment even at times 
when relevant environmental information is absent or hard 
to come by, or when the situation is novel. 
2)  The dog decides upon a rational course of action by 
employing processes that have in the past proved reliable in 
leading to successful and/or fitness maximising) behaviours 
in the current situation. Or, if processes that have in the past 
reliably lead to fitness maximising actions fail in a novel 
situation, a rational course of action is one which is adaptive 
in this novel situation. 
 
Answer 1) gives an account of behavioural rationality.  That is, it 
states under what conditions a dog’s behaviours are rational. 
Answer 2) then claims that rational processes are those that reliably 
produce successful behaviour in the current situation, or are those 
adaptive behaviours which arise from flexible cognitive processing in 
novel situations. Moreover, embodied representations enable the 
dog to produce successful responses to his environment and are 
foundational to rational behaviour in dogs. 
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The conception of rationality which I have argued for above 
applies to both human and non-human animals. One of its 
strongest features is that it can cope with situation specific types of 
rationality that dogs and other non-human animals display. For 
example, a primate might behave in particular ways in certain 
contexts that she cannot generalize to logically similar contexts. 
Hurley asks us to suppose a monkey observes that another fellow 
monkey ‘a’ is dominant over monkey ‘b’. She also recognises that 
‘b’ is dominant over ‘c’. Although she has never observed ‘a’ and ‘c’ 
together, she can realise that ‘a’ is dominant over ‘c’ and is able to 
use this information toward various ends (Hurley, 2006).  ‘The 
ability to reason in this way in such a situation is not generalisable, 
however. For the monkey, while able to make transitive inferences 
in this context may not be able to in a foraging situation’ (Hurley, 
2006, p.150). In other words, practical knowledge of how to 
complete tasks may be tied to specific situations. It is likely that the 
domestic dog occupies islands of practical rationality, and it is 
important that our notion of non-human animal rationality 
incorporates this.  
We should expect rational actions and the rational processes by 
which the dog fixes upon the rational action to be tied to specific 
situations and not generalisable. For example, the processes that 
reliably lead to a dog’s success in a training task (such as coming 
back to a call) may not work when the situation is altered but the 
task has remained the same. 
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In conclusion, I have argued that we ought to be more liberal in 
our accounts of rationality and accept that rational processes are 
flexible and adaptive cognitive processes. They can also be those 
that reliably lead to rational behaviour in the agent’s environment. 
 In short, rational behaviour in the non-human animal is 
behaviour that maximises fitness or is successful in achieving the 
agent’s goals and embodied representations play a large role in the 
production of such behaviour. 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation applied the embodied cognition framework to 
the study of domesticated dogs. I have argued that embodied 
cognition may be particularly valuable in the postulation of 
representation use in dogs. Embodied representations can help us 
to explain and understand certain behaviours and cognitive skills 
that we see in domesticated dogs. As mentioned at the outset, 
representation use by non-human animals is much discussed, but 
a clear and useful formulation of the nature of these 
representations was needed. I have outlined two main accounts of 
representation from within embodied cognition and argued that 
their application to the study of dogs is worthwhile. Their value lies 
in the provision of guiding principles which can positively impact on 
how we understand, study, and train dogs in their various walks of 
life. 
The application of embodied cognition and embodied 
representations to behaviour and cognition in dogs can also shed 
new light on some of the conclusions drawn in the experimental 
studies. When applied to empirical research, the embodied cognition 
paradigm can also guide the formulation of the questions we ought 
to be asking. For example, rather than ask ‘can dogs count?’ we 
might instead examine situations in which an assessment of number 
may be advantageous to the dog and ask ‘what are the affordances 
open to the dog in situations where he faces, for example, a larger 
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group versus a small one’? Then, ‘What guides his rational 
behaviour in each situation?’ Embodied representations can 
facilitate the flexible use of information enabling the dog to produce 
successful, adaptive and rational behaviours even at times when the 
dog is facing a novel challenge and is under significant time 
pressure. 
 
Final comments 
 
This dissertation hopefully provides a useful resource for 
researchers in dog cognition to focus on the dynamic interplay 
between the dog, his peers, environment and human counterparts. 
In addition, the findings of this study can enhance experimental 
design and inform the conclusions that we draw from empirical data 
regarding dogs’ cognitive capacities and behaviour. I support 
studies with an ethological focus, designed for dogs rather than 
humans. I also make the case for a greater emphasis on the role of 
actions and the environment in the study dog cognition. 
Moreover, I have argued that the adoption of two models of 
embodied representation can enlighten future research into dog 
cognition. In contrast to abstract theories of representation, we can 
see embodied representations come to life in dogs’ daily interactions 
with their surroundings.  Embodied representations can also 
underpin an account of rationality for non-human animals such as 
dogs. 
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As rational beings, dogs are ends in themselves, with intrinsic 
value that deserve respect and kindness on this basis. This thesis 
has opened up a new alternative to the idea that dog behaviour is 
the outcome of sub- personal conditioned responses. Instead their 
responses can be seen as the rational actions of an agent adapting 
to her environment. 
In conclusion, this dissertation sprang from the need for a fresh 
approach to the study of dog cognition. Recent years have seen an 
increase in the number of studies on dogs, and this is a worthwhile 
endeavour. Dogs occupy a unique position in the animal kingdom 
and their long-standing close association with humans makes this 
species a fascinating and ideal subject to which we can apply the 
principles of embodied cognition in our efforts to understand them 
further. 
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